Israel and Iran are at war. In fact, each side have been fighting for many years, but the conflict has largely been fought under the duvet of covert and clandestine operations.
Recent actions by each side of this once “shadow war” have modified the character of the conflict. It is unclear whether de-escalation is on the horizon.
On October 1, 2024, Iran carried out an enormous, direct attack on Israel hypothetically in retaliation for Israel’s double assassinations of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah chief Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah.
This is the second such attack in six months.
By multiple accounts, the previous Iranian attack on Israel on April 13 – which consisted of over 300 ballistic and cruise missiles and attack drones – caused little or no damage to Israel. Perhaps for this reason, and perhaps partly for this reason as well The US encourages restraintthen Israel’s immediate military response – an coating against a single advanced Iranian air defense system in Isfahan Province – was somewhat balanced.
Many observers saw the calibrated exchange in April as a possible indication that each side would accomplish that they like de-escalation reasonably than engage in ongoing open warfare.
However, further Israeli military operations since then have triggered an escalation of the Iranian military response, pushing the conflict out of the shadows.
As Hamas’s capabilities and leadership within the Gaza Strip degraded, so did Israeli military leaders they announced in June that they did “ready to face” Hezbollah, the Iran-backed Lebanese militant group whose continued rocket attacks on northern Israel have caused tens of 1000’s to evacuate area.
Israel heads north
Israel’s pivot from Gaza towards Lebanon coincided with the assassination of Hamas politburo chairman Haniyeh on July 31, 2024, while he was in Tehran. The alleged Israeli operation was seen as insulting Iran’s sovereignty. That was a shame too which highlighted the vulnerability and permeability of Iran’s internal security apparatus.
Although Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei announced a “strong reaction” against Israel, Iran took no motion until September.
Tehran’s passivity has raised doubts amongst many Middle East analysts whether Iran’s response will ever come – and, subsequently, what this may mean for Khamenei’s involvement in his proxy forces.
If indeed Iran’s leaders opted for restraint after the assassination of Hamas’s top political leader, the identical couldn’t be said for its response to Israel’s multi-phase operation against Hezbollah in mid-September.
Israel began with a covert operation to sow chaos and confusion in Hezbollah’s command and control through means sabotaged explosive communication devices. Israel then carried out elimination airstrikes Hezbollah’s top leaders including Nasrallah. The Israeli military then launched what the country’s leaders call “limited operation (terrestrial).” to southern Lebanon to clear Hezbollah positions along the northern border.
According to many Middle East experts, Tehran’s October 1 attack in response to Israel was indeed just that Iranian military leadersprimarily, retaliation for 2 high-profile assassinations of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders.
These were actually key aspects. But as expert on Iran’s defense strategyI argue that Iran’s leaders also felt compelled to attack Israel for 3 equally, if no more, necessary reasons: to slow Israel’s advance into Lebanon, to save lots of face, and to revive deterrence.
Questioning Israel’s Progress
Iran hopes to slow and potentially reverse Israel’s successes against Hezbollah, especially as Israel begins ground operations in southern Lebanon. Of course, Israeli ground troops now face what’s arguably the world’s strongest guerrilla fighting force – one which turned out quite successfully in the course of the Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006.
Nevertheless, Israel’s ability to tactically surprise and eliminate top Hezbollah leaders – even within the midst of an ongoing local war, and even after Israeli leaders announced their intention to have interaction Hezbollah – reveals a much superior Israeli strategy and operational planning and execution capabilities than Hezbollah.
And this represents an enormous blow to what’s seen in Iran because the crown jewel of the Islamic Republic in its “Axis of Resistance.”
In this context, Iran’s retaliatory attack on October 1 may be seen as an attempt to provide Hezbollah time to react appoint substitute managementregroup and organize against the Israeli ground invasion.
The brutal art of saving face?
It also helps Iran save face, especially within the eyes of other parts of its external proxy network.
Organized by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC – Tehran’s essential arm coordinating external operations – Iranian money, training, guidance and ideological support enabled and encouraged Hamas’ attack on Israel on October 7, 2023 – regardless that, it claims, Iran received no advance warning of the attack.
Since then, Hamas fighters have received almost no real-time support from Tehran. This lack of support little question contributed to Israel’s effective downgrading of Hamas to a threat, with lots of its members killed or in hiding and unable to mount a coherent offensive campaign, leading Israeli military leaders to say that the group had been dismantled successfully defeated.
It is not any wonder that Iran is glad to permit the Palestinians to fight Tehran’s enemies and absorb the human costs of the war, since such an arrangement primarily advantages the Islamic Republic.
When the fighting in Gaza began, the IRGC was nowhere to be seen.
Wisam Hashlamoun/Anadolu via Getty Images
Now that Israel has turned its attention to Lebanon and achieved some initial tactical successes against Hezbollah, Iran cannot afford to face by for 2 essential reasons. First, a 12 months of fighting in Gaza has shown that Israel is willing to do whatever is essential to eliminate threats along its borders – including a willingness to withstand international political pressure or operate inside Iran’s borders.
Second, Iran’s proxy groups elsewhere are watching whether Tehran will proceed to support them – or abandon them, as it apparently did with Hamas.
Recovering deterrence
Perhaps above all, Tehran’s calculations on how one can respond include the necessity for Iran to revive its deterrence mechanism.
Two defining features of Iran’s interconnected external relations, viz.defense forward” and deterrence strategies are the regional network of combat proxies and its arsenal of long-range weaponswhich incorporates a lot of advanced ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and attack-capable drones.
These Iranian defense strategies aim to dissuade enemies from attacking Iran directly in two ways: first, by threatening Israel and other U.S. regional allies with punishment through proxy militias or long-range weapons attacks; second, offering scapegoats against which Iran’s enemies can express their fury. In effect, Iran’s proxy forces act as proxy targets that pay the prices of Iran’s hostile policies.
Israel’s demotion of Hamas and ongoing operations against Hezbollah threaten to weaken Iran’s ability to discourage attacks on its homeland. For the leaders of the Islamic Republic, that is an unacceptable risk.
Who makes the subsequent move?
These intertwining imperatives likely led Iran’s leaders to launch a second massive direct missile attack on Israel on October 1. It is unclear how effective the attack will likely be in achieving any of Tehran’s goals.
The Islamic Republic claimed as many as 90% of ballistic missiles reached their intended targetswhile Israel and the United States characterize the attack as “defeated and ineffective,” despite unverified mobile videos showing several ballistic missiles exploding after reaching land in Israel.
However, it is sort of certain that this may not be the last move within the conflict. Israel is unlikely to halt its operation in Lebanon until it achieves its border security goals. And Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu did it announced retaliation against Iran for its latest retaliatory attack.
IRGC leaders were met with this warning: own counter-threat that if Israel responds militarily to the October 1 attack, Iran will again respond with unspecified “crushing and destructive attacks.”
Rhetorically, neither side is budging; militarily, this may increasingly also be true. The nature and scope of Israel’s next move will determine how the war with Iran develops – but make no mistake, it is a war.
