At the top of February 2025, senior leader Hamas and former division of his political office, Mous Abu Marzouk, said he would do it He didn’t support Hamas on October 7, 2023, attack On Israel, if he knew how destructive Israel’s response can be.

This extremely honest party now takes on re -significance, just a couple of weeks later, after the resumption of the brutal Bomb campaign of Israel. The raids from March 18 have He was already demanding lots of of Palestinian life And officially accomplished an uncertain weapon suspension agreement.

As Palestinian policy expertI imagine that a return to an energetic war in the Gaza Strip says – on the Palestinian side of the equation – to the continuing gross force Hamas’s military position imbalance VIS-A-Vis Israel and the dearth of strategic prediction of the group in not predicting the apparent readiness of Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu to return to the fight.

Asymmetrical “Peace”

It is not any secret that Netanyahu and his coalition partners showed little interest in the total implementation of the weapon suspension agreement, which was partly broker by the Messenger of Donald Trump in the Middle East, Steve Witkoff I Signed on January 19.

The contract was divided into two primary phases and then the reconstruction phase after the conflict.

Hamas in the primary round Released Israeli hostages in exchange for Release of Palestinian prisoners owned by Israel and Resumption of help to Gaza. Then the second round of negotiations was to see the discharge of all other Israel hostages in Hamas The total withdrawal of Israel’s forces from Gaza – and end to war.

But from the very starting there have been common fears that Netanyahu wouldn’t give you the option to supply the second phase of the weapon suspension agreement – and speculation he had No personal or political intentions doing it.

The Trump administration mainly took the identical position. Statements of the US President expressing the will Take over the gauze – with an accompanying implication Palestinians living there’ll have to go away – emphasized the dearth of involvement in the second phase of the arms suspension.

Hamas was aware of these reality. But the ruling fighter apparently thought that he had just a little different option than to implement the conditions for suspension of the weapon, while holding the one source of the lever he had – the opposite Israeli hostages, he believed consists of about 59 people Perhaps lower than half of them are still alive. Indeed, this lever was related to seeing the second stage of the weapon suspension.

Of course, the part of Hamas’s interest in the arms suspension consisted in the indisputable fact that she offered the group a probability to remain in power, while providing Hamas to praise that he secured Release of hundreds of Palestinian prisons.

No strategic prediction

But despite the plain defects of Hamas throughout the suspension of weapons, it will be significant to give attention to how the group significantly underestimated several external aspects.

First of all, Hamas’ leaders looked as if it would imagine for a lot of reasons that that they had more time to barter than they did. This belief consisted partly in the understanding that Israeli public opinion polls indicate that Most of the general public are conducive to the top of the war In exchange for releasing all Israeli hostages in one package.

In addition, Adam Boehler, Trump’s envoyhad has recently opened a direct communication channel Between the USA and Hamas – something that has not happened in many years – in reference to the edition Dual USA-Israel Citizen Edan Alexander.

And on the times once they resumed the fights, Hamas and Israel officials met with us, runny nose and Egyptian, where they talked about the proposal delay the primary phase Through the top of Ramadan, while negotiations lasted on the last stage.

They were clearly aware that the suspension of the weapon was in the borrowed time. USA. Witkoff envoy in blaming Hamas For alleged fading on the extension proposal – something that Hamas denies – clearly noticed March 14: “Hamas is a really bad bet that point is on the side.

It also seemed that Hamas calculated the political situation in Israel. Seemingly read an excessive amount of in fractures inside Israeli security establishment, including Netanyahu intention The head of the Israeli Security Agency, Ronen Bar – seeing in these events, signifies that Gaza was immune to any immediate resumption to fight amongst the inner Israeli divisions.

But removed from signaling short -term weakness, Netanyahu safety shocks simply removed separate voices.

Finally, Hamas let his limited success go to his head. Emerged from the initial suspension of weapons They present a bunch as triumphant As a struggle force that was still not defeated and could force Israel to the negotiating table. This was fully displayed through the multimedia machine inside six weeks of Israeli hostages transplants in which Hamas’ Repeated propaganda displays During the hostages of hostages, he indignant Israeli public opinion, in addition to Israeli political and security officials.

Growing gap

It is difficult to predict the situation in which matters are going. For now, Netanyahu seems too completely satisfied to return to the war on a full -scale war, which maintains completely satisfied members of the coalition, makes the brand new elections less likely and provides him with safety against the approaching penalty charges with which he would have to face once outside the office.

However, for all suffering for peculiar Palestinians that guarantee war, Hamas appears to be more drifting than ever. There is a transparent stretch marks between political leaders – based in Qatar and Turkey – who’re more interested in diplomacy and the pinnacle of the military wing in Gaza, Mohammed Sinwarwhose brother Yahya – the brain of attacks on October 7 – was killed by Israel Last autumn.

But in addition to the will for revenge on Israel and remaining the primary intermediary of power in Gaza, Hamas consistently tried to precise the achievable long -term strategy of alleviating the suffering of Palestinians in Gaza. The resumption of war won’t change it.

How did they get entangled in Zea and Saudi Arabia in Sudan?

National aspects in Sudan were the fundamental triggers of the outbreak of the civil war. Calming the Sudan conflict instead war may not appreciate or overlook essential internal variables.

But it is usually essential to emphasise indirect commitment other states. In the corner of the Africa region, Sudan has been cooperating the most in the Middle East in the last twenty years. Among these states there are two monarchies of the Persian Gulf – Saudi Arabia and Zea.

Political relations between Saudi Arabia and Sudan reach the independence of the Sudan state in 1956. And the links to people have flourished for hundreds of years. This is especially because Sudan is geographically near Saudi and two Muslim saints of Mecca (Mecca) and Medina.

The Zea case is different. Since the starting of the recent millennium, the Emirates have expanded their economic and financial impact in Africa, investing in area of interest sectors resembling Port logistics. In particular, Sudan got here to the fore at the end of 2010, when regional balances modified before and after Arab uprisings.

In the years 2014–2015, Saudi Arabia and Zea influence Sudan’s policy President Omar al-Bashir. Both monarchies desired to counteract Iran’s ability to projection of power in the Red Sea and Yemen. In 2015, after breaking relations with Iran in Sudan He brought 10,000 soldiers for military operation under the leadership of Saudi Arabia in Yemen in order to fight Houthi rebels. Both the Sudanese army and paramilitary forces participated, and private connections were falsified.

In the era of post-bashir that began 2019The influence of Saudi Arabia and Zea consistently grew due to these direct links.

In general, each monarchies are on the lookout for status. In the changing international context, Sudan is the basis for their ability to influence and shape future political settlements.

Seeing the transition after 2019 as a possibility to influence the regional position of Sudan, two monarchies decided to support various factions in the Sudan security apparatus. This external support has tightened internal competition.

Riyadh, in combination with Egypt, maintained close connections with the army leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. Abu Dhabi leveled with the head of fast support forces, Mohamed Dagalo or Heedti.

Since 2019, the relationship between ZAA and Saudi Arabia has modified. After greater than a decade of strategic convergence, especially in regional issues, two monarchies of the Persian Gulf began to develop in matters resembling their view of political Islam. This discrepancy was visible in various crisis scenarios, including in Sudan.

Although each countries jointly served The initial Sudan transition after the overthrow of Bashir, the deterioration of the relationship between Heedti and Al-Burhan created the conditions for showdown between the two monarchy.

However, the conflict in Sudan didn’t explode as a result of a stretch marks between ZAA and Saudi Arabia. But the local actors of Sudan felt in a position to go to war because they were aware of external support. After the outbreak of the conflict, each monarchies were reluctant to withdraw local support in order that they might not seem weak in the eyes of the regional counterpart.

Why is Sudan essential for these countries?

My Last examination With a political scientist Abigail Kabandula shows that ZAA and Saudi Arabia regularly increase their presence in Sudan 2011 Arabian uprisings. The fall of some regimes, including Egypt, made two monarchies of the Persian Gulf fear that instability can open them.

Our evaluation indicates two fundamental reasons for the impact of two countries in Sudan:

. US TRUS to Asia – Moving resources from the Middle East to Pacific – and Arab Spring protests increased uncertainty amongst the Persian Gulf countries. This led to the equalization of the regional dynamics of power and the formation of competing blocks. As a result, Zea and Saudi Arabia searched for closer ties with African countries. In Sudan, the union developed through each military and political involvement.

Our evaluation It shows a rise in the interest of each countries in Sudan in 2012–2020. However, our research also emphasized some key differences in their growing impact.

In the early years, after the Arabian uprisings, Zea’s influence increased rapidly, driven by fears about the spread of protests. This was particularly essential The proximity of Sudan to Egypt.

Saudi Arabia maintained a more stable level of influence in 2010–2020. It was despite Riyadh, it was initially afraid of the spread of protests.

Both countries of the Persian Gulf caught the growing bonds of Al-Bashira with Turkey and Qatar, which, as they were afraid, will strengthen the proisslamist block in the region. But later Bashir’s overthrow in 2019Their approaches began to spread.

Two monarchies of the Persian Gulf perceive Sudan as a key country as a result of its geographical location.

Sudan is situated between the two fundamental regions – Sahel and the Red Sea – characterised by instability and conflict. These regions are facing related challenges: political instability, poverty, food uncertainty and internal and external wars. They also develop into in the resettlement of the population, supranational crime and threat to jihadist groups.

In addition, Sudan is a crucial relationship between the Mediterranean Sea and Sub -Saharan Africa. The country is an intersection that affects the current and future geostrategic dynamics in the region.

The monarchies of the Persian Gulf, including Qatar, also invested quite a bit – between USD 1.5 billion and USD 2 billion -in the Sudan in the agri-food sector, which is essential for their food safety. Sudan, with him abundant water resourcesIt offers a considerable amount of fertile land, which makes it attractive for the Persian Gulf corporations.

What can we expect next?

Like other current global crises – resembling those in Ukraine, the Middle East and the Democratic Republic of Congo – the conflict in Sudan seems difficult to resolve through negotiations. The two fundamental aspects contribute to this difficulty.

First of all, each side perceive the victory of 1 side as completely depending on the defeat of the other. Such logic leaves no room for an answer helpful for winnings. Secondly, the current international context supports the continuation of hostilities. The global balance of the power of power provides each fighting pages of external support. This complicates efforts to search out a peaceful solution.

There are actually two centers of power and management in the country. It is probably going that this division will develop into more clear.

How does Egypt dependent on the USA?

With time, Egypt received more American foreign help than any country except Israel. Received USD 78 billion for economic assistance and USD 90 billion From 1946.

AND peace agreement In 1979, he ended the war between two countries with Israel. Israeli forces withdrew from the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula. Since then, the US has provided Egypt with a everlasting amount USD 1.5 billion, of which USD 1.3 billion is military assistanceEvery 12 months. Goes to financing the purchase by Egyptian weapons systems from American defense contractors.

Help in the US has been the cornerstone of Egyptian and USA for a long time.

Since 1979, Egypt has been a central pillar of American policy in the Middle East. Military assistance is taken into account essential for the regime in Egypt to adapt to the US interests. At the same time, this assistance is widely perceived as contributing to survival Egyptian authoritarian regime.

But history shows that Egypt can alleviate the potential impact of assist in the US in periods of stressed relationships.

USA He suspended some military help to Egypt after Change in the regime in 2013. At that point, El-Sisi who was Selected president in 2014He received support from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. He too Increased weapons import from France and Russia.

After the period of review, the Barack Obama administration published Egypt to preserve the interests of the USA. As US Secretary of State John Kerry once explained:

We receive a refund from this investment, which shouldn’t be irrelevant. The army also helps us to implement safety in Sinai (in Egypt). The army also helps us to implement a room in gas.

If this relationship becomes burdened again, Egypt may learn much more independent. The influence of China in Egypt is developmentAnd the Persia of the Persian Gulf, which enjoy close relations with Sisi, can even resolve to finance.

How did Egypt balance his interests with Arab countries, Israel and the USA?

Signature Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1979 A change in Egyptian foreign policy was marked. The treaty adapted Egypt with the West in the recognition of Israel. This decision, nonetheless, led to the isolation of Egypt in the Arab world and its exclusion from Arab league (This was again adopted in 1989).

When Mohamed Hosni Mubarak It was assumed that power The murder of Anwar El-Sadata in 1981Egypt needed to balance the US partnership, keep peace with Israel and reconcile his relations with the Arab countries.

Egypt condemned Israel’s aggression against Palestinians and against Lebanon in 1982 and 2006 and freeze efforts to normalize relations with Israel. This strengthened its key position in Arab circles without exposing the room with Israel.

Meanwhile, Egypt has helped American military assets in moving through the region, and the oil sailed through the SUEZ channel. He maintained peace and stability with Israel by pressure Palestinian resistance movements in de -escation. This balance act allowed Egypt to change into a mediator between Palestine and Israel.

Egypt under Sisi tried to keep up the balance act. However, the ongoing war in Gaza was intensified by Egypt challenges. These include flights for refugees and instability on its border. The war also threatened the long role of Egypt in the Middle East region.

How did the war in Gaza threatened the act of balance of Egypt?

The starting of the war in Gaza in October 2023 was on the fringe of Egypt. Kair is afraid of the potential strategy of Israel consisting in the forced location of Palestinians on the Sinai Peninsula, which is positioned on its territory. Egyptian officials recognized this scenario as Red line. Kair doesn’t need to be seen as undermining the Palestinian case.

In addition, the Egyptians are afraid that the presence of a significant Palestinian population in Sinai – which connects Africa with Asia, and borders with Israel and Gaza – can transform the region into a region into a region into a region Launchpad for attacks About Israel. This would force Egypt to suppress such activities or retaliation from Israel.

This fear results from Incident from 1955. The Israeli army attacked the Egyptian military camp in the Gaza Strip, which was then subject to Egyptian control. Seventeen soldiers were killed after the Palestinian Izrael fighter killed. The Palestinian transfer plan to Sinai caused protests in the Gaza Strip, bringing the Egyptian army in a direct confrontation with Palestinians.

This historical event still shapes Egyptian foreign policy, which rejects all the transfer of Palestinians to Sinai.

The current war emphasized structural weaknesses in A certain Egyptian economy. Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, which began in 2024 sharp drop In revenues from the Suez Canal, a critical source of foreign income for Egypt.

Sisi played in European fears that what happened in Gaza could harm Egypt’s economic situation and result in it Mass migration to Europe. But money infusions won’t solve deeply rooted economic challenges that the country faces.

The role of Cairo as a mediator between the West, Israel and the Arab world faces the renovated challenges. Other mediators Rhinitisappeared.

What can affect Egypt’s response to Trump’s proposal to the transfer of Palestinians?

Trump application He places the Egyptian regime in an uncertain position. If Egypt agrees to the Palestinian transfer plan, it will mean a dramatic departure from basic foreign policy. It can even destroy the dissatisfaction between his population.

Rejection of proposals would charge Egypt’s relations, potentially undermining support for the SISI regime, which can then be trying to find help from other countries.

The conflict in Gaza emphasizes the historical and political entanglement of Egypt in the Palestinian issue.