From the start economic crisis in 2019Lebanon has been grappling with a cascade of significant challenges which have drastically modified the day by day lives of its residents. The crisis, triggered by a mixture of economic mismanagement, political corruption, and an unstable regional environment, has led to unprecedented levels of inflation, a drastic devaluation of the Lebanese pound, and a pointy decline within the purchasing power of its population. Daily life has develop into a struggle for a lot of, with basic necessities akin to food, fuel, and medicine becoming increasingly scarce and unattainable.

Contrary winds

The situation was further exacerbated by the prospect of war with Israel, which fueled instability and uncertainty but didn’t discourage domestic and foreign investment. In addition, the devastating explosion on the Beirut port in August 2020 dealt a devastating blow to the economy, destroying much of town’s infrastructure, displacing 1000’s of residents and causing billions of dollars in losses. The explosion also destroyed public trust in the federal government, which was already at low levels because of the ongoing financial crisis.

…and unexpected profits

Yet within the face of those challenges, the Lebanese economy has shown remarkable resilience. published by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) provide compelling evidence of this resilience, evident in the numerous increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into Lebanon.

Foreign direct investment (FDI) refers to an investment made by an organization or individual from one country right into a business interest positioned abroad. Unlike portfolio investment (akin to stocks or bonds), FDI typically involves acquiring an enduring interest in a foreign business, akin to purchasing a major stake or organising operations akin to factories or offices. This sort of investment is meant to achieve direct control or influence over the operations of a foreign business, often resulting in job creation, technology transfer, and economic growth within the host country. In easy terms, FDI is when a foreign entity invests money to assist develop or expand a business abroad.

According to the report, net foreign direct investment inflows into Lebanon increased by 25% in 2023, reaching $582 million, in comparison with $461 million in 2022. This increase demonstrates Lebanon’s continued attractiveness as a fertile ground for entrepreneurship and investment, particularly within the context of small-scale industries and digital services.

Supporting small industries

Lebanon’s ability to extend the country’s investment attractiveness despite ongoing economic problems will be explained by several aspects.

The country’s entrepreneurial spirit is considered one of its most significant. Known for its dynamic and progressive culture, Lebanese entrepreneurs have been capable of generate significant economic activity and attract international investors – evidence of their confidence in Lebanon’s growth potential even in difficult times.

Another key factor is the lively role of the Lebanese diaspora. Many successful Lebanese expatriates reinvest of their homeland, particularly in smaller-scale industries, typically with limited capital, fewer staff, and native or area of interest markets. These industries include artisanal food and goods production, handicrafts, tech startups and digital services, eco-tourism and hospitality, and renewable energy. These areas are seeing significant investment because of lower capital requirements and high growth prospects. The link between expatriates and domestic economic activity creates a continuous flow of capital, know-how, and market connections.

Small industries and digital services have also emerged as leading sectors in Lebanon’s economic recovery, attracting significant foreign investment because of their adaptability and innovation. Small industries profit from Lebanon’s expert workforce and strategic location, while digital services thrive on the country’s high web penetration, estimated to 93% in 2024

This indicates that the amount of inward FDI into Lebanon increased by 24% in 2023, reaching roughly USD 655 million, in comparison with USD 527 million in 2022. This figure represents roughly 0.86% of the whole inward FDI within the West Asia and North Africa (WANA) region and 0.05% of the worldwide inward FDI.

This increase stands out particularly within the context of the worldwide decline in foreign direct investment (FDI), which decreased by 2% in 2023, reaching a complete of about USD 1.33 trillion in comparison with about USD 1.36 trillion in 2022. The decline in global FDI underlines the importance of Lebanon’s performance, pointing to its ability to draw investment even within the face of contraction in global investment flows.

Lebanon’s Appeal

The surprising growth in FDI in Lebanon is because of several key aspects. Government efforts to draw investors are among the many important ones, with various reforms aimed toward improving the business environment. These include improvements to the regulatory framework and incentives aimed toward making Lebanon a more attractive place for foreign investors.

Lebanon’s location is after all one other key factor. Situated on the crossroads of Europe, Asia and Africa, the country offers firms the chance to ascertain a presence in Syria’s fertile crescent.

In addition, Lebanon highly educated and multilingual staff increases the country’s investment attractiveness. The country’s universities and academic institutions proceed to supply graduates with the talents needed to thrive in today’s economy.

Finally, Lebanon’s wealthy cultural heritage and historical links with various regions world wide may explain its appeal as an investment destination. These long-standing links facilitate strong international partnerships and cooperation.

As Lebanon charts a course for recovery, continued support and confidence from international investors shall be crucial. The growing inflow of foreign direct investment not only demonstrates the country’s economic resilience, but in addition provides a foundation for sustainable growth and development within the years to return. However, it will be important to do not forget that the economic situation in Lebanon can be linked to the geopolitical situation within the Middle East.

Law on the Protection of Civilians in Syria

The effects of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, commonly generally known as the Caesar Act, are US law passed December 2019The Caesar Act imposes sweeping sanctions on the Syrian government, in addition to any individuals or entities that support the regime, akin to foreign firms, financial institutions, and government officials. The act also targets sectors key to the Syrian economy, including construction, energy, and finance.

The Caesar Act has had serious, disastrous repercussions for Lebanon’s economy, which is closely tied to Syria’s economy. The sanctions restrict Lebanese firms from engaging in trade or financial transactions with Syrian entities, resulting in reduced trade, disruption of supply chains, and increased economic uncertainty. Given Lebanon’s geographic proximity and historical economic ties to Syria, these sanctions have further strained Lebanon’s economy, which is already battling its own financial crisis.

Lebanon’s ability to draw and retain foreign direct investment despite its difficult economic situation underlines the country’s potential and ongoing efforts to make it a beautiful country for investors.

The current phase of fighting in the Middle East began almost a 12 months ago, on October 7, 2023, with a Hamas attack and a subsequent massive Israeli attack on Gaza. But so as to many scientists, foreign policy experts AND international observersWhat is going on can be the latest episode in a conflict that has been happening for many years. commonly referred to as “Arab-Israeli conflict.”

The experiences of the last 11 months have led many experts in the region I would love to reassess the term. Is “Arab-Israeli conflict” an accurate reflection, on condition that the energetic participants aren’t any longer just Arabs and Israelis? Should we abandon the term for good now that the conflict has expanded to include the United States and Iran—and potentially Turkey and others in the years to come?

How it began

The Arab-Israeli conflict began after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1922 in what’s now Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories, which were then Mandate of Palestine under British ruleOccasional disputes over land ownership have led to violence between the Jewish and Palestinian communities.

When Israel declared independence in 1948the conflict became an interstate war between Israel and a number of other Arab countries – Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. Hence it was called Arab-Israeli War each by the media and the political leaders of the time.

This name remained relevant for several many years, as the geopolitical and geographical conflict was limited to the Arab countries and Israel.

After the initial War 1948unresolved conflict led to several other wars between Israel and the Arab countries. Some oil-exporting Arab countries, comparable to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, also got involved not directly by providing financial support to the Arab states on the front lines and oil embargoes were announced against the West during the wars of 1967 and 1973.

Iraq was also directly affected by this protracted conflict in the Eighties when Israel destroyed its nuclear facilities. Iraq then repeatedly attacked Israel with missiles in 1991 during The First Gulf War.

Beyond the Arab World

The term “Arab-Israeli conflict” is just not used as often today, but it surely continues to be widely used, including by United Nationsthis United States Government, media points and lots of scholars from this region.

The use of the term “Arab-Israeli conflict” has declined lately

However, the reference to the “Arab-Israeli conflict” obscures the energetic role of several other participants, especially in recent many years.

American diplomatic support for Israel began with President Harry Truman’s decision to be the first to recognize the recent state in May 1948. In the Sixties, one other decision followed: increase in US military and financial support during Lyndon Johnson’s presidency.

There have also been significant arms transfers from the United States to Israel occurred in September 1970, when at President Richard Nixon’s RequestIsrael he mobilized his forces to save King Hussein of Jordan with the Palestinian rebellion supported by Syrian forces.

In subsequent many years, nevertheless, the U.S. role expanded to include direct involvement in air defense operations against missile and drone attacks on Israel. For example, U.S. Army air defense units were used to defend Israel against Iraqi Rocket Attacks already in the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991.

The US involvement has been visible since the October 7 attacks. In the months following the attacks, the US conducted operations against missile and drone attacks launched at Israel by Houthis in Yemen and thru Iran.

By all accounts, US military support for Israel played a key role in its Military advantage over its neighbors. Therefore, for my part, an appropriate name for the broader conflict should reflect this energetic U.S. participation.

On the “Arab” side of the conflict, Israel’s opponents aren’t any longer limited to Arab countries. Iran is now energetic participantTehran not only provides military support to groups hostile to Israel, including Hamas, the Houthis, and Hezbollah, but has also engaged in direct military operations with Israel during the ongoing war in the Gaza Strip.

In addition, Iran and Israel were involved in covert operations and cyber wars between them which have been happening for 15 years, which have intensified much more after the war between Israel and Hamas.

Risk of Turkish involvement?

And with no resolution to the current fighting in sight, the possibilities of the conflict escalating further shouldn’t be underestimated. Two possible scenarios that would escalate the conflict are a significant escalation between Israel and Iran, and energetic participation of Turkey.

Intense Israeli bombardment of Gaza and resulting high variety of casualties escalated tensions between Israel and Turkey. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and politicians from various Turkish political parties they were very loud in his criticism of Israeli military actions.

Public anger and anti-Israeli sentiment in Turkey have reached a high level, partly in consequence of the extensive coverage of the carnage and human suffering in Gaza. There is even a small possibility that unexpected eventcomparable to an Israeli navy encounter with a Turkish ship approaching Gaza to defy the Israeli naval blockade, could lead on to a military exchange between Turkey and Israel. While the likelihood of such an exchange stays low, a military escalation between Israel and Turkey may also be triggered according to some experts, in consequence of a significant Israeli operation in Lebanon.

MENA-ISRAM conflict?

Almost a 12 months into the latest phase of fighting in the Middle East, it has develop into clear that the label “Arab-Israeli conflict” now not reflects the facts on the ground. But “Israeli-Palestinian” or “Gaza-Israeli” fail to account for the growing number of nations which are collaborating—or an energetic role—in the fighting.

Indeed, during the current conflict in Gaza, people were killed in Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and IranSimilarly, the list of parties to the conflict includes Hamas and Israel, but in addition a number of Iranian-backed militias in the Middle East and Arabian Peninsula.

So where does this leave us?

A more accurate name for the ongoing hostilities can be to higher reflect all the major participants.

On one side, now we have several non-state actors and governments from across the Middle East and North Africa, or “MENA,” as the region is often called. On the other side, now we have Israel, which is heavily depending on the United States for its military prowess and protection, and the United States, which is fully committed to Israel’s security. I imagine that any name for the conflict should include the United States.

Therefore, for my part, it is best to call it the “MENA-ISRAME conflict” – during which “ISRAME” is formed by combining the first three letters of the words “Israel” and “America”.

I admit it’s kind of hard to pronounce and unlikely to catch on. Nevertheless, a reputation that reflects the larger group of participants in the Arab-Israeli conflict is required. It will raise awareness of the destruction, suffering and financial burden it has caused to all the countries involved throughout its existence.

This can increase the willingness of the international community, and particularly its energetic participants, to make greater efforts to find an answer that can put an end to the MENA-ISRAM conflict.

On August 27, Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, told newly elected President Masoud Pezeshkian and his cabinet that talking to the enemy could also be useful.

In a thinly veiled reference to Iran’s cooperation with the international community – and the United States specifically – Khamenei said Iran shouldn’t pin its hopes on such cooperation, but that that is no reason not to carry talks with the enemy.

It is that this green light that Pezeshkian must re-establish contact with the International Atomic Energy Agency and Western countries over Iran’s nuclear program, in addition to to check with international partners in regards to the growing tensions with Israel.

The statement appears to signal a desire to step back from the brink of all-out war with Israel over the difficulty. attempt Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh on Iranian soil in July and return to the mutual deterrence that has defined their relationship for years.

But that is probably not possible, given how much the region has modified over the past yr.

Crossing the edge in April

In April this yr, Israel attacked Iran embassy complex in Damascuskilling members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

This led to a fastidiously planned Iranian response. Iran couldn’t ignore the Israeli attack, which the authorities condemned as an attack on Iranian sovereign territory but didn’t wish to enter right into a war with Israel. As a result, Iran reportedly gave advance warning his upcoming replywhich allowed Israel and its allies to shoot down many of the greater than 300 missiles and drones fired from Iran.

That response was seen as a victory in Iran, nonetheless, since it demonstrated its technological ability to achieve Israel. It also marked a shift away from Iran’s default position of speaking tough but not engaging in direct confrontation.

Iran clearly crossed a line in April but seems very concerned about the implications.

Then on July 31, Haniyeh was murdered during a visit to Iran. Although Israel has neither confirmed nor denied responsibility, that’s it was commonly believed be behind it.

This has put Iranian leaders in a difficult position. There have been calls from radicals for retaliation to revive Iran’s image as a rustic that may defend itself and avenge the killing of a detailed ally. Khamenei also he insisted Israel will probably be punished for its actions, however the timing of this can depend upon Iran’s decision.

It is evident that the Iranian leadership cannot afford to look weak and risk damaging its standing with its allies and proxies within the region, which include Hamas, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthi rebels in Yemen and other Shiite militant groups in Iraq and Syria. But there are other considerations weighing heavily on their minds.

Legitimization Crisis

A direct response to Israel could open a Pandora’s box. It would pave the best way for further direct attacks by Israel, even perhaps targeted assassinations of Iranian leaders.

It is an actual possibility. Israel has demonstrated its willingness to reply to any threat with force under the guise of self-defense. It has also demonstrated its ability to conduct precision strikes in Iran, resembling its retaliatory attack within the radar system in the town of Isfahan following an Iranian missile and drone attack in April.

Moreover, such escalation carries an actual risk of drawing the United States into the conflict.

The Iranian leadership has made a high-quality art of balancing on the sting of risk. Anti-Americanism is ingrained within the political discourse of the political elite and frames Iranian foreign policy. But Iran has thus far avoided war with the United States since it could jeopardize the whole lot.

The reason: Iran’s leaders are already concerned about their political future, and a conflict with Israel and the US could seriously aggravate the situation.

There is currently a big disconnect between large segments of society and the ruling regime. Two years ago, Iran was shaken by spontaneous mass anti-regime protests under the slogan “Woman, Life, Freedom“They began in response to death Mahsa Amini arrested for improperly wearing the hijab, however it soon was an anti-establishment riot that called for the “fall of the dictatorship” and an end to the Islamic regime. The riot was suppressed by force, arbitrary detentions and executions.

The death of President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in May of this yr gave the ruling regime a possibility to reconcile with reformist critics. Pezeshkian, a reformist lawmaker, was vetted and approved to run within the election selection replace Raisi with the intention of accelerating voter turnout. Iran supreme leader has repeatedly stressed that voter turnout is an indicator of the regime’s legitimacy.

But Participation rate in the primary round of elections it was only 39.9% – the bottom end in the history of presidential elections in Iran – and only achieved 49.8% within the last round. This indicates the depth of the general public’s disillusionment with the political system. Many reformers boycotted the elections and dismissed them as a farce and a smokescreen for the ruling regime.

Iran’s legitimacy crisis has peaked, leaving it vulnerable to a different explosion. A war with Israel or the United States could ignite this may of powder.

Potential solution for Iran?

The Iranian leadership is subsequently facing a dilemma. It cannot withdraw from its anti-Israeli and anti-American rhetoric. Tehran has built its foreign policy and created an enormous network on its basis, the so-called Axis of Resistance. It cannot betray this pillar of its identity.

But acting on this basis would have put the regime’s survival in danger. So the leadership sought an increasingly difficult balance.

The recent exchange of fireplace between Hezbollah and Israel could have been a response. By supporting Hezbollah, Iran can claim to have hurt Israel without striking back.

The goal is to revive the establishment that existed before April. This strategy involves delegating fighting to Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies to be able to protect the ruling regime from direct confrontation and prevent an existential threat to the leaders’ rule.

But that could be wishful pondering. The strategy could give Israel the justification it must strike Iranian targets again. And that, in turn, could function a spark for pent-up public frustration with the brutality of the ruling regime.