1. What prompted Israel to launch an attack on the Iranian embassy in Damascus? Are they not busy enough in Gaza without the prospect of opening one other front in the conflict?
For over a decade, Israel has been attacking the positions of Iran, a vital supporter of the Assad regime in the internal conflict in Syria. They periodically struck Iranian and Assad positions to disrupt the transfer of weapons and missiles to Lebanon’s Hezbollah, an Islamist militant organization.
After entering the war with Hamas on October 7, Israel moved from ammunition attacks to targeted killings of senior Iranian officers. Iran’s top commander in Syria was Sayyed Razi Mousavi killed December 25 and other commanders – including the head of Iranian intelligence (Sadegh Omidzadeh) and the deputy intelligence chief (Hajj Gholam) – were killed in Damascus in subsequent attacks.
The assassination of General Mohammad Reza Zahedi, commander of the Quds Force overseeing Syria and Lebanon, and six other staff members on April 1 was due to this fact not without precedent. The location was characteristic: the first Israeli attack on the Iranian diplomatic complex.
2: Iran’s leaders are known for issuing blood-curdling statements – but are Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s threats aimed more at a domestic audience and geared toward strengthening his leadership in the region?
The threats from Khamenei, the Revolutionary Guard, and other Iranian officials represent a significant projection of their image of strength to audiences each at home and abroad, designed to cover up the reality of the regime’s weakness.
But rhetoric will not be motion. When Iran tried the latter in January, it was hit in the nose. Escalating attacks by Iranian-led militias in Syria and Iraq on bases with US personnel were stopped by retaliatory US airstrikes. And a missile display across the Pakistani border backfired as Pakistan fired its own salvo into southeastern Iran.
3. The US and Israel probably know all about this. How seriously do they take this threat? Are we receiving any suggestions from US or Israeli intelligence agencies?
Any threat from Iran have to be taken seriously, given the possibility of attacks via its army, proxies and allies. Both the US and Israel have long had contingency plans in place.
The difference in recent days has been the publicity of the threat posed by the US and Israeli governments. This is a display intended to pre-empt or deter the Iranian regime.
Tehran reinforced the need for this display when it miscalculated with a blatant lie. Iranian officials said the United States had asked them to not attack American personnel, suggesting Washington would relent if Israel was the goal. This has raised the stakes for the United States, including for President Joe Biden confirm “iron” support for Israel.
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4. Let’s assume Khamenei means what he says and Iran is planning something big. What options does Tehran have?
Iran has the possibility of a direct missile attack on Israel. However, this may inevitably result in Israeli and American attacks on Iranian territory – a trade in which Tehran would have the advantage.
Theoretically, Hezbollah could launch this attack in the air and on the ground on the Israeli-Lebanese border. However, the Lebanese group, having been fighting with the Israelis since October, doesn’t need to escalate the confrontation in which it could suffer serious damage.
Iran could return to encouraging militia attacks on Americans in Syria and Iraq. However, this may be dangerous given the U.S. readiness – already displayed in January – hit the militia hard. China could stop escalating attacks by Yemen’s Houthi insurgents on shipping in the Red Sea, which warned effects on its economy.
Tehran complied computer attacks in the past to entities in the US and Israel. While they’ve had some success, they’re unlikely to cause widespread disruption to U.S. and Israeli systems – each of which have cyberwarfare capabilities that they’ve used against Iran in the past.
5. What do you’re thinking that is the most definitely final result in the short to medium term if an attack on Israel fails?
Shortly after October 7, the Iranian regime assessed that its advantage over Israel lay in the political and diplomatic spheres. It could present itself, alongside Gaza civilians, as a victim of Israeli and US aggression.
These tactics have been stepped up since the attack on the Iranian consulate constructing on April 1. Being the supreme leader he said this week that Israel “must be punished and it will be,” his specific appeal was to Muslim countries to chop economic and political ties with Israelis. The Iranian state and semi-official media – contrary to headlines in Western media – recommend patience with Tehran’s response.
A brief-term Iranian military response retaliating against Tehran would likely undermine this political and diplomatic approach. So the long-term tactic is to try to construct Iran’s connections with other countries in the region and beyond, while attempting to disrupt Israel’s own connections. This would result in a victory in burying the “normalization” between Israel and Arab countries that has been a central element of the Biden administration’s Middle East strategy.