Hamas will achieve this start the method soon to determine who will probably be the following head of the militant Palestinian organization after the October 16, 2024 killing of former leader Yahya Sinwar – but this task won’t be easy or quick.

What makes his alternative as chairman of Hamas’ political bureau difficult is that for the reason that October 7, 2023 attack – for which Sinwar was seen because the most important architect – Israel has killed many senior political and military leaders who could replace it or at least be tasked with determining the longer term direction of Hamas.

Just two months before Sinwar’s death, his predecessor in office, Ismail Haniyeh, was assassinated in Tehran, allegedly during an Israeli operation. Meanwhile, Hamas military chief Mohammed Deif was killed in July and Saleh Arouri, a senior Hamas official and Haniyeh’s deputy, was previously killed in a drone attack in Beirut.

as expert on Palestinian politicsI imagine that Sinwar’s death will leave a vacuum in Hamas that may likely last for many months, if not years. The query is whether or not the group will ultimately select a leader who will proceed Sinwar’s tough legacy or whether he’ll try to moderate Hamas’ approach.

Sinwar’s legacy

Sinwar’s uncompromising stance shaped not only Hamas but in addition the Palestinian cause.

Born and raised within the Gaza Khan Younis refugee camp, Sinwar joined Hamas within the early days of the organization, which was founded in 1987. he quickly rose through the ranks and he was responsible for it establishment of the Majd security agency within the military wing of Hamas responsible for detaining and executing Palestinian collaborators with Israel.

Sinwar admitted to Israeli interrogators that he killed and buried him 12 suspected of cooperation – which earned him a life sentence in an Israeli prison. He served 22 years before being released in 2011 as a part of a prisoner swap deal that also the discharge of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.

A number of years later, he reached the highest of Hamas, serving as chairman of the Hamas political bureau in Gaza from 2017. Following Haniyeh’s assassination in late July 2024, Sinwar assumed overall leadership.

Throughout, Sinwar has been a supporter of Hamas’s tough stance on Israel – an approach that has earned him respect inside the organization.

Less than a yr after taking power in Gaza, Sinwar endorsed “The Great March of Return and the Breaking of the Siege”March 2018 protests along the borders of Israel and Gaza. Demonstrations – during which Israeli troops shot dozens of Palestinian protesters – managed to galvanize international support for the Palestinian cause.

The protests might also have contributed to Israel’s decision in August this yr to allow Qatar to launch operations monthly payments within the hundreds of thousands of dollars to Hamas and Gaza in an attempt to defuse and de-escalate tensions.

Further concessions got here as Israel tried to please Sinwar and avoid further escalation of unrest in Gaza, including allowing staff from Gaza to work in Israel for the primary time since Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip in 2005.

However, Sinwar failed to persuade Israel to agree to the discharge of other Hamas members, whom he left in Israeli prisons and promised to get out. He repeatedly tried to reach an agreement regarding the bodies of two Israeli soldiers and two civiliansbut Israel was not interested. Probably the failure contributed to Hamas’ decision attack Israel on October 7, 2023

How Hamas responds to blows

The killing of Sinwar weakened Hamas, but Hamas as an idea and beliefs is more difficult to kill.

Israel knows this. In March 2004, an Israeli missile hit and killed him Founder of Hamas and spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin; a month later his successor Abdel Aziz Rantisi was also killed.

But these deaths haven’t weakened Hamas. On the contrary, the organization became more radical. Younger and more defiant leaders have taken over a company that has repeatedly fought against Israel since 2008, culminating within the October 7 attacks.

Hamas’ response to this double blow may provide insight into the present decision-making process.

Yassin’s assassination was a chance for Hamas to revise its military tactics against Israel – which at the time consisted mainly of suicide bombings against Israeli civilians.

Ultimately, nevertheless, Hamas vowed to proceed its brutal fight against Israel.

Moderation or radicalization?

Hamas finds itself at a crossroads again. He is weakened, alienated from moderate Arab rule and increasingly unpopular amongst Gazans.

But she remained defiant throughout the last yr of the conflict. Footage of injured Sinwar, fighting until the tip and attempting to shoot down an Israeli drone with a stick only enriched his legacy, making him a legend to many supporters.

The latest leadership could have to make a choice from continuing the radicalization represented by Sinwar or selecting moderation.

But Israel doesn’t make the latter option any easier.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s only offer to Hamas is complete give up – left no face-saving option for the group.

It subsequently seems likely that Hamas will determine to proceed the fight.

Therefore, one among the almost certainly candidates for the leadership of Hamas after Sinwar is Khalil al-HayyaPalestinian politician who has been vice-chairman of the Hamas political bureau since August 2024.

Al-Hayya is understood for his hawkish approach to the concept of ​​reconciliation between Hamas and the rival Palestinian group Fatah and his hawkish statements about Israel. After Sinwar’s death he promised to proceed the fight Israel, a sign that the spirit of Sinwar will proceed to guide the Palestinian resistance within the years to come.

His most important contender for the leadership role is Khaled Mashalwho was chairman of Hamas’s political bureau from 1996 to 2017 and currently serves as its chairman in exile.

Mashaal, who has a large network of regional and international allies, is taken into account a more moderate option. He was responsible for drafting 2017 Hamas Manifesto – seen as a departure from the sooner, more radical i blatantly anti-Semitic card from 1988.

Collective Leadership: Room for Maneuver?

However, a right away decision on who will take the leadership role mustn’t be expected. Hamas seems more willing collective leadership until the scheduled elections in March 2025, conditions permitting.

In the meantime, a five-member commission formed in August after Haniya’s murder will take over decision-making. The committee is tasked with “guiding the movement in times of war and exceptional circumstances, as well as its plans for the future”, and the brand new committee is empowered to “make strategic decisions”. according to Hamas sources who spoke to Agence France-Presse reporters.

This type of collective leadership would seemingly indicate that Hamas currently doesn’t see any single person as able to filling the vacuum left by Sinwar.

It would also give Hamas potentially greater room for maneuver in negotiations with Israel and regional actors, as some commission members are seen as acceptable faces for moderate Arab governments.

Collective leadership also provides Hamas with a survival mechanism, making it difficult for Israel to achieve the success it has to date achieved in assassinations of those named as Hamas “leaders.”

There is little doubt that Israel weakened Hamas with this strategy – especially the killing of Sinwar. And while the assassination of leading Hamas figures doesn’t mean a “total victory” over the group, as Israel wantsthe truth is, it makes it way more difficult for Hamas to select its next leader.

Politics and luck have allowed Europe to take a respite from the high gas prices reached between the winters of 2022 and 2023, but prices are rising again and the worldwide gas market stays precariously balanced.

Rising tensions within the Middle East could turn this the other way up. If the conflict spills over to the Persian Gulf, it could disrupt liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies from Qatar, which accounts for 20% of world exports.

We imagine that this winter shall be the ultimate act of the gas crisis. Here’s what we must always expect.

Dangerously underprepared

There is an argument for the UK to quickly phase out natural gas for heating and power generation overwhelming. This would ease household bills from costly gas imports and make the country less vulnerable to energy supply disruptions, while also reducing greenhouse gas emissions. This will take time to do: as of today, the UK is depending on gas 37% of total energy consumption.

British households particularly are dangerously exposed to gas prices. Directly, because 4 fifths of households use gas for space heating. Indirectly, because in Great Britain electricity prices are set by price of gas-fired generation. After a decade failed home insulation and energy efficiency policiesThe UK still has a number of the draftiest homes in Europe. It simply takes more energy to heat British homes which are losing heat thrice faster than European neighbors.

Since the start of the last crisis, the UK government has done little to alter these facts. There is recent concern over the top of the winter fuel payment for pensioners. The Energy Crisis Commission recently concluded that the UK stays “dangerously underprepared” for a repeat of the gas price explosion of 2022–2023.

To sum up, Great Britain cannot remain indifferent to the developments on the worldwide gas market.

Crisis within the making

Resurgent gas demand following the lifting of Covid-19 restrictions led to a four-fold increase in UK gas prices in 2021. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Vladimir Putin restricted gas gas exports via pipelines to Europe.

Europe has turned to its largest source of flexible gas supplies: marine LNG. There was a price competition for cargo. The purchasing power of European economies has diverted supplies from low-income Asian countries akin to Pakistan and Bangladesh, leading to debilitating blackouts ia switch to coal energy.

Energy bills for the typical UK household reached £4,279 in January 2023. The government protected consumers from the worst costs £51 billion in 2022-23but a mean household in 2022 it lost 8% of its budget on account of energy costsrising to 18% for the poorest tenth of households. About 2 million households using prepaid meters were cut off from their energy supplies at the very least once a month at the peak of the crisis.

Mild winters, moderate gas demand in Asia and effective measures to cut back gas demand in Europe have caused UK gas prices to fall from mid-2023. But they are still relatively high – at a level of 48% above the typical of the three years preceding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Another winter

Could the situation worsen? Already in 2022, experts were talking a couple of “three-winter crisis”, as significant recent LNG export capability (mainly within the US and Qatar) was not expected until 2025. This is true, and provide and demand in the worldwide LNG market remain tight.

A number of disturbances can upset this balance. The International Energy Agency expects global gas demand to grow throughout 2024 exceed the expansion rate of recent LNG supplies. Attacks by Houthi militia in Yemen on merchant ships within the Red Sea in response to Israel’s invasion of Gaza have resulted in a change in LNG transport routes. Cargo that will transit through the Suez Canal must now take an extended route across the Cape of Good Hope.

At the top of 2024, a vital five-year agreement regulating the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine will expire, and no prospects for renewal. Supplies of Russian gas to Europe will decline approximately 5% of total gas imports to the EUwhich accounts for 65% of total gas imports to Austria, Hungary and Slovakia.

Although Europe has been spared by mild winters over the past two years, this happiness may break in response to some forecasts in 2024-25. Temperature – and the warmth demand it generates – will likely determine winter gas prices in Europe.

Geopolitical response

How could the worst-case scenario of a conflict within the Persian Gulf come true?

The escalation of Israeli military attacks on Hezbollah since September 17 coincided with this event gas prices in Great Britain increase by 17%.. Following Iran’s missile and drone attacks on Israel on October 1, European gas prices reached a brand new high this yr. Thus, three LNG tankers headed to Asia change course mid-trip and go to Europe.

Israel announced revenge for the Iranian attack. After the destruction of Gaza and the beheading of Hezbollah’s leaders, and with the decisive material support of the United States, Israel can they now see Iran as defenseless.

A harsh Israeli response targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities or oil infrastructure would raise the stakes even further. Wanting to avoid direct conflict, Iran could select not to take care of Israel, but with the flow of oil and gas through the Strait of Hormuz, on which its Western backers depend. Qatar’s LNG supplies through the strait 20% of world supply alone.

Any disruption would also block Iran’s oil exports, affect Iran’s friends as much as its enemies, and kill Iran. current reconciliation with the Persian Gulf countries. This is unlikely, but one can hope that warning signs in the worldwide gas market will remind Western policymakers that the conflict within the Middle East may proceed to affect them.

The escalation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah since September 2024 and Israeli bombing of civilian areas across Lebanon have sparked deep conflict humanitarian disaster.

Mass displacement over 1 million peopleincluding Lebanese nationals, migrant employees AND Syrian AND Palestinian refugees, it has triggered a crisis in Lebanon. However, an equally significant phenomenon is happening beyond Lebanon’s southern border with Israel: movement people displaced from Lebanon to Syria.

Estimated 400,000 Lebanese and Syrians have reportedly fled to Syria as a result of overpopulation border crossings.

Not to be confused with back, this movement represents a reversal of the refugee flow after Syria descended into civil war in 2011. It can also be emblematic of a broader pattern of cyclical displacement crises in the region.

Complex and interconnected stories Lebanon and Syria – where each of them was at different times shelter for residents of the other side – challenge the easy binaries often related to the refugee experience.

The exchange of roles between Lebanon and Syria highlights not only the fragility of regional stability, but additionally the fluidity of displacement – ​​in addition to the deeper implications that cross-border movement has for the socio-political dynamics of each countries.

The story of mutual shelter

The relations between Lebanon and Syria has long been complex and oscillates between cooperation and tension. Despite Syria’s official withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 a long time as an occupying forcethe two countries remain connected as a result of shared borders, economic ties and security concerns. Collaboration exists in areas corresponding to tradebut there may be considerable tension, particularly with the presence of the over 1 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon.

However, in their modern history, one of the most enduring bonds has been their shared experiences of displacement and refuge, dating back to their origins Civil war in Lebanon. Between 1975 and 1990, hundreds of Lebanese fled to Syria to flee the sectarian conflict that engulfed their homeland.

However, the post-war period was marked by a change in the dynamics between the two countries. The 2005 withdrawal Syrian troops from Lebanon marked the starting of a brand new chapter in their relations.

Tensions rose as Lebanon tried to rebuild and assert its sovereignty after the law 30 years Syrian occupation. However, the trend of upheavals in the region soon led to a different role reversal a long time later, it was estimated 180,000 Lebanese he took it refuge in Syria while July War 2006.

With the arrival Civil war in Syria in 2011 it was Lebanon’s turn to function a refuge. Until 2015 1 million Syrians are fleeing violence made a visit to Lebanon.

Despite being one of 44 countries he never signed 1951 Refugee Convention. Lebanon is the country receiving the largest number of refugees refugees per capita globally.

Because Lebanon has not signed the convention, it doesn’t formally recognize refugee status, which it says gives the country more control over its refugee policy. Although Lebanon receives humanitarian aid from the United Nations Refugee Agency, refugees remain in: uncertain legal statuswith limited rights.

For many Lebanese, the recent influx of fleeing refugees from Syria has revived memories of their very own displacement, while for others it has been a trigger anti-refugee sentiment.

Bouncing between 2 war torn countries

With the latest escalation of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict, history is repeating itself again. Lebanese residents, mainly from Hezbollah’s strongholds in southern Lebanon and the Beqaa Valley, are searching for refuge in Syria, a rustic still battling its own problems economic collapse, violence and internal conflicts.

Although the conflict on Lebanese territory has been ongoing for over a yr, movements into Syria only intensified at the end of September 2024, when people they develop into increasingly eager to escape.

As one displaced person forced to flee Beirut explained to me: “Syria was certainly not a ‘better’ option than Lebanon six months ago, but in the last week, since the attacks on Beirut and the political assassinations, Syria is safer – it goes through it anyway. This is how unsafe we ​​feel in Beirut – bouncing between one war-torn country and another.”

Implications for refugee-host dynamics

The cyclical nature of resettlements between Lebanon and Syria subverts the prevailing political narrative the host-refugee dynamic is constant and unidirectional.

Syrians were resettled in Lebanon presented by some Lebanese politicians as one-way. This appears to be intended to border Syrian refugees as the only person aid recipients – unlike Lebanese residents – as well load is Lebanon.

However, when displacement occurs in each directions, this narrative begins to interrupt down.

Syrian refugees who once sought safety in Lebanon now see their country as… a safer haven – although fragile and temporary. Meanwhile, the residents of Lebanon are faced the same type of susceptibility and desperation that their Syrian counterparts have experienced over the past decade.

Importantly, testimonies from people traveling from their “temporary” home in Lebanon back to Syria emphasize that these movements shouldn’t be confused with back movements. Rather, they’re a short lived solution in themselves.

As one Syrian who fled his Lebanese home explained to me: “No, I’m not going back. I prefer to leave one foot in Lebanon and the other in Syria. Syria is not a safe place by any means. As men, we are at risk of arrest and forced conscription. But Lebanon is temporarily, at this point in history, much less safe. We make this assessment week by week. I sent my wife and children first. I will follow.”

For their part, IDPs arriving in Syria insist that the moves are “entirely temporary.” One of them told me: “Syria is no stranger to us. This feels close and familiar. But most importantly, it feels temporary and appropriate proximity to Lebanon. As soon as the situation calms down, we will return to our homes. Many of us have nothing to return to, but even then we will not stay in Syria.”

Displacement tension

Both Lebanon and Syria are in some ways ill-prepared to address a brand new wave of displacement.

By 2023, the cause was Lebanon’s economic collapse 80% of its population into poverty, which makes it almost unimaginable to tackle the additional weight load internal displacement.

Government paralysiscompounded by political impasse, leaves internally displaced individuals with little or no state support, mainly relying to survive using help and social networks.

Syria, although positioned as the “host” of the current migration flow, has the same situation forced. Country infrastructure stays devastated by greater than a decade of civil war. Basic services are stretched thin and economy he didn’t get better. Humanitarian organizations coordinating the response are operating under overstretched resources is decreasing support.

A region plunged into everlasting chaos

I fear that as the armed conflict between Israel and Hezbollah escalates, the displacement crisis in Lebanon and Syria is more likely to worsen.

The recent wave of Syrian and Lebanese refugees into Syria demonstrates the cyclical nature of refuge in the region. Ultimately, the ongoing displacement crisis in Lebanon and Syria is a reminder that refuge is commonly temporary and depending on changing geopolitics in the region.

The histories of these two countries, each of which served as havens for the other’s displaced populations, underscore the complexity of displacement in the Middle East.

The indisputable fact that Lebanese residents at the moment are searching for refuge in Syria, a rustic from which over one million refugees fled just over a decade ago, underscores the variability of regional displacement patterns. It also raises critical questions on the sustainability of international refugee systems, which too often depend on static, one-way migration models and don’t keep in mind the fluid and often reversible nature of resettlement.