The sensitivity on this issue is comprehensible. The recent upsurge in anti-Syrian violence in Turkey has highlighted the fragility of efforts to revive diplomatic relations with Syriawhich were cut off firstly Syrian Civil War.
This conflict affected Turkey in some ways. Ankara sided with the opposition forces in Syria and eventually intervened militarily, occupation of the northern part of the countryMeanwhile, the fighting has led to an influx of thousands and thousands of refugees into Turkey, sparking anti-Syrian sentiment and, more recently, violence.
On June 30, 2024, the town of Kayseri in central Turkey was the location of acts of vandalism and arson against properties, vehicles, and businesses belonging to Syrians. sexual harassment allegations against the Syrian. Powered by social mediaThe attacks soon spread and sparked probably the most violent anti-Syrian riots so far in areas of Turkey hosting large numbers of Syrian refugees.
It has also sparked or fueled violence in opposition-held northwestern Syria against Turkish military positions. The region was already on edge after comments by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan signaling his desire to revive ties with the Syrian government — something that will have profound consequences for opposition-held areas.
Since popular uprisings in 2012 changed into civil war, Erdogan has held Syrian President Bashar al-Assad accountable for the persecution and displacement of Syrians, which has made negotiations between the neighbouring countries difficult.
But now Erdogan has suggested he is prepared to fulfill with Assad. His hope is that a return to normal relations will facilitate the return of 3.6 million Syrian refugees to Turkey and resolve common concern a few potential Kurdish state in northeastern Syria.
As a political scientist specializing in security in the center eastI can see how a diplomatic breakthrough may benefit each leaders. For Erdogan, it will ease tensions over Syrian refugees; for Assad, it will be one other sign that his regional isolation is over. But elsewhere, it complicates the already complex and volatile nature of Turkey’s involvement in Syria, especially in its relations with Syrian refugees and opposition groups in northwestern Syria.
Anti-Syrian Riots and Social Media
The outbreak of violence against Syria in Turkey got here just days after Erdogan’s decision was the primary to signal the likelihood of meeting with AssadThe Turkish president accused the opposition parties of fueling racism and stoking tensionsMeanwhile, Interior Minister Ali Yerlikaya drew attention to online campaigns fueling violence, noting that 38% “Provocative and negative” posts published on the evening of the riots got here from bot accounts.
Syrians cross the border into Turkey through the Cilvegozu border crossing in Reyhanli, southeastern Turkey. AP Photo/Bernat Armangue, Archive
Whoever was behind the campaign to stoke hostility, it fueled existing tensions in opposition-held northwestern Syria. Hundreds of indignant Syrians took to the streets in several cities, attacking Turkish trucks and removing Turkish flagswhile demanding the withdrawal of Turkish forces. In response, Türkiye closed its borders with northwestern Syria.
The growing anti-Turkish sentiment in opposition-held areas of Syria underscores the complicated nature of Turkey’s bid for rapprochement with the Damascus regime. Having established himself as a staunch supporter of anti-Assad forces, Erdogan now stands accused of turning his back on his former allies. Moreover, for refugees in Turkey who fled Assad’s repression, a deal that will allow them to return could be tantamount to a betrayal.
When news of Erdogan’s intention to fulfill with Assad began to flow into in the media, some Syrian opposition factions called it “Turkey Sells Out Opposition.”
Some Syrian experts said that normalization of relations with Assad was a step towards mass forced return refugees to Syria in the face of growing public demands and electoral pressures. As was evident during 2023 elections in Turkeythe return of refugees has develop into a politicized issue in the country.
All of this leaves Erdogan in a difficult position. While he desires to reassure Turkish public opinion, he doesn’t wish to anger or cut ties with the Syrian opposition, a bunch with which he previously maintained relations as potential ally against Kurdish independence.
Negotiations with Assad
For a time, negotiations with the Syrian regime were considered a red line by Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party, known by its Turkish acronym AKP. The party saw Assad because the essential actor accountable for the persecution and forced displacement of Syrians.
Until recently, Assad had shown no interest in meeting with Erdogan because he blamed him for the violence in Syria by supporting rebel groups fighting the regime. But he recently signaled that “he could meet with President Erdogan, provided that the sovereignty of the Syrian state over its entire territory is respected and all forms of terrorism are combated.”
So why the diplomatic push for rapprochement now? Part of the reply lies in Erdogan’s desire to send back Syrian refugees living in Turkey because of his domestic popularity. Even if he fails to achieve an agreement, he’ll have the ability to talk to a public increasingly critical of “open door policy Syrian refugees that attempts were made to determine cooperation with Damascus, but that this didn’t bring any concrete results.
Then there may be the fear shared by Türkiye and Syria concerning the materialization of a de facto Kurdish state, Autonomous Administration of North and East SyriaAlso often called Rojava, in northeastern Syria. Rojava is supported by the US but considered a terrorist organization by Turkey.
A protester throws a stone at a Turkish truck during anti-Turkey protests in Al-Bab, in the northern Syrian province of Aleppo controlled by the opposition, July 1, 2024. Photo: Bakr Alkasem/AFP via Getty Images
If US withdraws troops from the region, Erdogan would should negotiate with Assad over Turkey’s policy towards northeastern Syria.
However, each leaders are currently in a weak position to dictate the terms of a brand new order in northeastern Syria. Restoring diplomatic relations would allow each countries to coordinate their efforts to realize a standard goal preventing the creation of an autonomous Kurdish state.
Anticipating the impact of a possible rapprochement on its political interests, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria connections diplomatic efforts “a conspiracy against the Syrian people” and “a clear legitimization of the Turkish occupation” of areas previously dominated by Kurds. The United States also opposes normalization of relations with Syria in the absence of “genuine progress” towards a political solution to the conflict.
The New Realities of the Middle East
Erdogan’s try to restore relations with Syria can be seen as an adjustment to recent political realities in the Middle East. United Arab Emirates restored diplomatic relations with Syria in 2018. The Arab League also normalized relations with Syria and readmit it in 2023. Saudi Arabia also reopened its embassy in Damascus in 2024.
In other words, Syria’s isolation in the region has ended. As a result, Ankara can have concluded that it’s in its best interest to take care of diplomatic relations with a rustic with which it must negotiate and coordinate on a variety of military, political and migration issues.
This article was originally published on : theconversation.com
Former Hawke-Keating cabinet minister Gareth Evans has accused the Albanian government of political timidity, condemning its instinct to “go into cautious, defensive mode and avoid the wedge”.
In a speech on Wednesday, Evans said the federal government had enough talented top-class ministers “to be a great reform government in the Hawke-Keating tradition”, spending political capital reasonably than hoarding it indefinitely until its value was eroded.
He added, nevertheless, that the federal government had adopted a defensive posture on issues akin to gambling promoting, election financing, census issues, the Makarrata Commission and all constitutional reforms, including those relating to the republic.
“Perhaps the most worrying of all, given the security and sovereignty issues,” was AUKUS, said Evans, who was amongst a gaggle of Labor critics of the deal, including Paul Keating.
“The government’s reward for all this has not been growth but decline in popularity,” Evans said.
He acknowledges that other aspects have also influenced the federal government’s current situation, including concerns about the fee of living and housing availability, which could be difficult for even probably the most competent government to address.
“But one cannot help but feel that more and more individuals are asking, what is that this Labour government all about?
“It is time for the party leadership to regain its drive and say: a prosperous, safe and, above all, decent society, the kind that only a Labour government can deliver.”
Evans served as Minister for Foreign Affairs within the Hawke and Keating governments and held various other positions; he can also be a former Chancellor of the Australian National University. He delivered the Barry Jones Oration in 2024. His speech, titled Looking on the Bright Side: the risks – and rewards – of political optimism, called for maintaining “a spirit of optimism about the art of the possible”.
“If we want to change for the better, maintaining hope is key,” he said.
“Whether we work in governments, parliaments, intergovernmental organizations, academia, think tanks, media, non-governmental organizations, or in influential positions of social responsibility in the private sector, or simply as ordinary citizens with a passion for decency, we must believe that what we do can and will make a difference.”
This article was originally published on : theconversation.com
From the start economic crisis in 2019Lebanon has been grappling with a cascade of significant challenges which have drastically modified the day by day lives of its residents. The crisis, triggered by a mixture of economic mismanagement, political corruption, and an unstable regional environment, has led to unprecedented levels of inflation, a drastic devaluation of the Lebanese pound, and a pointy decline within the purchasing power of its population. Daily life has develop into a struggle for a lot of, with basic necessities akin to food, fuel, and medicine becoming increasingly scarce and unattainable.
Contrary winds
The situation was further exacerbated by the prospect of war with Israel, which fueled instability and uncertainty but didn’t discourage domestic and foreign investment. In addition, the devastating explosion on the Beirut port in August 2020 dealt a devastating blow to the economy, destroying much of town’s infrastructure, displacing 1000’s of residents and causing billions of dollars in losses. The explosion also destroyed public trust in the federal government, which was already at low levels because of the ongoing financial crisis.
…and unexpected profits
Yet within the face of those challenges, the Lebanese economy has shown remarkable resilience. published by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) provide compelling evidence of this resilience, evident in the numerous increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into Lebanon.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) refers to an investment made by an organization or individual from one country right into a business interest positioned abroad. Unlike portfolio investment (akin to stocks or bonds), FDI typically involves acquiring an enduring interest in a foreign business, akin to purchasing a major stake or organising operations akin to factories or offices. This sort of investment is meant to achieve direct control or influence over the operations of a foreign business, often resulting in job creation, technology transfer, and economic growth within the host country. In easy terms, FDI is when a foreign entity invests money to assist develop or expand a business abroad.
According to the report, net foreign direct investment inflows into Lebanon increased by 25% in 2023, reaching $582 million, in comparison with $461 million in 2022. This increase demonstrates Lebanon’s continued attractiveness as a fertile ground for entrepreneurship and investment, particularly within the context of small-scale industries and digital services.
Supporting small industries
Lebanon’s ability to extend the country’s investment attractiveness despite ongoing economic problems will be explained by several aspects.
The country’s entrepreneurial spirit is considered one of its most significant. Known for its dynamic and progressive culture, Lebanese entrepreneurs have been capable of generate significant economic activity and attract international investors – evidence of their confidence in Lebanon’s growth potential even in difficult times.
Another key factor is the lively role of the Lebanese diaspora. Many successful Lebanese expatriates reinvest of their homeland, particularly in smaller-scale industries, typically with limited capital, fewer staff, and native or area of interest markets. These industries include artisanal food and goods production, handicrafts, tech startups and digital services, eco-tourism and hospitality, and renewable energy. These areas are seeing significant investment because of lower capital requirements and high growth prospects. The link between expatriates and domestic economic activity creates a continuous flow of capital, know-how, and market connections.
Small industries and digital services have also emerged as leading sectors in Lebanon’s economic recovery, attracting significant foreign investment because of their adaptability and innovation. Small industries profit from Lebanon’s expert workforce and strategic location, while digital services thrive on the country’s high web penetration, estimated to 93% in 2024
This indicates that the amount of inward FDI into Lebanon increased by 24% in 2023, reaching roughly USD 655 million, in comparison with USD 527 million in 2022. This figure represents roughly 0.86% of the whole inward FDI within the West Asia and North Africa (WANA) region and 0.05% of the worldwide inward FDI.
This increase stands out particularly within the context of the worldwide decline in foreign direct investment (FDI), which decreased by 2% in 2023, reaching a complete of about USD 1.33 trillion in comparison with about USD 1.36 trillion in 2022. The decline in global FDI underlines the importance of Lebanon’s performance, pointing to its ability to draw investment even within the face of contraction in global investment flows.
Lebanon’s Appeal
The surprising growth in FDI in Lebanon is because of several key aspects. Government efforts to draw investors are among the many important ones, with various reforms aimed toward improving the business environment. These include improvements to the regulatory framework and incentives aimed toward making Lebanon a more attractive place for foreign investors.
Lebanon’s location is after all one other key factor. Situated on the crossroads of Europe, Asia and Africa, the country offers firms the chance to ascertain a presence in Syria’s fertile crescent.
In addition, Lebanon highly educated and multilingual staff increases the country’s investment attractiveness. The country’s universities and academic institutions proceed to supply graduates with the talents needed to thrive in today’s economy.
Finally, Lebanon’s wealthy cultural heritage and historical links with various regions world wide may explain its appeal as an investment destination. These long-standing links facilitate strong international partnerships and cooperation.
As Lebanon charts a course for recovery, continued support and confidence from international investors shall be crucial. The growing inflow of foreign direct investment not only demonstrates the country’s economic resilience, but in addition provides a foundation for sustainable growth and development within the years to return. However, it will be important to do not forget that the economic situation in Lebanon can be linked to the geopolitical situation within the Middle East.
Law on the Protection of Civilians in Syria
The effects of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, commonly generally known as the Caesar Act, are US law passed December 2019The Caesar Act imposes sweeping sanctions on the Syrian government, in addition to any individuals or entities that support the regime, akin to foreign firms, financial institutions, and government officials. The act also targets sectors key to the Syrian economy, including construction, energy, and finance.
The Caesar Act has had serious, disastrous repercussions for Lebanon’s economy, which is closely tied to Syria’s economy. The sanctions restrict Lebanese firms from engaging in trade or financial transactions with Syrian entities, resulting in reduced trade, disruption of supply chains, and increased economic uncertainty. Given Lebanon’s geographic proximity and historical economic ties to Syria, these sanctions have further strained Lebanon’s economy, which is already battling its own financial crisis.
Lebanon’s ability to draw and retain foreign direct investment despite its difficult economic situation underlines the country’s potential and ongoing efforts to make it a beautiful country for investors.
This article was originally published on : theconversation.com
The experiences of the last 11 months have led many experts in the region I would love to reassess the term. Is “Arab-Israeli conflict” an accurate reflection, on condition that the energetic participants aren’t any longer just Arabs and Israelis? Should we abandon the term for good now that the conflict has expanded to include the United States and Iran—and potentially Turkey and others in the years to come?
How it began
The Arab-Israeli conflict began after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1922 in what’s now Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories, which were then Mandate of Palestine under British ruleOccasional disputes over land ownership have led to violence between the Jewish and Palestinian communities.
When Israel declared independence in 1948the conflict became an interstate war between Israel and a number of other Arab countries – Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. Hence it was called Arab-Israeli War each by the media and the political leaders of the time.
This name remained relevant for several many years, as the geopolitical and geographical conflict was limited to the Arab countries and Israel.
After the initial War 1948unresolved conflict led to several other wars between Israel and the Arab countries. Some oil-exporting Arab countries, comparable to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, also got involved not directly by providing financial support to the Arab states on the front lines and oil embargoes were announced against the West during the wars of 1967 and 1973.
Iraq was also directly affected by this protracted conflict in the Eighties when Israel destroyed its nuclear facilities. Iraq then repeatedly attacked Israel with missiles in 1991 during The First Gulf War.
Beyond the Arab World
The term “Arab-Israeli conflict” is just not used as often today, but it surely continues to be widely used, including by United Nationsthis United States Government, media points and lots of scholars from this region.
The use of the term “Arab-Israeli conflict” has declined lately
Google Ngram tool showing percentage of sample books (y-axis) containing chosen phrases since 1948.
However, the reference to the “Arab-Israeli conflict” obscures the energetic role of several other participants, especially in recent many years.
American diplomatic support for Israel began with President Harry Truman’s decision to be the first to recognize the recent state in May 1948. In the Sixties, one other decision followed: increase in US military and financial support during Lyndon Johnson’s presidency.
In subsequent many years, nevertheless, the U.S. role expanded to include direct involvement in air defense operations against missile and drone attacks on Israel. For example, U.S. Army air defense units were used to defend Israel against Iraqi Rocket Attacks already in the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991.
The US involvement has been visible since the October 7 attacks. In the months following the attacks, the US conducted operations against missile and drone attacks launched at Israel by Houthis in Yemenand thru Iran.
By all accounts, US military support for Israel played a key role in its Military advantage over its neighbors. Therefore, for my part, an appropriate name for the broader conflict should reflect this energetic U.S. participation.
An Israeli soldier leads a Jordanian soldier through the streets of Bethlehem during the Six-Day War in 1967. Bettmann via Getty Images
On the “Arab” side of the conflict, Israel’s opponents aren’t any longer limited to Arab countries. Iran is now energetic participantTehran not only provides military support to groups hostile to Israel, including Hamas, the Houthis, and Hezbollah, but has also engaged in direct military operations with Israel during the ongoing war in the Gaza Strip.
In addition, Iran and Israel were involved in covert operations and cyber wars between them which have been happening for 15 years, which have intensified much more after the war between Israel and Hamas.
Risk of Turkish involvement?
And with no resolution to the current fighting in sight, the possibilities of the conflict escalating further shouldn’t be underestimated. Two possible scenarios that would escalate the conflict are a significant escalation between Israel and Iran, and energetic participation of Turkey.
Intense Israeli bombardment of Gaza and resulting high variety of casualties escalated tensions between Israel and Turkey. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and politicians from various Turkish political parties they were very loud in his criticism of Israeli military actions.
Public anger and anti-Israeli sentiment in Turkey have reached a high level, partly in consequence of the extensive coverage of the carnage and human suffering in Gaza. There is even a small possibility that unexpected eventcomparable to an Israeli navy encounter with a Turkish ship approaching Gaza to defy the Israeli naval blockade, could lead on to a military exchange between Turkey and Israel. While the likelihood of such an exchange stays low, a military escalation between Israel and Turkey may also be triggered according to some experts, in consequence of a significant Israeli operation in Lebanon.
MENA-ISRAM conflict?
Almost a 12 months into the latest phase of fighting in the Middle East, it has develop into clear that the label “Arab-Israeli conflict” now not reflects the facts on the ground. But “Israeli-Palestinian” or “Gaza-Israeli” fail to account for the growing number of nations which are collaborating—or an energetic role—in the fighting.
Indeed, during the current conflict in Gaza, people were killed in Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemenand IranSimilarly, the list of parties to the conflict includes Hamas and Israel, but in addition a number of Iranian-backed militias in the Middle East and Arabian Peninsula.
So where does this leave us?
A more accurate name for the ongoing hostilities can be to higher reflect all the major participants.
On one side, now we have several non-state actors and governments from across the Middle East and North Africa, or “MENA,” as the region is often called. On the other side, now we have Israel, which is heavily depending on the United States for its military prowess and protection, and the United States, which is fully committed to Israel’s security. I imagine that any name for the conflict should include the United States.
Therefore, for my part, it is best to call it the “MENA-ISRAME conflict” – during which “ISRAME” is formed by combining the first three letters of the words “Israel” and “America”.
I admit it’s kind of hard to pronounce and unlikely to catch on. Nevertheless, a reputation that reflects the larger group of participants in the Arab-Israeli conflict is required. It will raise awareness of the destruction, suffering and financial burden it has caused to all the countries involved throughout its existence.
This can increase the willingness of the international community, and particularly its energetic participants, to make greater efforts to find an answer that can put an end to the MENA-ISRAM conflict.
This article was originally published on : theconversation.com
