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Iran’s strike against Israel was retaliatory – but it was also about saving face and restoring deterrence

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Israel and Iran are at war. In fact, each side have been fighting for many years, but the conflict has largely been fought under the duvet of covert and clandestine operations.

Recent actions by each side of this once “shadow war” have modified the character of the conflict. It is unclear whether de-escalation is on the horizon.

On October 1, 2024, Iran carried out an enormous, direct attack on Israel hypothetically in retaliation for Israel’s double assassinations of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah chief Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah.

This is the second such attack in six months.

By multiple accounts, the previous Iranian attack on Israel on April 13 – which consisted of over 300 ballistic and cruise missiles and attack drones – caused little or no damage to Israel. Perhaps for this reason, and perhaps partly for this reason as well The US encourages restraintthen Israel’s immediate military response – an coating against a single advanced Iranian air defense system in Isfahan Province – was somewhat balanced.

Many observers saw the calibrated exchange in April as a possible indication that each side would accomplish that they like de-escalation reasonably than engage in ongoing open warfare.

However, further Israeli military operations since then have triggered an escalation of the Iranian military response, pushing the conflict out of the shadows.

As Hamas’s capabilities and leadership within the Gaza Strip degraded, so did Israeli military leaders they announced in June that they did “ready to face” Hezbollah, the Iran-backed Lebanese militant group whose continued rocket attacks on northern Israel have caused tens of 1000’s to evacuate area.

Israel heads north

Israel’s pivot from Gaza towards Lebanon coincided with the assassination of Hamas politburo chairman Haniyeh on July 31, 2024, while he was in Tehran. The alleged Israeli operation was seen as insulting Iran’s sovereignty. That was a shame too which highlighted the vulnerability and permeability of Iran’s internal security apparatus.

Although Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei announced a “strong reaction” against Israel, Iran took no motion until September.

Tehran’s passivity has raised doubts amongst many Middle East analysts whether Iran’s response will ever come – and, subsequently, what this may mean for Khamenei’s involvement in his proxy forces.

If indeed Iran’s leaders opted for restraint after the assassination of Hamas’s top political leader, the identical couldn’t be said for its response to Israel’s multi-phase operation against Hezbollah in mid-September.

Israel began with a covert operation to sow chaos and confusion in Hezbollah’s command and control through means sabotaged explosive communication devices. Israel then carried out elimination airstrikes Hezbollah’s top leaders including Nasrallah. The Israeli military then launched what the country’s leaders call “limited operation (terrestrial).” to southern Lebanon to clear Hezbollah positions along the northern border.

According to many Middle East experts, Tehran’s October 1 attack in response to Israel was indeed just that Iranian military leadersprimarily, retaliation for 2 high-profile assassinations of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders.

These were actually key aspects. But as expert on Iran’s defense strategyI argue that Iran’s leaders also felt compelled to attack Israel for 3 equally, if no more, necessary reasons: to slow Israel’s advance into Lebanon, to save lots of face, and to revive deterrence.

Questioning Israel’s Progress

Iran hopes to slow and potentially reverse Israel’s successes against Hezbollah, especially as Israel begins ground operations in southern Lebanon. Of course, Israeli ground troops now face what’s arguably the world’s strongest guerrilla fighting force – one which turned out quite successfully in the course of the Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006.

Nevertheless, Israel’s ability to tactically surprise and eliminate top Hezbollah leaders – even within the midst of an ongoing local war, and even after Israeli leaders announced their intention to have interaction Hezbollah – reveals a much superior Israeli strategy and operational planning and execution capabilities than Hezbollah.

And this represents an enormous blow to what’s seen in Iran because the crown jewel of the Islamic Republic in its “Axis of Resistance.”

In this context, Iran’s retaliatory attack on October 1 may be seen as an attempt to provide Hezbollah time to react appoint substitute managementregroup and organize against the Israeli ground invasion.

The brutal art of saving face?

It also helps Iran save face, especially within the eyes of other parts of its external proxy network.

Organized by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC – Tehran’s essential arm coordinating external operations – Iranian money, training, guidance and ideological support enabled and encouraged Hamas’ attack on Israel on October 7, 2023 – regardless that, it claims, Iran received no advance warning of the attack.

Since then, Hamas fighters have received almost no real-time support from Tehran. This lack of support little question contributed to Israel’s effective downgrading of Hamas to a threat, with lots of its members killed or in hiding and unable to mount a coherent offensive campaign, leading Israeli military leaders to say that the group had been dismantled successfully defeated.

It is not any wonder that Iran is glad to permit the Palestinians to fight Tehran’s enemies and absorb the human costs of the war, since such an arrangement primarily advantages the Islamic Republic.

When the fighting in Gaza began, the IRGC was nowhere to be seen.

Rockets fired from Iran are seen over Jerusalem, October 1, 2024.
Wisam Hashlamoun/Anadolu via Getty Images

Now that Israel has turned its attention to Lebanon and achieved some initial tactical successes against Hezbollah, Iran cannot afford to face by for 2 essential reasons. First, a 12 months of fighting in Gaza has shown that Israel is willing to do whatever is essential to eliminate threats along its borders – including a willingness to withstand international political pressure or operate inside Iran’s borders.

Second, Iran’s proxy groups elsewhere are watching whether Tehran will proceed to support them – or abandon them, as it apparently did with Hamas.

Recovering deterrence

Perhaps above all, Tehran’s calculations on how one can respond include the necessity for Iran to revive its deterrence mechanism.

Two defining features of Iran’s interconnected external relations, viz.defense forward” and deterrence strategies are the regional network of combat proxies and its arsenal of long-range weaponswhich incorporates a lot of advanced ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and attack-capable drones.

These Iranian defense strategies aim to dissuade enemies from attacking Iran directly in two ways: first, by threatening Israel and other U.S. regional allies with punishment through proxy militias or long-range weapons attacks; second, offering scapegoats against which Iran’s enemies can express their fury. In effect, Iran’s proxy forces act as proxy targets that pay the prices of Iran’s hostile policies.

Israel’s demotion of Hamas and ongoing operations against Hezbollah threaten to weaken Iran’s ability to discourage attacks on its homeland. For the leaders of the Islamic Republic, that is an unacceptable risk.

Who makes the subsequent move?

These intertwining imperatives likely led Iran’s leaders to launch a second massive direct missile attack on Israel on October 1. It is unclear how effective the attack will likely be in achieving any of Tehran’s goals.

The Islamic Republic claimed as many as 90% of ballistic missiles reached their intended targetswhile Israel and the United States characterize the attack as “defeated and ineffective,” despite unverified mobile videos showing several ballistic missiles exploding after reaching land in Israel.

However, it is sort of certain that this may not be the last move within the conflict. Israel is unlikely to halt its operation in Lebanon until it achieves its border security goals. And Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu did it announced retaliation against Iran for its latest retaliatory attack.

IRGC leaders were met with this warning: own counter-threat that if Israel responds militarily to the October 1 attack, Iran will again respond with unspecified “crushing and destructive attacks.”

Rhetorically, neither side is budging; militarily, this may increasingly also be true. The nature and scope of Israel’s next move will determine how the war with Iran develops – but make no mistake, it is a war.


This article was originally published on : theconversation.com
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International

At the beginning of the war, I interviewed Syrian militias – they will listen if other countries get involved in their activities

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On Sunday, the world received news that it might not have thought possible. The murderous regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is not any more, and after 13 years of suffering, the Syrian civil war could also be coming to an end.

In just a couple of days, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – an armed Islamist group based in Idlib in northern Syria – moved south, capturing Aleppo and Homs, after which capturing the capital Damascus. Meanwhile, Assad is reported he fled together with his family to Moscow.

The most optimistic observers see this moment as a probability for peace. Assad has finally been toppled, his key allies Russia and Iran are involved elsewhere, and a fragile peace is emerging between Syria’s various armed factions. Others warn that the resulting vacuum may lead to a continuation of the chaotic violence that has plagued Libya since the overthrow and killing of the country’s dictator Muammar Gaddafi in 2011.

What happens next will depend as much on forces outside Syria as on those inside it. I was in Syria in 2013, interviews with fighters and commanders from several groups that got here together to form HTS, including Al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate. As I learned from talking to them, armed groups like HTS are likely to listen when the international community tries to interact with them.

HTS was formed in 2017 as an alliance of a number of Islamist armed groups in northwestern Syria, including the Syrian affiliate of al-Qaeda often known as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. In previous years, HTS was in a difficult situation in the Idlib region. Yet it stubbornly persevered while many other armed groups collapsed under the onslaught of a regime backed by Russian warplanes and Hezbollah fighters.

Syria is at a crossroads with many potential paths ahead. Some point The Islamist roots of HTS. For these people, the nightmare scenario that the world has been trying to stop since 2011 got here true: a radical Islamist group got here to power in Syria.

Others say the group has separated from its more radical roots. As the saying goes, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham divorced Al-Qaeda in 2016 he didn’t wish to be tainted anymore as a consequence of its negative global image and merged with other groups to form HTS.

And HTS has recently sought to advertise a more moderate image, even encouraging religious tolerance. If his assurances are to be believed, it might aim to construct a peaceful and stable Syria.

People have fun in the streets after Syrian rebels captured the capital, Damascus.
Hasan Belal/EPA

The key to determining Syria’s future will be the actions of other countries that want to interact HTS and its affiliates. My research shows that sometimes they will make changes in consequence of this dialogue. Groups with a history of violating the laws of war may reply to international pressure and cause changes in their behavior.

They will also sometimes respond positively to involvement by participating in negotiations and conflict resolution. However, when isolated, siled or ignored, these groups can do exactly the opposite.

While in Syria, I spoke to many alternative insurgent factions and the common thread was that they felt ignored by the international community. The general of the Free Syrian Army (then a U.S.-backed coalition of rebel groups) complained about the difficulty of complying with international humanitarian law without international support.

Fighters from Islamist groups complained about the hypocrisy of international organizations. When they tried to contact states and organizations, they felt ignored, forcing them to ally with more hard-line groups as a substitute of moderates. An Islamic State commander even asked me to send positive messages about them to my family and friends, hoping it will encourage more international contacts.

It could be a mistake to wholeheartedly imagine armed groups in their declared willingness to cooperate peacefully. But by the same token, completely ignoring them is unlikely to finish the fighting.

Is peace possible?

Explaining how we got thus far could also be easier than predicting what will occur next. The Assad regime has long been supported by its allies. So, with Russia engaged in a war of attrition in Ukraine and each Hezbollah and Iran fighting conflict with Israel, HTS saw a possibility and seized it.

While many have fun the failure of Iranian and Russian interventions in Syria, it’s unlikely that either power’s influence in Syria will end. Recent developments may even bring the two sides closer to a partnership that would include interventions elsewhere or exchanges of weapons technology.

No country will simply quit its goals in Syria. Russia, for instance, has strategic air and naval bases there which are essential for the Kremlin to project power in the Middle East, the Mediterranean and Africa. Russia will not abandon them easily.

During the meeting, Putin and Bashar al-Assad sat next to each other.
Russia has long been a serious supporter of the Assad regime in Syria.
Michał Klimentiew / Sputnik / EPA

Türkiye appears to have been an extended-time supporter of HTS a robust position to influence events. This may include using its advantage in a sustained attack on the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria.

Although the SDF are nominal allies of America, it’s unlikely that they have forgotten about Donald Trump sudden abandonment of them in 2019. When the US president announced the withdrawal of US military forces from Syria, it created an influence vacuum that Turkey used as a reason to launch a military operation against the Syrian Kurds. The future of Kurdish autonomy may due to this fact be in query, although the battle-hardened SDF will probably not quit and not using a fight.

It is just not yet clear how the Trump administration will cooperate with Syria under HTS control. While it’s unlikely that we will see a rise in American involvement on the ground, it’s difficult to assume that Trump will grow to be an ally of HTS, an armed group with historical ties to Islamists.

Meanwhile, Israel took over temporary control of a demilitarized buffer zone in Syrian-controlled areas of the Golan Heights. Some fear that this may increasingly result in a rise in conflict in the country. The Israeli military has warned Syrians living in five villages near the occupied areas to “stay at home.” Some schools have switched to online classes in anticipation of the unrest.

These events in Syria have enormous consequences for the country and the region, and HTS is at the center of them. It is unclear whether the group will manage to take care of power in Syria, and if so, what type of regime it will try to construct.

The response from regional and global powers will be crucial at this juncture where commitment to HTS is crucial if the opportunity for peace is to be realized.

This article was originally published on : theconversation.com
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International

After five decades of brutal Assad rule, Syria is at a crossroads. Here are 4 priorities that will help you avoid another war

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Who could have predicted that after almost 14 years of civil war and five years of stalemate, the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria would collapse in only a week? With Assad gone, the burning query is what Syria’s immediate future holds.

When opposition fighters led by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group captured the most important city of Aleppo in late November with minimal resistance, commentators widely believed it marked the start of the autumn of the Assad regime. Many expected a fierce fight until the very end.

Assad was caught off guard and his forces clearly unprepared. He withdrew remaining troops from Aleppo to regroup and buy time for reinforcements to reach from Russia and Iran, hoping opposition fighters would stop there.

It wasn’t meant to be. Emboldened by their rapid success in Aleppo, HTS fighters wasted no time in advancing on Hama, capturing it with ease. They quickly moved on and took Homs, another large city to the south.

Russia provided limited air support to Assad. However, Iran, having exhausted its forces defending Hezbollah against Israel in Lebanon, was unable to supply significant assistance and withdrew the remaining staff from Syria. Meanwhile, Assad calls frantically support from Iraq he didn’t go anywhere.

Seeing the writing on the wall, the morale of Assad’s forces and leadership has plummeted. Fearing retribution within the event of the regime’s fall, desertions began en masse, further hastening Assad’s fall.

And on the last day Assad escaped country, and its prime minister officially handed over power to HTS and its leadership. This marked the top of 54 years of Assad family rule in Syria.

Opposition fighters destroy a huge portrait of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Aleppo.
Mohammed Al-Rifai/EPA

Assad’s legacy

Most Syrians will likely remember the Assad family, including Bashar al-Assad and his father, Hafez al-Assad, as brutal dictators.

The modern state of Syria was established in 1920 Sykes-Picot Agreement within the aftermath of the First World War. Syria became a League of Nations mandate under French control, gaining independence only in 1944. After a turbulent period, including failed unification with Egypt, the Baath Party took control in 1963 in a coup d’état led by Hafez al-Assad.

In 1966, Hafez al-Assad became the leader another coup together with other officials of the Alawite minority. This eventually led to the establishment of a civilian regime, and Hafez al-Assad became president in 1970.

Hafez al-Assad
Portrait of Hafez al-Assad, taken a while before 1987.
Library of Congress/Wikimedia Commons

Hafez al-Assad became often known as an authoritarian dictator, concentrating power, the military and the economy within the hands of his relatives and the Alawite community. Meanwhile, the Sunni majority has been largely marginalized and excluded from positions of power and influence.

Hafez al-Assad is most infamous for his brutal suppression of the opposition in 1982. As a result of the rebellion led by the Islamic Front, the opposition captured the town of Hama. In response, the Syrian army razed the town, leaving an estimated 10,000 to 40,000 civilians dead or missing, ultimately suppressing the revolt.

Hafez al-Assad died in 2000, and his younger son, Bashar al-Assad, the least likely candidate, took over as president. Educated within the West to change into a doctor, Bashar al-Assad projected a picture of moderation and modernity, inspiring hope that he could usher in a recent era of progress and democracy in Syria.

However, Bashar al-Assad soon found himself in a turbulent regional landscape following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the US invasion of Iraq. In 2004, after the United States imposed sanctions on SyriaAssad was on the lookout for closer ties with Turkey. He and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have struck up a friendship as they waive visa requirements between their countries and plan to create economic zones to spice up trade.

Erdoğan and Assad then fell out during a series of events in 2011, which was a turning point for Syria. The country erupted in Arab Spring revolts, presenting Assad with a critical selection: pursue the trail of democracy or crush the opposition, as his father did in 1982.

He selected the latter, missing a historic opportunity for Syria’s peaceful transformation.

The consequences were disastrous. A devastating civil war broke out, killing over 300,000 people (some estimates are higher), 5.4 million refugees and 6.9 million internally displaced individuals. This will be Assad’s legacy.

Destroyed buildings in Homs, Syria.
A person rides a bicycle through Homs, Syria, in 2014. The city was devastated by civil war.
Dusan Vranić/AP

Immediate challenges facing Syria

Syria now has a recent force in power: HTS and its leadership, led by militant leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani. They will face immediate challenges and 4 key priorities:

1) Consolidation of power. The recent leadership will now strive to make sure that there are no armed groups capable of difficult their rule, especially the remnants of the old Assad regime and smaller factions that weren’t part of the opposition forces.

Crucially, they will also need to discuss how power will be shared among the many coalition of opposition groups. Al-Jolani is more likely to change into the founding president of the brand new Syria, but how the remainder of power will be distributed stays uncertain.

It seems that the opposition was not prepared to take power so quickly and there could also be no power-sharing agreement. This will need to be negotiated and worked out quickly.

The recent government will probably recognize it Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the territories it controls as an autonomous region in Syria. However, an independent Kurdish state will be strongly opposed by Türkiye, the most important external supporter of the opposition.

However, it seems that history is moving in favor of the so-called Kurds. There is now the last word possibility of establishing an independent Kurdish state, potentially uniting northern Iraq and northeastern Syria into one entity.

Syrian-Kurdish children in a refugee camp in 2014.
Syrian-Kurdish children stand in front of a tent in a refugee camp in Suruc, on the Turkish-Syrian border, in 2014.
Lefteris Pitarakis/AP

2) International recognition. Syria is a very complex and diverse place. Therefore, the brand new government can only be maintained if it receives international recognition.

The key players on this process are Türkiye, the European Union, the United States and Israel (through the US). It is likely that all of these entities will recognize the brand new government provided it establishes a moderate administration, refrains from fighting the Kurdish YPG and doesn’t support Hezbollah or Hamas.

Given the unexpected success in toppling Assad so quickly, the opposition will likely accept these terms in exchange for help and recognition.

3) Formation of a recent government. Everyone is wondering what kind of political order the opposition forces will establish now. HTS and lots of groups in its coalition are Sunni Muslims, including HTS origin linked to Al-Qaeda. However, HTS broke away from the terrorist organization in 2016 and focused exclusively on Syria as an opposition movement.

Nevertheless, we should always not expect democratic secular rule. The recent government is also unlikely to resemble the ultraconservative theocratic rule of the Taliban.

In his last interview for CNNal-Jolani made two key points. He indicated that his and other group leaders’ views evolved with age, suggesting that the intense views of their youth had softened over time. He also emphasized that the opposition will be tolerant towards the liberty and rights of religious and ethnic minorities.

The details of how this will manifest remain unclear. HTS is expected to form a conservative government by which Islam plays a dominant role in shaping social policy and legislating.

On the economic and foreign policy fronts, the country’s recent leaders are more likely to be pragmatic and open to alliances with the regional and global powers that have supported them.

4) Rebuilding the country and maintaining unity. This is needed to stop another civil war from breaking out – this time among the many victors.

Recent statement by the HTS Department of Political Affairs said the brand new Syria would give attention to construction, progress and reconciliation. The recent government goals to create positive conditions for displaced Syrians to return to their country, establish constructive relations with neighboring countries and prioritize economic reconstruction.

Syria and the broader Middle East have entered a recent phase of their modern history. Time will tell how all the things will develop, but one thing is certain: it will never be the identical.

This article was originally published on : theconversation.com
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International

Syrians are torn between fear and hope as the front line moves rapidly

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The rapid capture by Syrian rebels of huge swaths of northern Syria, including the war-torn country’s second largest city, Aleppo, and the strategically essential city of Hama further south, is a blow to the regime of Bashar al. -Assad.

The rebels are here now pushing further south towards my hometown of Homs. When these cities fell to Assad – Aleppo fell in 2017 – it was seen as an indication of the end of Syria popular rebellion against the regimewhich began with such optimism when the Syrians poured out onto the streets across the country in 2011 to call for freedom, justice and dignity.

After a long time of oppression by the Assad family, hopes were high for a unique future. However, hope quickly turned to despair. Peaceful demonstrations were suppressed by Assad’s government, sparking a brutal armed conflict that left many dead half one million people and displaced over 12 million more.

Over the years, the war in Syria has largely disappeared from the headlines. But with the explosion of violence in the country last week, that modified.



After capturing the city of Hama, the group at the center of the rebel advance, Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), begins a campaign on Homs.
Institute of War Studies

For many Syrians, each in exile and at home, the rebel advance has rekindled hopes from 13 years ago. Many prisoners are like that already released from Syrian prisons and there may be cautious optimism that displaced people and refugees will finally have the ability to return home.

At the same time, nevertheless, many Syrians fear latest wars to return, latest cycles of violence in cities and towns across the country, and latest sources of suffering, displacement and human rights violations.

Assad has vowed to “crush” rebel forces, and his key allies Russia and Iran have offered their “unconditional support.” Since November 27, when the rebel offensive began, almost 300,000 people were relocated and a whole bunch died. Fighter jets intensively bombed rebel-held areas, hitting residential buildings and even A hospital in Idlib in northern Syria.

In a speech delivered on December 4 to the UN Security Council in New York, Raed Al Salih, director of the Syrian White Helmets Civil Defense, also he talked about his own serious concern about the “real threat of chemical attacks”. Civilians, especially those in rebel-held areas, are once more trapped in the heart of battlefields.

But Syrians are not only fearful about further waves of violence. Since 2011, life itself has change into a struggle for access to basic necessities. And now the situation is becoming more and harder.

Prices of basic goods in Aleppo, as well as in other cities, have increased significantly since the rebel takeover, with reports from residents that the price of some goods has doubled. In a rustic where roughly 90% of the population already lives living in povertygreater instability will only make life harder for individuals who are already struggling to survive.

A street vendor sits in front of a damaged building in Aleppo.
A street vendor sits in front of a damaged constructing in Aleppo after opposition forces took over the city.
Bilal Al Hammoud/EPA

Fear of an uncertain future

There are also concerns that if rebel groups take control of further parts of the country, there can be further restrictions on freedom. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Islamist militant group at the center of the offensive, was originally formed from al-Qaeda affiliates. However, in recent times the group has modified its name.

Its leader, Ahmed Hussein al-Shara, known by his pseudonym Abu Mohammad al-Jawlani, identifies himself as champion of pluralism and tolerance. HTS is currently calling for the creation of a “Syria for all Syrians”, with the aim of gaining broad public support from people representing different religions and sects.

In an exclusive interview with CNN on December 6 this 12 months. Jawlani was asked whether Christians and other religious and ethnic minorities will live safely under HTS rule. In response, he stated, “no one has the right to erase another group. Each sect has coexisted for hundreds of years and no one has the right to eliminate them.”

Regardless, many Syrians living abroad have expressed concerns about the future following the rebel advance. In interview released on December 4, Mehdi Hasan, a British-American journalist, discussed how HTS takes its cue from the Taliban in Afghanistan.

“Many supporters of the Assad regime say that if this group is allowed to take over Syria, it will be like the Taliban. You will oppress women, you will have persecution of Christians, you will have Shiites, and the targets will be minority groups,” Hasan noted. “Is this true right now? Is that so?” – he asked. Hassan I. HassanSyrian-American journalist, replied: “It’s true. And that’s the biggest fear.”

These concerns are rooted in human rights violations committed by HTS in the areas it controls. In 2023 Amnesty International warned that HTS subjected journalists, activists and anyone who criticized its rule in Idlib province to “arbitrary detention without access to a lawyer or family members.”

A 12 months earlier, the Syrian Network for Human Rights based in Great Britain published the report attributing the deaths of not less than 505 civilians between 2012 and 2021 to HTS, including 71 children and 77 women. In an interview with CNN Jawlani admitted that “there have been some violations” against minorities by “some people during periods of chaos.” “But we have addressed these issues,” he added.

AND video on x (formerly Twitter) shows a Muslim woman asking a person in Aleppo if he’s a Christian and what his situation is after the rebels took over the city. The offensive appears to be accompanied by a coordinated PR campaign aimed toward reassuring folks that life will proceed as normal after HTS takes control.

This is in contrast to areas controlled by other radical groups such as Islamic State, where people have been killed due to their beliefs or religion.

Syria is once more at a crossroads. And nobody knows what might occur next. Turkman Rimsenior research fellow at the London School of Economics, believes that “a reasoned political solution that truly engages all actors on the ground” is the only thing that can ensure peace in Syria.

After 13 years of exile, displacement and mass murder, we Syrians need this peace. But for now we want a miracle. The voices of wisdom, unity and peace must prevail to forestall Syria from falling into one other period of mourning.

This article was originally published on : theconversation.com
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