Similarly Iraq at the starting of 2003dominant images coming out of Syria at the end of 2024 were Joyful crowds of overthrowing the statues of thrown dictators . In just about all movies, stone or metal sculptures raises a cloud of dust when it decreases, blurring the view of the stage for a few moments.
After the fall of 61 years of the dictatorship of the Ba’ath party and 53 years of the Al-Azad dynasty in Damascus, our view on the geopolitical LansCape in Syria and the Middle East is similarly obscured. We are still in the process of a cloud raised by the fall of the regime, attempting to take a have a look at what it’s going to seem like when the dust falls.
However, there are some things that we are able to safely suppose. One of them is that Syria in 2024 may be for Turkey, which Iraq was for Iran in 2003. When the US attacked Iraq in 2003 and overthrew the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein and Iraqis Ba’ath, it also unknowingly got rid of the buffer state, so for many years he maintained the regional ambitions of Iran.
In 2003, the starting of the Tehran march towards hegemony in the Middle East, and the outbreak of Arab spring in 2011 accelerated this process. The regional power of Iran has increased in tandem with destabilization in various other countries, to the extent that it will definitely established each direct and indirect presence (through Iran financed by Iran, trained and armed combat) in Lebanon, Gaza, Syria, Yemen and Iraq .
So -called Resistance axis He was nothing greater than an alliance of factions supported by Iran in these countries. The first touch stone of this initial hegemony was the land corridor for the Mediterranean Sea: Iran-Iraq-Syria -lebanon. The second was the ability to threaten the two most strategic straits in the region: Hormuz and Bab El-Manddeb (the latter by Yemeni Houthi Rebel).
When Iran reached the height of his power
In the years 2013–2017 Iran reached the zenith of his power in the Middle East. In particular Signing of the Nuclear Agreement 2015 He granted him international strength and put an end to the sanctions that mutilated his economy.
In this expansive phase, Iran tried to push the US out of the region and force countries equivalent to Saudi Arabia and the monarchy of the Persian Gulf to take care of a low profile and behave of Tehran’s interests. He also built a network to defeat Israel in the war for abrasion.
Three leaders embodiment this successful strategy of Iranian regional domination: Qasem soleimanicreator of the resistance axis; Mohsen Fakhrizadehfather of the renovated nuclear program; AND AmmiResponsible for the development of the rocket and drone program.
However, the high pressure campaign initiated by Donald Trump during his first term at the office meant the starting of the fall of Iran. Soleimani was murdered in January 2020, and Fakhrizadadeh in November 2020. The signing of Abraham’s agreements, organized by Trump in September 2020, also accelerated the fall of the power of the Islamic Republic in the region.
The destruction of Gaza, the defeat of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and recently the fall of Al-Assad in Syria was the last nails in the casket of strategic and hegemonic aspirations of Iran.
Türkiye settles earlier results
Geopolitics stops a vacuum of power. The loss of one country is the profit of the other, and the space left by Iran is currently occupied by Turkey. This mustn’t be surprising: the history of the Middle East between the sixteenth and 18th centuries was the history of struggle between the Ottoman and Persian empires and it appears that evidently in the twenty first century.
Syria Al-Assad and the Ba’ath party acted as a buffer state in Turkey Tayyip Erdoğan, which, like Russia Putin, desires to resolve the results with the past. In the case of Putin, this is the fall of the Soviet Union 30 years ago, for Erdoğan it is the fall of the Ottoman Empire 100 years ago.
It is not that Russia or Türkiye are attempting to regain direct rule over all previous territories of their imperial past, but try to determine an area of influence on these territories. It could be based on a military occupation or occasional annexation of some border regions (in the case of Turkey, North Iraq and Syria). It also means establishing friendly governments in neighboring countries and creating a network of clients with military and economic assistance.
Ankara needs to be careful in coping with triumph in Syria. Erdoğan and other members of his party will feel improved by the fall of Assad, because along with Qatar they were the only Muslim countries in the Middle East, which maintained strong opposition to the Assad regime. Even lately, when Assad looked as if it would survive the civil war, and the Idlib rebel factions seemed an increasing number of weak, Türkiye and Qatar maintained support for resistance.
It is sensible that Ankara is celebrating a quick and unexpected triumph of December. However, Erdoğan also needs to have a look at Pakistan. A number of years ago, the Pakistan state security apparatus also celebrated the sudden and unexpected Taliban triumph after twenty years on the ropes, and it was clear that without the support of Islamabad Taliban victory in Kabul wouldn’t be possible. However, since the power of power, friction has increased between Taliban and Pakistan In recent weeks.
Although it may be expected that Syrian rebels will maintain permits to Ankara, we are able to expect differences and misunderstandings in the future. To save the country from bankruptcy and misery, Damascus needs far more than simply what Türkiye or Qatar can offer.
In the pursuit of regional hegemony, Turkey will face not only Iran, but also Saudi Arabia, the third predominant player in the Middle East, who strives to shape the region in keeping with his interests. The result of various conflicts that currently kidnap the region could have a big impact on how well these three countries can learn to coexist.