The rapid pace of events between Israel and the Palestinians, and in the wider Middle East, could make people think that change is inevitable.

Political scientists like me, I sometimes witness significant and groundbreaking events, comparable to the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and its aftermath, as aspects causing increased insecurity amongst the potential to drive wider change.

But not much has modified since this year.

Relatively stable established order on October 6

Throughout the first a part of 2023, relations between Israel and the Palestinians and the wider region appeared generally stable. In September 2023, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan declared that the Middle East “isquieter than it has been for 20 years”

Palestinians widely believed that their representatives – the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Hamas in the Gaza Strip – they were corrupt and he deserved it little or no public trust. At the same time, Palestinian factionalism and division between the West Bank and Gaza he was unbeatable.

Israeli society has endured nine months of widespread demonstrations against the government’s conservative reforms, including proposed limits on judicial power. In fact, elements of Israeli democracy, including its laws and liberal values, were has been weakening for a few years.

Israel’s relations with the Palestinians were stable if tense. Israel exercised military control over Palestinians living in the occupied West Bank.

Israel’s approach to managing the conflict with the Palestinians has been based on surveillance technology and intelligence gathering to make sure the security of its borders with the Gaza Strip. Periodic military operations were believed to discourage Hamas from open violence. Similarly, economic incentives comparable to thousands and thousands of dollars in money transferred to Hamas through Qatar and work permits for Gazans to enter Israel.

The Israeli government’s approach was this whose goal was to sever ties between Gaza and the West Bankso as to weaken the Palestinian Authority. The ultimate goal was to stop political negotiations around the prospect from re-emerging Palestinian statehood.

In the US, the Biden administration did this has focused its attention abroad totally on China. The attention she paid to the Middle East was largely involved defense pact with Saudi Arabia this may include restoring diplomatic relations between the Saudis and Israel, with little or no attention to the Palestinian issue.

Other key Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, also found it convenient to focus less on the Palestinian issue. Their national security goals countering Iran’s growing power equated with Israeli ones.

Iran was also all in favour of maintaining the established order. This has been pursued restore ties with various Arab governments and obtain some easing of economic sanctions. Some relief got here inside Prisoner exchange in August 2023 from the USA

The prospect of change

Experts and analysts have identified the October 7 attack and subsequent Israeli bombing campaign and subsequent ground invasion of Gaza as creating a likelihood for change.

A consensus emerged amongst observers that the Hamas attack made this clear Palestinian demands for self-determination they weren’t going to vanish quietly.

Action suggestions included resumption of political negotiations for a Palestinian state, reforming the Palestinian Authority to revive its legitimacy, and engaging neighboring countries to secure and rebuild Gaza in exchange for improved diplomatic relations with Israel.

Calls for change have come from across the world community, with public demonstrations around the world. International legal institutions called for peace and tranquility: The International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court launched an investigation into the actions of each Hamas and Israel.

A little change a year later

A year later, not much of what people imagined had happened.

The Palestinian Authority is focused by itself survival amid growing instability in the West Bankincluding violence by Israeli settlers, Israeli military operations, and resistance by Palestinian militants.

The humanitarian conditions in Gaza are dire, including: acute level of hunger, water shortages and poor sanitation. Some fighting continues Hamas is attempting to regroup where possible.

In Israel, as the war against Hamas continued, so too did Israel’s means of apostasy from democracy, marked by restrictions on freedom of speech and increasingly widespread nationalist hawkish sentiment. Despite continuing protests and calls for his resignation, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s pro-war coalition will survive and will likely survive until the scheduled elections in October 2026.

The statements and actions of the Israeli ruling coalition indicate that it intends to avoid resolving the conflict until the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and expanding security buffer zones under Israeli military control Lebanon AND Gauze.

The United States has been very energetic, with Secretary of State Antony Blinken visiting the region nine times President Joe Biden officially begins negotiations for a ceasefire and hostage deal in the short term and for regional negotiations in the long run. After one ceasefire and release of over 100 hostagesnone of those efforts resulted in an extra cessation of the war or the release of the hostages.

As the fall elections approach, it is unclear which U.S. efforts will proceed. Majority of the American public – 62% – wants the United States to play little or no rolein resolving the Israel-Hamas war.

Broader interests prevail

Other Middle Eastern countries publicly support and often take part in U.S.-led negotiations, but all are careful to take care of their very own interests.

For example, Egypt and Jordan are concerned about the so-called the potential for more Palestinians to flee the fighting and come to their territories. The Saudis and the United Arab Emirates fear that the conflict may spill over to other countries.

Iran’s position has strengthened barely, with increasing power and attention on their proxiesincluding Hamas, Hezbollah, the Assad regime in Syria, Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen.

Until the missile attacks on Israel on October 1, 2024, Iran had consistently signaled that its fundamental interest was to avoid a regional war. Its recent president, Masoud Pezeshkian, has repeatedly spoken about his desire constructive dialogue with the West.

Overall, despite almost a year of fighting and lack of life, there is more continuity than change. International courts take their time and have limited powers. Israel’s democratic apostasy, its 57 years of career Palestinian territories, Palestinian fragmentation and weak governance, in addition to the lack of real commitment from nearby countries and the United States – in addition to the absence of any stable or peaceful solution.

As we approach the one-year anniversary of the October 7 attack on Israel, conflict in the Middle East has intensified significantly. Iran had just fired almost 200 rockets at Israel, and Israel continued to fight Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza.

In addition to the assassination of top Hezbollah commanders, including its leader Hassan Nasrallah, Israel has struck a whole lot of targets in southern Lebanon, the Bekaa and the outskirts of Beirut over the past few days. It also expanded the conflict to incorporate a limited land invasion of Lebanon.

Meanwhile, despite continued U.S. efforts, the possibility of certainty exists cease-fire in Gaza and the wider region seems increasingly distant.

After Iranian missile attacks a Spokesman for the US Department of State he said: “We will not give up on achieving a ceasefire in Gaza because we believe it is the best way to release the hostages.” But he later added, referring to Hamas, “you need commitment from both sides, and currently one of them is refusing to engage.”

It is increasingly likely that President Joe Biden is not going to achieve a political victory in the Middle East before the November 5 elections, as his team had clearly hoped. Some say that is partly because Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hopes that Donald Trump will win in November and that he’ll then have the opportunity to attract the US right into a confrontation with Iran.

Ceasefire blocked

The United States appeared to be making some progress on the ceasefire July. But then got here the assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran (which Israel didn’t he admitted Down).

Some argued that this was not only an try and draw Iran into the EU conflictbut a transparent blow to the possibilities of a ceasefire. The more pragmatic Haniyeh was soon replaced by a more extremist Hamas commander, Yahya Sinwar.

The United States again hoped to achieve a peace agreement in September, but Netanyahu torpedoed it with last-minute demands. These include a ban on the return of armed men to northern Gaza during a possible ceasefire and an order for Israel to take care of control of the Philadelphia Corridor, a narrow strip along Gaza’s border with Egypt.

Reports suggest that Netanyahu was deliberately undermining negotiations and profiting from delays tactics over the summer. But what’s the political purpose of delaying peace?

Netanyahu is counting on Trump winning the election and having an American partner who is simpler to control than Biden. Netanyahu boasted that he managed to persuade Trump to depart the EU Nuclear agreement with Irana historic agreement crafted by the Obama administration in 2015 to lift economic sanctions on Iran in exchange for curbs on its nuclear program. Many saw this as a step in that direction world peace.

Trump’s controversial decision to maneuver the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem – which the Palestinians also consider their very own capital – was also a symbolic victory for Netanyahu and the Israeli right.

Arab-American voting patterns

Despite Trump’s unconditional support for Israel, many Arab Americans usually tend to vote for Trump (or at the least vote against Kamala Harris) in November.

Jewish voters in America have traditionally voted for the Democratic ticket, with roughly 70% of Jewish residents identifying as Democrats. This is significant because swing states equivalent to Pennsylvania (433,000), Florida (672,000), and Georgia (672,000) have significant Jewish communities (from 141 thousand).

Recent polls show that 72% of Jewish voters support Harris against Trump. And although 75% of American Jews said Israel was necessary to them, on an inventory of 11 issues it was only ninth most vital in shaping their vote.

The same can’t be said for Arab-American communities, which have been devastated by the conflict in Gaza (and now Lebanon) and are angered by Biden’s response to Israel. Although the US has used diplomatic pressure to agitate for a ceasefire, it has recently sold one other $20 billion (£15.08 billion) of fighter jets and other weapons to Israel. This is one in all the largest military packages since the starting of last 12 months War in Gaza.

Given an inventory of ten issues and asked to decide on the three most vital issues, 60% of Arab Americans surveyed selected Gaza, and 57% said the war in Gaza would influence their vote. This may explain why nearly 80% of Arab-American voters have an unfavorable opinion of Biden (based on a poll conducted in May). Only 55% have an unfavorable opinion of them Trump.

While Arab Americans don’t necessarily like Trump, they cannot stand supporting an administration that has failed to forestall a humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza. They can either not vote or vote for a 3rd party candidate.

Netanyahu hopes that this issue will influence the election results in Trump’s favor. Arab Americans constitute a critical voting bloc in swing states equivalent to Pennsylvania (126,000 Arab Americans) and Michigan (392,000 Arab Americans).

It is probably going that the Jewish-American vote will remain unchanged from 2020 to 2024, but Arab Americans supported Biden nationwide, gaining 64% support in 2020, and in the key swing state of Michigan, they gave Biden almost 70% support. That could tip the scales against Harris in a state Biden won by just 154,000 votes.

Many Arab-American voters should not convinced that Harris represents a shift away from Biden – and in a poll conducted by the Council on American-Islamic Relations in Michigan in August, only 12% of Muslim American voters in the state approved Harris. These voters are demanding a ceasefire.

But we cannot see a ceasefire anytime soon. Before the October 7 attacks on Israel, Netanyahu was fighting for his own political survival. Netanyahu, who remains to be on trial on charges of fraud, bribery and breach of trust, has repeatedly disparaged democratic institutions and resisted public pressure to step down. After the attacks in Lebanon, Netanyahu is recovering polls in Israel. Netanyahu faces less domestic pressure for a ceasefire in Gaza and becomes more confident that aggression pays off.

In our opinion, the more aggressive Netanyahu’s government is (each in Lebanon and Gaza), the more likely Trump might be elected. This all works perfectly for Netanyahu, because it might probably allow him to look beyond Lebanon and concentrate on his best obsession: Iran.

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After firing some from Iran 180 ballistic missiles in Israel, overnight the Middle East once more found itself getting ready to a costly and devastating regional war. Israel and its ally, the United States, shot down a lot of the rockets.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu immediately announced retaliation for the attack. He he called it “a big mistake” for which Iran will “pay”.

The strike marked a dramatic shift in Iran’s calculus after weeks of escalating Israeli attacks on the leaders of its proxy groups, Hamas and Hezbollah, and their forces in Gaza and Lebanon.

Iran has traditionally outsourced its fighting to Hezbollah and Hamas. She was very concerned about the opportunity of being drawn into direct confrontation with Israel due to the implications for the ruling regime – namely the possible internal dissent and chaos that any war with Israel could cause.

When Hamas political leader Ismail Haniya was killed in Tehran in late July, Iran’s leaders said they might respond appropriately. They principally left it to Hezbollah.

And as Israel has intensified its military campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon in recent weeks, one other Iranian proxy group, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, he claimed to have retaliated firing missiles and drones at Israeli cities and US destroyers in the Red Sea. Israel responded air attacks on Yemen.

In this context, from the Iranian standpoint, it looked like Iran was simply sitting on the fence and never playing its leadership role in difficult Israel. Therefore, to a large extent, Iran had to fulfill its role because the leader of the so-called “axis of resistance” and join the fight.

The fight against Israel is basically a pillar of state identity in Iran. The Iranian political establishment is predicated on the principle of difficult the United States and liberating Palestinian lands occupied by Israel. These things are rooted in the identity of the Iranian state. Therefore, if Iran doesn’t follow this principle, it runs a serious risk of undermining its own identity.

A fragile balancing act

However, this kind of direct attack by Iran carries serious risks.

Domestically, the Iranian political regime is affected by a serious crisis of legitimacy. There have been many popular uprisings in Iran in recent years. These include the bigWomen, life, freedom” movement that erupted after Mahsa Amini allegedly died in police custody worn incorrectly her hijab.

There can be a large dissenting opinion in Iran that questions the regime’s anti-American and anti-Israel state identity and its involvement in constant conflict with each countries.

The Iranian authorities subsequently feared that a direct confrontation with Israel and the United States would raise internal voices of dissent and seriously threaten the regime’s survival. It is that this existential threat that stops Iran from acting on its principles.

Moreover, Iran has a latest president, Masoud Pezeshkian, who belongs to the reformist camp and has a program to improve Iran’s relations with the West. Which he was talking about reviving the Iran nuclear agreement with the international community, sending signals that Iran is prepared to talk with the Americans.

The problem is that regional dynamics have completely modified for the reason that agreement was negotiated with the Obama administration in 2015. Iran has been a pariah state in recent years – and much more so for the reason that conflict between Israel and Hamas began a yr ago.

Since then, no Western country would consider it appropriate or politically expedient to engage in nuclear talks with Iran to ease international sanctions on the regime. Not at a time when Iran is openly calling for the destruction of Israel, supporting Hezbollah and Hamas in their attacks on Israel, and now engaging in confrontations with Israel itself.

The timing is subsequently disastrous for Pezeshkian’s program to repair the damage done to Iran’s global position.

Ultimately, nonetheless, it will not be the president who decides in Iran – it’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Supreme National Security Council who consider problems with war and peace and judge on a plan of action. The supreme leader can be the top of state and appoints the top of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

IRGC generals have advocated for more serious and decisive motion against Israel for the reason that Gaza war began. And it looks just like the supreme leader has finally heeded that advice.

Thus, the regime maintains a delicate balance of the next aspects:
preserving Iran’s state identity and what it represents in the region, in addition to the necessity to contain internal dissent and ensure its survival.

Under normal circumstances, it was easy for Iran to maintain this balance. It could manage its domestic opponents through brute force or concessions and advocate an aggressive foreign policy in the region.

Now the dimensions has tipped. From the Iranian perspective, Israel has been so brazen in its actions against its proxies that it simply didn’t look good for Iran to proceed to sit on the fence and take no motion.

As such, it has turn into more essential for Iran to emphasize its anti-American and anti-Israel state identity and maybe deal with a suitable level of risk from increased domestic dissent.

Where is that this going?

By attacking Israel, Iran can be prepared for one more risk – direct retaliation from Israel and the outbreak of total war.

According to Netanyahu’s playbook, the conflict in the region really continues. Was supporting for striking Iran and for the United States targeting Iran. Now Israel has justification to retaliate against Iran and drag the United States into the conflict.

Unfortunately, Iran is now also prepared for the complete Persian Gulf to turn into embroiled in the conflict, as any retaliation by Israel and maybe the United States would expose American assets in the Persian Gulf, such as naval ships and merchant ships, to attacks by Iran or its allies . This could have serious consequences for trade and security in the region.

Things are heading in that direction. Iran would know that striking Israel would trigger Israeli retaliation and that this retaliation would likely come with U.S. support. Iran appears willing to bear the prices.