Paintings emerging from Syria in the course of the last week showed joy on the streets, because thousands and thousands rejoice the tip of 24 years of repression under the Al-Assad tower.

Rebels rarely tilt the scales in their favor and win the war directly after such a protracted and prolonged impasse. But the plain next query is: what is going to occur next? Looking at a handful of similar examples, history suggests that latest forms of violence can still threaten Syria’s political future.

In Libya, umbrella coalition Rebel forces Known because the National Transition Council, he defeated the Miammar Gaddafi government in 2011. Meanwhile in South Sudan, Victory against Omar al-Bashir He got here in the shape of a successful referendum on independence in the identical yr.

Looking further, in Uganda, Idi Amin, the alliance was broken by the neighboring Tanzania between the 2 competing rebellions in 1979. Joint military campaign Soon after, it ended in Amin’s failure.

The direct consequences of the rebel victory in each of these cases indicate one joint lesson. Where the crushed coalition of armed groups is in a political vacuum, more violence – no less – it might be on the horizon.

Fragile and changing coalitions

Regressing regimes often motivate riot. They may also provide a typical enemy, which, especially when sensing a window of possibilities, allows competing armed groups to postpone differences and cooperation for a typical cause.

Then the transition periods cause uncertainty in regards to the political future. This may make it difficult for former allies united.

Many Libyan militias allied for the National Transition Council in the course of the Uprising against Muammar Gaddafi. But soon He became violent rivals In the competition for political influence in the transitional government they were created in Tripoli.

In the vacuum of power, these latest forms of violence can seem like local turf wars. But they are sometimes attempts to make use of the faction to make use of themselves, because political spoils could be obtained on the national level.

Meanwhile, where the dominant factions compete for national power in the presence of many smaller and more positioned militias, these weaker factions could also be willing to vary loyalty to finish on the winning side.

Fighting in Libya throughout 2017 showed this kind of opportunistic floping. Local militias reminiscent of Kiniyat Brigade They modified their loyalty between the faction of former Prime Minister Khalifa Al-Ghawil, and a competing faction based in Tripolis, who claims that he represents a legitimate government of Libya.

He has a conflict in South Sudan It has been described for a protracted time As an ethnic character. The most important competing leaders, Salva Kiir and Riek Machar, belonged to the 2 largest ethnic groups in the country, Dinka and Nuer. But these messages are a more complex and strategic constellation of alliances. Many groups that fought against Kiir were also ethnic Dinkas and vice versa, and loyalty changes over time, because each leader gains a bonus. Some of the newest violence were between the loyal forces towards Machara and the faction of co -creative shards often called Kitgwangwho opposes his leadership.

Numerous reports of international observers and mediators have confirmed The difficulty of brocie and maintaining a stable agreement on the conditions of transition in these countries attributable to liquid and changing coalitions.

Armed groups in Syria have already shown such trends. Command of military operations, a coalition of Syrian opposition groups, which brought the Assad regime, exists only on the name. The dominant group, Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), is the amalgam of a minimum of 4 separate militias, while the previous coalitions supported by Turkey and the USA with time connected and crushed.

HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa He promised it All rebels fractions “will be resolved and the warriors trained to join the ranks of the Ministry of Defense.” But history suggests that the rival will probably emerge from one of these blocks to query the HTS claim ID to conduct a passage. This will introduce a brand new element of uncertainty for smaller factions forced to decide on a page.

Looking at the longer term on the election

Even where a stable transitional coalition could be maintained, the room can ultimately threaten the outcomes of the winner-elevated elections.

Violence was avoided in Uganda after amines, so long as two faction leaders who overthrowed him took the best positions in the transitional government of the division of power. But when the election made a transparent win for Milton Obote in 1980, his rival, Yoweri Museveni, He launched his riot again. The so -called Bush war in Uganda will last until 1986, when Museveni’s forces took the capital of Kampal, by force.

The change in Ethiopia, the post -war passage did a bit after the victory Allied Rebel Assault In the case of the authoritarian DERG regime in 1991, the bulk of the Ethiopia rebel factions had clear and clear ethnic and terror bases, in consequence of which the brand new structure emerging from the incorporating national conference transferred power to ethnic regions in the federal system.

This try to create a political participation for former rebels, which aren’t completely depending on the outcomes of the national elections, could have succeeded if the primary or regional elections took place the primary. Ultimately, nonetheless, a minimum of two rebellions returned Low level violence In the Nineteen Nineties, accusing the brand new government of marginalization and attempts to undermine their competitiveness of election.

In any case, devotion seems unlikely in Syria. In addition to Kurdish separatists in the northeast, many of the country’s militias have less clear connections with specific demographic groups and sometimes overlap their areas of influence. And with HTS Now they call A unified state without federal regions, a political game on the national level will remain high and prone to violent forms of competition.

Lebanon parliament He selected a new president On January 9, after a two -year political impasse and 13 attempts. Joseph Aun reached the victory threshold in the second round of voting after his rival, a candidate supported by Hezbollah named Suleiman French, withdrew from the race.

In his inaugural speech to the Parliament, President Aoun outlined a series of obligations to cope with overlapping crises that led Lebanon to the fall point. However, the implementation of these guarantees can be extremely difficult.

The presidential victory AUN is amazing. He didn’t publicly conduct a work campaign and none of the political parties sponsored him as a favored presidential candidate. So how did Aouna appear to win the presidency?

AUN, as an alternative of a established descendant of the political class commander of the Lebanese army From 2017. Lebanon Army, Lebanese armed forces (LAF) is a rare example of an establishment that is widely seen as a uniting symbol in Lebanon.

Aun effectively stopped the army from caught up with a recent conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, despite death Over 40 LAF soldiersAnd he played a decisive role in the supervision of a 60-day weapon suspension agreement, in which in November and France in November.

The essential supporters of the Presidential offer of AUN were a loose network of regional and international players, including USA, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. All these states perceive AUN as the best hope for maintaining a fragile suspension of weapons, while supervising the restoration of the domestic government of Lebanon.

They used their lever, providing economic assistance to addiction to Lebanon at the essential political fractions selecting AUN.

The selection of AUN provides further evidence weakening Hezbollah’s strength in Lebanon. In recent years, Hezbollah has suffered several political and economic reversal.

In the universal elections in 2022, Hezbollah and his allies lost the parliamentary majority. And then, in 2024, it appears that evidently Israel weakened the hezbollah military machine, including killing his leader Hassan Nasrallah And a few seniors.

The recent overthrow of the Bashar Al-Assad regime in Syria deprived Hezbollah of a powerful ally, while the essential supporter of the group, Iran, is unable to maintain the level of financing. Iran’s ability to support Hezbollah has decreased significantly International sanctions Managed by the US to prevent the regime in Tehran, developing nuclear weapons.

Former president of Lebanon, Michel Aun (Not related to Josephem Aun) He was a longtime ally of Hezbollah. The group hoped that they’d install one other ally at the Presidential Palace, supporting the candidacy of French. But French He withdrew from the race And next to many other legislators, he announced his support for AOUN.

In his first speech as a president Aun said: “My mandate will emphasize the state of the state to monopolize weapons.” Although Aun didn’t call Hezbollah, his words were comprehensible that he would try to disarm the group. Hezbollah parliamentarians succumbed to quietly, and most deputies applauded the AUN statement.

For a good start

Aun accused his presidency of several sublime ambitions. But these ambitions will prove to be difficult to deliver. The power of the presidency has strict restrictions due to its largely symbolic status of figuration.

The president’s position is primarily to serve Lebanon power division system. This system provides representation guarantees in parliament 18 sect communities. To ensure that no group can monopolize political power, the role of the president is reserved for Maronite Christians, while the prime minister must come from the Muslim Sunnic community, and the chamber’s speaker is the Shiite.

President Aun has undertaken to reform the government of the division of power. The evidence from the survey indicates that the Lebanon government has The lowest level of trust In the Middle East. The Lebanese system of division of power is susceptible to dysfunctional political institutions, policy impasse and periodic rounds of fall. Politicians dividing power are known corruption and buying votes.

Aun has a good start. A number of days after the meeting, he convened a parliament to select new prime ministerNawaf Salam, current head of the International Court of Justice. Salam confirmation is a surprise, because, like AUN, it is not seen as a patron of any of the essential political parties in the country.

The incontrovertible fact that the usual trading of horses between the essential pages of the arrangement of the new prime minister of the minister didn’t occur, emphasizes the weakness of Hezbollah, which was unable to get the preferred candidate, Najib Mikati, back into power. In response to the Salam meeting, Accused legislators of Hezbollah Their political opponents attempted to exclude and fragment the country. Salam has a long history calling for reform state and the fight against endemic corruption.

Aun and Salam are actually facing many challenges related to the hope that many Lebanese feel their meetings. They may have to create a government to obtain urgency to create political stability and approve the budget. Lebanon is confronted with the tragic economic situation, which the World Bank he identified as Among the “heaviest crisis episodes visible around the world since the mid -nineteenth century.”

Another urgent priority is the supervision of the current extension Weapon suspension agreement with Israelwhich ends on January 25. The current agreement requires the Israeli army to withdraw from the side of the border.

With the support of the army, large parts of the Lebanese population and the powerful international players of AOUN and Salam create evaporation that give realistic hope for a period of everlasting stability and reconstruction. But finding a way to construct a consensus policy in Lebanon is not going to be easy, especially if the new president and prime minister set a course that leads them to confrontation with Hezbollah.

Similarly Iraq at the starting of 2003dominant images coming out of Syria at the end of 2024 were Joyful crowds of overthrowing the statues of thrown dictators . In just about all movies, stone or metal sculptures raises a cloud of dust when it decreases, blurring the view of the stage for a few moments.

After the fall of 61 years of the dictatorship of the Ba’ath party and 53 years of the Al-Azad dynasty in Damascus, our view on the geopolitical LansCape in Syria and the Middle East is similarly obscured. We are still in the process of a cloud raised by the fall of the regime, attempting to take a have a look at what it’s going to seem like when the dust falls.

However, there are some things that we are able to safely suppose. One of them is that Syria in 2024 may be for Turkey, which Iraq was for Iran in 2003. When the US attacked Iraq in 2003 and overthrew the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein and Iraqis Ba’ath, it also unknowingly got rid of the buffer state, so for many years he maintained the regional ambitions of Iran.

In 2003, the starting of the Tehran march towards hegemony in the Middle East, and the outbreak of Arab spring in 2011 accelerated this process. The regional power of Iran has increased in tandem with destabilization in various other countries, to the extent that it will definitely established each direct and indirect presence (through Iran financed by Iran, trained and armed combat) in Lebanon, Gaza, Syria, Yemen and Iraq .

So -called Resistance axis He was nothing greater than an alliance of factions supported by Iran in these countries. The first touch stone of this initial hegemony was the land corridor for the Mediterranean Sea: Iran-Iraq-Syria -lebanon. The second was the ability to threaten the two most strategic straits in the region: Hormuz and Bab El-Manddeb (the latter by Yemeni Houthi Rebel).

When Iran reached the height of his power

In the years 2013–2017 Iran reached the zenith of his power in the Middle East. In particular Signing of the Nuclear Agreement 2015 He granted him international strength and put an end to the sanctions that mutilated his economy.

In this expansive phase, Iran tried to push the US out of the region and force countries equivalent to Saudi Arabia and the monarchy of the Persian Gulf to take care of a low profile and behave of Tehran’s interests. He also built a network to defeat Israel in the war for abrasion.

Three leaders embodiment this successful strategy of Iranian regional domination: Qasem soleimanicreator of the resistance axis; Mohsen Fakhrizadehfather of the renovated nuclear program; AND AmmiResponsible for the development of the rocket and drone program.

However, the high pressure campaign initiated by Donald Trump during his first term at the office meant the starting of the fall of Iran. Soleimani was murdered in January 2020, and Fakhrizadadeh in November 2020. The signing of Abraham’s agreements, organized by Trump in September 2020, also accelerated the fall of the power of the Islamic Republic in the region.

The destruction of Gaza, the defeat of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and recently the fall of Al-Assad in Syria was the last nails in the casket of strategic and hegemonic aspirations of Iran.

Türkiye settles earlier results

Geopolitics stops a vacuum of power. The loss of one country is the profit of the other, and the space left by Iran is currently occupied by Turkey. This mustn’t be surprising: the history of the Middle East between the sixteenth and 18th centuries was the history of struggle between the Ottoman and Persian empires and it appears that evidently in the twenty first century.

Syria Al-Assad and the Ba’ath party acted as a buffer state in Turkey Tayyip Erdoğan, which, like Russia Putin, desires to resolve the results with the past. In the case of Putin, this is the fall of the Soviet Union 30 years ago, for Erdoğan it is the fall of the Ottoman Empire 100 years ago.

It is not that Russia or Türkiye are attempting to regain direct rule over all previous territories of their imperial past, but try to determine an area of ​​influence on these territories. It could be based on a military occupation or occasional annexation of some border regions (in the case of Turkey, North Iraq and Syria). It also means establishing friendly governments in neighboring countries and creating a network of clients with military and economic assistance.

Ankara needs to be careful in coping with triumph in Syria. Erdoğan and other members of his party will feel improved by the fall of Assad, because along with Qatar they were the only Muslim countries in the Middle East, which maintained strong opposition to the Assad regime. Even lately, when Assad looked as if it would survive the civil war, and the Idlib rebel factions seemed an increasing number of weak, Türkiye and Qatar maintained support for resistance.

It is sensible that Ankara is celebrating a quick and unexpected triumph of December. However, Erdoğan also needs to have a look at Pakistan. A number of years ago, the Pakistan state security apparatus also celebrated the sudden and unexpected Taliban triumph after twenty years on the ropes, and it was clear that without the support of Islamabad Taliban victory in Kabul wouldn’t be possible. However, since the power of power, friction has increased between Taliban and Pakistan In recent weeks.

Although it may be expected that Syrian rebels will maintain permits to Ankara, we are able to expect differences and misunderstandings in the future. To save the country from bankruptcy and misery, Damascus needs far more than simply what Türkiye or Qatar can offer.

In the pursuit of regional hegemony, Turkey will face not only Iran, but also Saudi Arabia, the third predominant player in the Middle East, who strives to shape the region in keeping with his interests. The result of various conflicts that currently kidnap the region could have a big impact on how well these three countries can learn to coexist.