The current phase of fighting in the Middle East began almost a 12 months ago, on October 7, 2023, with a Hamas attack and a subsequent massive Israeli attack on Gaza. But so as to many scientists, foreign policy experts AND international observersWhat is going on can be the latest episode in a conflict that has been happening for many years. commonly referred to as “Arab-Israeli conflict.”

The experiences of the last 11 months have led many experts in the region I would love to reassess the term. Is “Arab-Israeli conflict” an accurate reflection, on condition that the energetic participants aren’t any longer just Arabs and Israelis? Should we abandon the term for good now that the conflict has expanded to include the United States and Iran—and potentially Turkey and others in the years to come?

How it began

The Arab-Israeli conflict began after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1922 in what’s now Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories, which were then Mandate of Palestine under British ruleOccasional disputes over land ownership have led to violence between the Jewish and Palestinian communities.

When Israel declared independence in 1948the conflict became an interstate war between Israel and a number of other Arab countries – Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. Hence it was called Arab-Israeli War each by the media and the political leaders of the time.

This name remained relevant for several many years, as the geopolitical and geographical conflict was limited to the Arab countries and Israel.

After the initial War 1948unresolved conflict led to several other wars between Israel and the Arab countries. Some oil-exporting Arab countries, comparable to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, also got involved not directly by providing financial support to the Arab states on the front lines and oil embargoes were announced against the West during the wars of 1967 and 1973.

Iraq was also directly affected by this protracted conflict in the Eighties when Israel destroyed its nuclear facilities. Iraq then repeatedly attacked Israel with missiles in 1991 during The First Gulf War.

Beyond the Arab World

The term “Arab-Israeli conflict” is just not used as often today, but it surely continues to be widely used, including by United Nationsthis United States Government, media points and lots of scholars from this region.

The use of the term “Arab-Israeli conflict” has declined lately

However, the reference to the “Arab-Israeli conflict” obscures the energetic role of several other participants, especially in recent many years.

American diplomatic support for Israel began with President Harry Truman’s decision to be the first to recognize the recent state in May 1948. In the Sixties, one other decision followed: increase in US military and financial support during Lyndon Johnson’s presidency.

There have also been significant arms transfers from the United States to Israel occurred in September 1970, when at President Richard Nixon’s RequestIsrael he mobilized his forces to save King Hussein of Jordan with the Palestinian rebellion supported by Syrian forces.

In subsequent many years, nevertheless, the U.S. role expanded to include direct involvement in air defense operations against missile and drone attacks on Israel. For example, U.S. Army air defense units were used to defend Israel against Iraqi Rocket Attacks already in the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991.

The US involvement has been visible since the October 7 attacks. In the months following the attacks, the US conducted operations against missile and drone attacks launched at Israel by Houthis in Yemen and thru Iran.

By all accounts, US military support for Israel played a key role in its Military advantage over its neighbors. Therefore, for my part, an appropriate name for the broader conflict should reflect this energetic U.S. participation.

On the “Arab” side of the conflict, Israel’s opponents aren’t any longer limited to Arab countries. Iran is now energetic participantTehran not only provides military support to groups hostile to Israel, including Hamas, the Houthis, and Hezbollah, but has also engaged in direct military operations with Israel during the ongoing war in the Gaza Strip.

In addition, Iran and Israel were involved in covert operations and cyber wars between them which have been happening for 15 years, which have intensified much more after the war between Israel and Hamas.

Risk of Turkish involvement?

And with no resolution to the current fighting in sight, the possibilities of the conflict escalating further shouldn’t be underestimated. Two possible scenarios that would escalate the conflict are a significant escalation between Israel and Iran, and energetic participation of Turkey.

Intense Israeli bombardment of Gaza and resulting high variety of casualties escalated tensions between Israel and Turkey. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and politicians from various Turkish political parties they were very loud in his criticism of Israeli military actions.

Public anger and anti-Israeli sentiment in Turkey have reached a high level, partly in consequence of the extensive coverage of the carnage and human suffering in Gaza. There is even a small possibility that unexpected eventcomparable to an Israeli navy encounter with a Turkish ship approaching Gaza to defy the Israeli naval blockade, could lead on to a military exchange between Turkey and Israel. While the likelihood of such an exchange stays low, a military escalation between Israel and Turkey may also be triggered according to some experts, in consequence of a significant Israeli operation in Lebanon.

MENA-ISRAM conflict?

Almost a 12 months into the latest phase of fighting in the Middle East, it has develop into clear that the label “Arab-Israeli conflict” now not reflects the facts on the ground. But “Israeli-Palestinian” or “Gaza-Israeli” fail to account for the growing number of nations which are collaborating—or an energetic role—in the fighting.

Indeed, during the current conflict in Gaza, people were killed in Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and IranSimilarly, the list of parties to the conflict includes Hamas and Israel, but in addition a number of Iranian-backed militias in the Middle East and Arabian Peninsula.

So where does this leave us?

A more accurate name for the ongoing hostilities can be to higher reflect all the major participants.

On one side, now we have several non-state actors and governments from across the Middle East and North Africa, or “MENA,” as the region is often called. On the other side, now we have Israel, which is heavily depending on the United States for its military prowess and protection, and the United States, which is fully committed to Israel’s security. I imagine that any name for the conflict should include the United States.

Therefore, for my part, it is best to call it the “MENA-ISRAME conflict” – during which “ISRAME” is formed by combining the first three letters of the words “Israel” and “America”.

I admit it’s kind of hard to pronounce and unlikely to catch on. Nevertheless, a reputation that reflects the larger group of participants in the Arab-Israeli conflict is required. It will raise awareness of the destruction, suffering and financial burden it has caused to all the countries involved throughout its existence.

This can increase the willingness of the international community, and particularly its energetic participants, to make greater efforts to find an answer that can put an end to the MENA-ISRAM conflict.

On August 27, Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, told newly elected President Masoud Pezeshkian and his cabinet that talking to the enemy could also be useful.

In a thinly veiled reference to Iran’s cooperation with the international community – and the United States specifically – Khamenei said Iran shouldn’t pin its hopes on such cooperation, but that that is no reason not to carry talks with the enemy.

It is that this green light that Pezeshkian must re-establish contact with the International Atomic Energy Agency and Western countries over Iran’s nuclear program, in addition to to check with international partners in regards to the growing tensions with Israel.

The statement appears to signal a desire to step back from the brink of all-out war with Israel over the difficulty. attempt Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh on Iranian soil in July and return to the mutual deterrence that has defined their relationship for years.

But that is probably not possible, given how much the region has modified over the past yr.

Crossing the edge in April

In April this yr, Israel attacked Iran embassy complex in Damascuskilling members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

This led to a fastidiously planned Iranian response. Iran couldn’t ignore the Israeli attack, which the authorities condemned as an attack on Iranian sovereign territory but didn’t wish to enter right into a war with Israel. As a result, Iran reportedly gave advance warning his upcoming replywhich allowed Israel and its allies to shoot down many of the greater than 300 missiles and drones fired from Iran.

That response was seen as a victory in Iran, nonetheless, since it demonstrated its technological ability to achieve Israel. It also marked a shift away from Iran’s default position of speaking tough but not engaging in direct confrontation.

Iran clearly crossed a line in April but seems very concerned about the implications.

Then on July 31, Haniyeh was murdered during a visit to Iran. Although Israel has neither confirmed nor denied responsibility, that’s it was commonly believed be behind it.

This has put Iranian leaders in a difficult position. There have been calls from radicals for retaliation to revive Iran’s image as a rustic that may defend itself and avenge the killing of a detailed ally. Khamenei also he insisted Israel will probably be punished for its actions, however the timing of this can depend upon Iran’s decision.

It is evident that the Iranian leadership cannot afford to look weak and risk damaging its standing with its allies and proxies within the region, which include Hamas, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthi rebels in Yemen and other Shiite militant groups in Iraq and Syria. But there are other considerations weighing heavily on their minds.

Legitimization Crisis

A direct response to Israel could open a Pandora’s box. It would pave the best way for further direct attacks by Israel, even perhaps targeted assassinations of Iranian leaders.

It is an actual possibility. Israel has demonstrated its willingness to reply to any threat with force under the guise of self-defense. It has also demonstrated its ability to conduct precision strikes in Iran, resembling its retaliatory attack within the radar system in the town of Isfahan following an Iranian missile and drone attack in April.

Moreover, such escalation carries an actual risk of drawing the United States into the conflict.

The Iranian leadership has made a high-quality art of balancing on the sting of risk. Anti-Americanism is ingrained within the political discourse of the political elite and frames Iranian foreign policy. But Iran has thus far avoided war with the United States since it could jeopardize the whole lot.

The reason: Iran’s leaders are already concerned about their political future, and a conflict with Israel and the US could seriously aggravate the situation.

There is currently a big disconnect between large segments of society and the ruling regime. Two years ago, Iran was shaken by spontaneous mass anti-regime protests under the slogan “Woman, Life, Freedom“They began in response to death Mahsa Amini arrested for improperly wearing the hijab, however it soon was an anti-establishment riot that called for the “fall of the dictatorship” and an end to the Islamic regime. The riot was suppressed by force, arbitrary detentions and executions.

The death of President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in May of this yr gave the ruling regime a possibility to reconcile with reformist critics. Pezeshkian, a reformist lawmaker, was vetted and approved to run within the election selection replace Raisi with the intention of accelerating voter turnout. Iran supreme leader has repeatedly stressed that voter turnout is an indicator of the regime’s legitimacy.

But Participation rate in the primary round of elections it was only 39.9% – the bottom end in the history of presidential elections in Iran – and only achieved 49.8% within the last round. This indicates the depth of the general public’s disillusionment with the political system. Many reformers boycotted the elections and dismissed them as a farce and a smokescreen for the ruling regime.

Iran’s legitimacy crisis has peaked, leaving it vulnerable to a different explosion. A war with Israel or the United States could ignite this may of powder.

Potential solution for Iran?

The Iranian leadership is subsequently facing a dilemma. It cannot withdraw from its anti-Israeli and anti-American rhetoric. Tehran has built its foreign policy and created an enormous network on its basis, the so-called Axis of Resistance. It cannot betray this pillar of its identity.

But acting on this basis would have put the regime’s survival in danger. So the leadership sought an increasingly difficult balance.

The recent exchange of fireplace between Hezbollah and Israel could have been a response. By supporting Hezbollah, Iran can claim to have hurt Israel without striking back.

The goal is to revive the establishment that existed before April. This strategy involves delegating fighting to Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies to be able to protect the ruling regime from direct confrontation and prevent an existential threat to the leaders’ rule.

But that could be wishful pondering. The strategy could give Israel the justification it must strike Iranian targets again. And that, in turn, could function a spark for pent-up public frustration with the brutality of the ruling regime.

King Salman of Saudi Arabia issued a royal order on August 8, which allowed a government meeting to be convened in his absence and that of Prime Minister and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

The meeting will probably be chaired by the most senior Cabinet member from amongst the descendants of King Abdulaziz Al-Saud, the founding father of the Saudi state as we realize it today.

The royal order is a politically significant event. Since Mohammed bin Salman was elevated to the position of crown prince in 2017 after which prime minister five years later, the administratively and politically critical positions of deputy crown prince and deputy prime minister have remained vacant.

The vacancies have made it difficult to discover the third most influential person in the Saudi decision-making structure and to take a position about possible candidates.

The dynamics of decision-making in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have long been a complicated matter. King Saud, the eldest son and successor of Abdul Aziz, was forced to abdicate in 1964 after mutual agreement between the Saudi royal family and the religious elite.

His trying The centralization of power in the hands of his own sons, volatility in spending, and dangerous foreign policy actions forced Saud’s half-brother and heir to the throne, Faisal, to form a family coalition to confront him and take away him from power.

Faisal became king after Saud’s removal and introduced a new system of government in which power was distributed amongst the various sons of Abdul Aziz who had participated in his coup. The aim was to avoid the concentration of power in one subsection of the family.

This horizontal division of power has led to the creation of institutional culture of feudalismEach prince in charge of a government department or organisation treated it as his personal fiefdom and used it to extend his political influence by cultivating a network of patronage.

This steadily established a hierarchy of power inside the Saudi royal family. A gaggle of greater than 30 half-brothers emerged below the king and the crown prince, who were considered as future candidates to the throne of Saudi Arabia as a result of seniority, mother’s ancestry and the political significance of the institutional properties they control.

Against this backdrop, the appointment of Prince Fahd as Second Deputy Prime Minister (the Crown Prince is normally the First Deputy) of the Kingdom in 1967 was a significant event. At the time, there was no official position of Deputy Crown Prince and subsequently no formal entry into the line of succession.

But Fahd’s position as Minister of Interior, and the eldest of Abdul Aziz’s seven sons with Hussa Bint Ahmed Al Sudairi, he cemented his path to the throne. Fahd became king in 1982 following the death of his older half-brother and reigning king, Khalid.

This dynamic dictated the appointment of successive second deputy prime ministers. They were either part of a strong group of brothers, as was the case Sudairi sevenor were supported by the reigning king, influential family groups or held key positions.

An example is Prince Abdullah, who was appointed second deputy prime minister in 1975. Abdullah, who was one of Faisal’s allies in the coup against Saud, had commanded the Saudi National Guard since 1962. He also had maternity links to the powerful Shammar tribe, which in the past was a political enemy of the Saudi royal family.

Abdullah became king in 2005 after Fahd’s death, and nine years later appointed one other half-brother, Prince Muqrin, as deputy crown prince, thus initiating a new formal position in the royal line of succession. Like his predecessors, Muqrin held an influential position as head of intelligence – although his appointment was mainly as a result of his closeness to the king.

But when Abdullah died in 2015, the decades-old dynamic in which political positions became a means of competition between half-brothers and their allies modified completely. Salman took the throne and inside two years had REMOVED two more heirs to the throne and he promoted his own sonMohammed, for this position.

In the meantime, Salman and his son managed erase political influence powerful princes and royal factions through administrative changes and an anti-corruption campaign.

All the King’s Men

In this new system, power became the exclusive prerogative of the king and his son. This has transformed the position of the king of Saudi Arabia, from first amongst equals (primus inter pares) to supreme ruler (ultimum imperium).

However, the recent decision to permit Abd al-Aziz’s eldest descendants to chair Cabinet meetings provides us with a glimpse into the current hierarchy of royal power below the king and crown prince.

This the two oldest members of the royal family The cabinet, Prince Mansour bin Miteb and Prince Abdul Aziz bin Salman (one of King Salman’s sons), are each significantly older than the crown prince himself. This means they’re unlikely to be future candidates for the position of deputy crown prince.

So the real candidates are the five remaining young members of the royal family who hold key positions in the government. With the exception of Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman (who’s one of King Salman’s youngest sons), none of these cabinet members inherited their ministry directly or not directly from their fathers.

The hierarchy of power inside the royal family has modified. The personal relationship and closeness between a particular individual and the King and Crown Prince increasingly dictates their place in the hierarchy of the kingdom.