The end of the crisis in Aleppo i Syrian ceasefire created an unlikely alliance. Relations between Russia, Turkey and Syria are crucial not just for the Middle East, but additionally for global geopolitics.
The leaders of all three countries – Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Bashar al-Assad – unexpectedly rose to prominence around the identical time, accompanied by a certain level of optimism. But over the past 16 years, they’ve joined a growing club of populist and authoritarian leaders.
Vladimir Putin first became president of Russia in 2000 – young, energetic and promising to lift Russia from the ashes of the fallen Soviet Union.
Erdogan rose to prominence in 2003 after a severe economic crisis elevated him to the position of prime minister of Turkey, carrying with him the hopes of the Turkish people. His first two terms of presidency were marked by attempts to affix the European Union, liberal reforms and economic growth.
Bashar al-Assad succeeded his dictatorial father in 2000. His older brother, who was expected to take over the presidency, died in a automobile accident in 1994. His youth and Western education seemed that he would make Syria more liberal and democratic. However, behind a friendly and liberal façade, Assad continued to run a police state.
During this time, Erdogan developed a private friendship with Assad. Erdogan invited him on vacation to Turkey, calling him “my brother Assad.”
By 2010, Turkey was heralded as a model country where democracy and Islam coexist. Encouraged by his political success and growing popularity within the Arab world, Erdogan began to indicate ambitions for leadership within the Muslim world. It began to emulate EU-style policies, establishing visa-free travel and economic partnerships with other Muslim countries, starting with Syria and Lebanon.
Between 2004 and 2011, Putin also intensified Russia’s relations with Syria at a vital moment through the invasion of Iraq by the United States and the international coalition. By 2011, Iraq was destabilized and polarized along Sunni-Shia sectarian lines.
Dissatisfied with growing U.S. and Western influence over Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, Putin increased Russia’s presence in Syria by developing and enlarging its naval base in Tartus and strengthened his ties with Assad.
Then he got here Arab Spring from 2011.
The strategy for Putin was clear: support the Assad regime and then challenge Western domination not only of the Middle East but additionally of the geopolitical world order. At the identical time, it could be a convenient distraction growing unrest and protests within the country and Russian aggression in places like Georgia.
During Civil war in SyriaPutin has grow to be the guardian of the Shiite alliance between Iran, Syria and Shiite political forces in Iraq and Lebanon.
For Erdogan, the Arab Spring meant an acceleration in his ambition to realize leadership within the Sunni world. His “brother Assad” became enemy primary because a possible Islamist takeover of Syria fit his leadership vision higher than the Shiite and secular nature of the Assad regime. Erdogan has actively supported plenty of Syrian opposition groups through his logistical presence in Turkey and constant flow of resources.
For Erdogan, being anti-Assad also meant being anti-Russian – until 4 of Erdogan’s ministers were hit serious corruption allegations in 2013. In response, Erdogan selected the trail of authoritarianism, purging and firing members of the police and judiciary liable for investigating corruption.
The narrative was easy: foreign powers (i.e. the West) didn’t want Turkey’s growing influence within the region, so that they cooperated with domestic forces to overthrow the federal government. Most importantly, this stance signaled Erdogan’s departure from the Western bloc.
Erdogan’s relationship with Putin reached a brand new low in 2015 when the Turkish military shot down a Russian fighter jet in Syria. Putin responded with economic sanctions and promoted an international offer label the Erdogan government as lively supporters of the Islamic State (IS).
However, an alliance with Russia was essential for Erdogan as he slowly left the Western bloc. In June 2016, Erdogan apologized to Putin and the 2 men quickly reached an agreement that included a partnership in managing the Syrian conflict.
Erdogan’s inconsistent foreign policy and growing authoritarianism have been met with aggression coup attempt in July 2016, Erdogan survived the ordeal and declared that it was “God’s gift” to cleanse the military and state of dissidents.
The result was the purge of hundreds of presidency staff, the seizure of billion-dollar businesses, and the imprisonment of greater than 120 journalists. That meant Türkiye jails more journalists than every other country.
Erdogan quickly dragged the Turkish army into the Syrian conflict, signaling that he was a player in Syria and the region. This was an unimaginable act without the Russian alliance. And an alliance with Putin in Syria means support for Assad when the boomerang in Erdogan’s relations returns to “my brother Assad” mode.
The fall of Aleppo and the ceasefire appear to be a victory for Putin, Erdogan and Assad, a minimum of within the short term. For Assad, just being on the international negotiating table is a victory. But even when he regains control over Syriacan have to fight an extended battle against the Islamic State, much like the continuing battles against the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Putin will use his growing influence within the Middle East to weaken Western political and economic influence within the world. He will use his relationship with Erdogan’s Turkey to weaken NATO and make it irrelevant in the brand new world order or the disorder of populist leaders.
Most interestingly, Erdogan will claim that because the Sunni representative of the three, he brought peace to Syria. His brave efforts change the structure of Turkey the introduction of an executive presidential system during a state of emergency can only be understood when it comes to his strong desire to guide the Muslim world. He wants uninterrupted rule without critical dissent and political challenges in order that he can direct all his energy towards the greater Middle East.
As IS leader Abu-Bakr Baghdadi’s caliphate concoction fades, the world could have to come back to terms with Erdogan’s caliphate in 2017, the five hundredth anniversary of the Ottoman takeover of the caliphate from Egypt in 1517.
If Erdogan takes this step, it’s going to throw the region and the world into uncharted territory.