What a difference that the dictator makes. Some world leaders pass at their oval office meetings with Donald Trump-Okinny, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, whom the US president and his entourage publicly discredited at their notorious meeting at the end of February. But not Salvador Nayib Bukele, a self-proclaimed “coolest dictator of the world”-an autocrat whose imprisonment of the country is the highest in the world-from which Trump exchanged a few friendly jokes about authoritarian leadership this week.

“They say that thousands were imprisoned. I say we’ve liberated millions,” said Bukele about his prison writing without the right trial, adding: “To free so many, you must imprison her.”

“Who gave him this line? Do you think I could use it?” He answered Trump to the general.

Bukele was obliged to Trump, imprisonment of tons of of Venezuelan and Salvadors migrants deported with the USA on charges of being members of criminal gangs – none of which had a day in court. One one who is especially interesting by journalists was Kilmar Abrego Garcia, a man from Maryland deported because of the “administrative error”. The United States Supreme Court ordered Trump’s administration to do the whole lot in his power to “facilitate” returning to his wife and family in the USA.

“Of course, I’m not going to do it,” said Bukele, asked if he would send Abry Garci back to the USA, adding that it could be “sending the terrorist back to the United States.” He smiles from US officials. This apparently makes it a matter of foreign policy, not the failure of American justice – or, most significantly, an upcoming constitutional crisis in reference to the lack of Trump’s administration compliance with the Supreme Court’s decision.

Bukele knows something about the celebration of constitutional law, writes Amalend Misra, a professor of international policy at the Lancaster University, who to be able to talk in Latin America wrote extensively about Latin America. The President of Salvadoran serves the second term, despite the structure of his country, which previously limits the president from the service of two subsequent conditions.

Critics say that Bukele used its overwhelming majority to interchange five members of the Supreme Court in Salvador to acquire the desired decision – which could also raise him in the estimation of the US president.

Misra is charged by the increase in Bukele power and its achievements, which include the transformation of Salvador from the capital of the murder of the world into one of the lowest murder rates in the Western hemisphere. But not without significant violations of human rights and civil liberties – something that, as now we have seen, bukele is just not the owner.

Meanwhile, constitutional scholars are separating the decision of the US Supreme Court in the case of Abry Garcia, who’s currently sitting at the well -known Salvador Terrorism Center (Cecot).

What exactly did the court mean when he instructed Trump’s administration to “facilitate” returning to the USA? The US prosecutor general, Pam Bondi, offered its interpretation on Wednesday-saying that the decision was completely in line with the bukele, and that if he desires to send ABRE Garci back, “we would give him a plane.”

Trump’s relations with American constitutional law are already under a number of evaluation, because he and his higher officials have began joint efforts to take a break from court rulings, that are geared toward reversing or delaying some of his policy.

“Trump’s approach seems to be testing the limits of law,” writes Stephen Clear, an authority on constitutional law at the Bangor University. Clear believes that Trump’s second term goes further, faster than his first in exerting pressure on the control system and balances, on which the US structure depends.

A transparent take a look at the Trump’s strategy consisting in the use of executive orders to determine a policy – in its first 85 days there have been 124 (executive orders don’t require confirmation of the Congress). Federal courts at the moment are examining many of these orders which were questioned as a result of unconstitutionality. The United States Supreme Court is already in the face of an unprecedented number of emergency applications and it seems when judges resolve – and, most significantly, how administration reacts to the decisions of the Supreme Court.

A federal court judge, whose decision on the deportation of 100 migrants to El Salvador was apparently disregarded by the Trump administration, published the opinion that the lack of application is a “probable cause” of maintaining administration members in criminal contempt.

The judge of the US District Court James Boasberg wrote that the judicial order “should be followed – no matter how wrong it may be – until the court reverses it.” The legal status of the American Cassandra Burke Robertson answers our questions on this matter.

Ultimately, the most reliable test of Trump and the Republican party remains to be on the voting card. Interansual selections, the first real test of the approval by Trump 2.0 USA, are in over 18 months. But how does Trump’s second administration fall with the Americans?

It depends who you ask, writes Paul Whiteley of the University of Essex. Whiteley, an authority in public opinion, was occupied with whether the recent shocks created by the Trump’s tariff plan influenced the way the US audience perceives its results.

The obligated Republicans still attribute to Trump that he knows what he’s doing, while Democrats, as you’ll be able to expect, remain principally against administration. And the same, generally speaking, for his or her appropriate views on coping with trade policy. But a great change, as Whiteley notes, is amongst people identifying as independent, wherein the assessment of Trump’s approval has dropped significantly, especially compared with tariffs.

This is critical, says Whiteley, because independent at the moment are the largest election group in the USA. He sums up: “If this change will persist and independent voters support Democrats candidates in the middle of the period in 2026, it means that Democrats will probably take control of Congress.”

A story about two peace conversations

Another promise of Trump’s campaign is increasing: his commitment to finish the war in Ukraine “within 24 hours”. The US President now insists that he could be “sarcastic” when he made this claim – but after almost three months Trump’s efforts to finish the war “they fight to leave the starting blocks,” writes Jennifer Mathers of Aberrystwh University.

Despite the undeniable fact that Zelensky unconditionally accepted the initial proposal of a 30-day suspension of the USA and support of the US to be able to establish a limited suspension of weapons-reaching for energy infrastructure and in the ocean-Russia doubled its attacks. Recent strikes in Palm Sunday, which killed no less than 35 civilians in the borders of the sums, seemed particularly unjustified, considering that each side should speak about peace.

Mathers writes that Vladimir Putin deliberately does the whole lot in his power to tug his feet because of negotiations, while maintaining Russia’s original demands on the huge swaths of Ukrainian territory, guarantees that Kiev will abandon his plan to hitch NATO and selections that can happen in Ukraine. You would should imagine that Moscow will pull out all stops to make sure that that the winner is more likely than Zelensky.

One of the foremost problems, as Mathers sees, is that various American diplomats repeat Putin’s demands, giving them an ID. It is clear that these demands don’t find the favor of Kiev, because they constitute practically full Ukrainian give up.

The second great diplomatic gambit with the participation of the White House of Trump is in Oman this weekend, when representatives of the USA and Iran meet to debate the possibility of a latest agreement on the Iran nuclear program. The initial characters aren’t good. Trump threatened the tragic consequences, unless Iran is prepared to offer up nuclear ambitions. Iran refuses to calculate this concept.

But there are signs that there could also be some progress behind the scenes. Iran leaders are under high national pressure to acquire sanctions when its economy remains to be leading. And it was reported that Trump refused to approve American-Israeli joint strikes for Iranian nuclear facilities.

Simon Mabon from Lancaster University – a safety specialist in the Middle East, and particularly the relationships between Saudi Arabia and Iran – investigates, which suggests conversations for the broader Middle East stability. He believes that the results of conversations are particularly fastidiously observed by China, which have their very own ambitions for the region.

Indian democracy

Last 12 months, the elections in India were the biggest democratic exercise that the world has ever seen, covering over 642 million people, casting their votes in seven phases on this vast country. In fact, these were the largest elections in India, exceeding the first elections in 1951–52 after the country reached independence from Great Britain.

Tripurdaman Singh, a member of the University of London’s School of Advanced Study, tracked the progress of democracy in India from what he describes as “a moment of such stunning idealism and enthusiasm, a jump of faith so bold that the famous lawyer and scholar Kenneth Instant “.

Singh looks intimately to this experiment in democracy, examining the structure of an ordered country and the way of interpretation. He discovers that this “idealism” was more aspiration than reality, and the authorities have at all times been strongly kept by the director. But, he writes, the very variety of the electorate has – no less than no less than – it successfully prevented the tyrannical impulses of India leaders. At least to date.

The 12 months 2000 was a reference point for a lot of Western countries, including Australia, of their perspective in the world.

The focus was to go away from Processing interventions it was dominated Previous decade to at least one formed by operations and counter -terrorist deployments in the Middle East.

The threat of terrorism didn’t disappear. But Australia is far more busy threats of a different character 25 years later, mainly emanating from China. These include cyberratake, economic coercion, political interference and harassment of Australian defense forces (ADF), aircraft and staff.

Although our international perspectives have modified a lot over the last quarter, the Australian alliance from the US remained everlasting.

However, when our troops approached, the US-China competition also intensified. In combination with a series of unpredictable and destabilizing decisions from the second Trump administration, this closeness caused anxiety in Australia.

Evolutionary threats and challenges

In December 2000, Howard’s government published its first White Book of Defense. This meant the starting of a major change in international perspectives and the presence of Australia.

He emphasized that “two related trends seem to shape our strategic environment – globalization and strategic primacy of the USA.” He also noted that “military operations other than conventional war (it was more and more common.”

The article was also produced in relation to China’s growth. He said:

The United States is of key importance for the security system in Asia and the Pacific (…) In Asia, it’s going to be that the United States will probably have the most difficult problems in shaping their future strategic role-especially in relations with China.

There is a small but still significant possibility of cultivation and everlasting confrontation between the essential powers in Asia and even the conflict. Australia’s interests can be deeply involved in such a conflict, especially if it concerned the United States.

However, nine months after the issue of this document, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, after which bombing in Bali in 2002, began to dramatically transform global security perspectives.

A couple of days after the attack of September 11, Howard referred to the Treaty of Anzus for the first and only once, driving “War with terrorism” by US President George W. Bush. Then Australian forces placed in Afghanistan As a part of an invasion conducted by the USA in October 2001.

Before 2003 foreign policy white book It was released, emphasized “terrorism, spreading weapons of mass destruction, regional disorders and international offenses, such as smuggling people” as the key features of the “more complex safety environment” in Australia.

A month later, Australia joined the USA “Coalition of willingness” to attack Iraq to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime and locate and destroy the weapons of mass destruction, considered there. (Later it turned out that the evidence of the existence of this weapon was incorrect).

Australia has contributed 2,000 soldiers to the mission. Our soldiers remained actively involved in training, reconstruction and rehabilitation in Iraq until July 2009.

Both of those events have been related to the USA in Australia, the USA to a greater extent than any time since the Vietnam war.

Although the Union with the US has been crucial for Australian foreign policy for many years, it became less visible in Australia’s strategic planning in the years after the end of the Cold War.

US support – and diplomatic pressure on Indonesia -He was needed in securing the presence of Australian peace forces after a referendum in Eastern Timor in 1999. However, it was “the war with terrorism” really focused the relationship as basic for Australian foreign policy.

In fact, Australia was even called the USA “”Deputy Sheriff“In Asia and Pacific-Piercenoni utilized by Bush In 2003, this caused some anxiety at home and in the region.

Since then, this picture had a significant strength to stay and it turned out that Australia is difficult to remove.

Repetition of history?

Although the accusations of war crimes compensated against the Australian special forces in Afghanistan Continue to resound, our foreign policy has returned to our region significantly.

This change was largely brought on by the perceived threat created by the growing China. While the must focus more on China has already been recognized as the White Book of Defense in 2009, this pressure has develop into the most pronounced Scott Morrison leadership.

. 2024 National Defense Strategy He presented Australia as “the most difficult strategic environment since World War II.”

He was in favor of a significant change in the strategic goals and structure of ADF, noting that the optimism of the 90s was “replaced by the uncertainty and tensions of rooted and growing strategic competition between the USA and China.”

Today, military ties between the USA and Australia are probably as close as ever.

ADF supports American platforms at the highest level, corresponding to F-35 Combat Aircraft, P-8 Patrol Patrol Aircraft, M1 Abrams Tanks and AH-64 Apache Helicopters. Defense Minister Richard Marles has gone to this point that ADF shouldn’t only interoperative from the US, but also replaceable.

If every part goes to the set, Australia will construct and operate its own fleet of submarines powered by the nucleus under the Aukus partnership in the coming many years.

At the same time, the positioning of US President Donald Trump “first” positioning in America meant that the closest allies were nervous.

His early moves paid the belief that globalization is a goal that each one the essential countries strive. In fact, some say doubles It can be adopted when the USA aggressively introduces tariffs against their allies, perform economic acquisitions and withdraw from key international bodies.

These actions led to the query of whether Australia became too dependent on its essential ally and whether we can have to emphasise a more self -sufficient defense attitude. This is, nevertheless It is way easier to say than to do.

Looking back, 2000 represented the starting of significant changes in Australian foreign policy. This is now the pace of changes, we are able to see 2025 in the same light in the next quarter of a century.

Whether the Australian alliance from the US will still need to be long -term. Regardless of how bilateral relations can change, the Indo-Pacific region will proceed to be the basis of Australian foreign policy prospects, similar to at the turn of the century.

What does Indian and Pakistani press archives, government documentation and memories can tell us in regards to the Middle East of the Twenties and the thirtieth century, when the Empire of Great Britain was within the years of dusk? What he did dissolution Ottoman Empire, Movement to Egyptian independenceIs the crisis within the British mandate of Palestine related to the choice to divide India?

Like Muhammad Ali Jinnah, he moved from being a secular young man terrified Indian interference in Ottoman caliphate crisis To the moving spirit of demand on Pakistan – a latest Islamic nation that, he claimed, would have the ability to defend Muslims abroad?

These are types of questions that didn’t surprise me at night. The result of this insomnia is My latest bookEast of Empire: Egypt, India and the world between the wars.

I give attention to a quarter of a century, which immediately preceded the tip of the Empire in India-Pakistan and Palestine-Israel. Both countries were divided into ethnic lines – the primary by the British, and the second by the UN – causing catastrophic bloodshed and forced displacement of thousands and thousands.

These partitions took place only six months in 1947–1948. They remain in the middle of terrifying state violence on each continents, not to say the intergenerational trauma and the wounded historical debate.

For most of the period, my book deals with, from 1919 to the mid -Thirties, the division of territory between religious or ethnic blocks could be difficult for most individuals within the Middle East and South Asia. There were no obvious boundaries that could possibly be drawn between local communities. Especially in cities and towns, neighbors of various ethnic groups and denominations lived on the cheek.

In fact, at that time, between the First and Second World War, the Egyptians and Indians considered their movements to self -determination as joint divisions.

Artists, politicians, activists and intellectuals described a dense and flexible network of mutual connections – some spiritual or language, other cultural and geopolitical – which together created something that known as, Orient or “East”. It was said that it exceeds every kind of barriers, depending on who you asked – faith, language, ethnic origin, nation, gender and class, to begin with.

Many historians writing about this era raised this “east” to closer control – only to postpone it quickly. They claim that it is simply too vague, amorphous and internally contradictory to be very useful as an analytical category. They usually are not flawed. In the Twenties and the Forties there have been many (maybe even countless) visions of the East in circulation.

There was an east of orientalists – a stranger, exotic and “different”. There was an anti -colonial east, geography of allies within the fight against foreign dominance. Then there was a spiritual east, often contrasting with a materialist West. There was an Islamic East, a region inhabited largely (though never exclusively) by Muslims. There was also a cosmopolitan east, a wealthy gobelin of cultures related to trade and exchange of ideas. Finally, there was a strategic east, a geopolitical block or a bastion that can counteract other constellations of power.

It is vital to emphasise that none of these concepts has been mutually exclusive. Instead, supporters of the eastern part often combined several “types of eastern ideas in a personal hybrid.

So, in his memory, Sultan Mahomed Shah, Aga Khan III, restored his long -term dream in regards to the Eastern Bloc of Muslim nations, serving each as a moral compass for the world and healthy control of the facility of Europe and the United States.

For the Egyptian feminist Huda ShaaraviThe east was undeniably anti -colonial. On the pages of his magazine L’EgePtienne was often ancient and exotic – but in addition, most significantly, the stage at which women from many cultural, ethnic and religious circles together create a future in their very own image.

Considering the stunning range of potential EASTS, they might never call the dorms a coherent ideology. But this didn’t prevent that that is a highly visible feature of each political debate and activities in Egypt, India and a wider Arab-Asian region throughout the interwar period.

Starting from the Twenties and deep within the Thirties, various eastern visions flowed and even with one another because the headlines modified, alliances have evolved and priorities moved. However, in the beginning of the war in Europe in 1939, the rates of these ideological differences began to grow.

Subscribed by the inexorable pressure of war, many Eastern threads began to spray, paying more smooth and open possibilities that enlivened the previous many years.

Post -war ideologies with sharper edges, hardened national borders and – after years of cataclysmic violence – a small faith in pacifist and humanistic ideals of the past era appeared of their Stead. This almost chemical transformation is a background on which the voices confirmed the partitions of India and Palestine in 1947.

Here, due to this fact, the story told within the east Empire: just like the visions of the transnational, liquid and unconform Eastern, shaped the interwar policy of India and Egypt, and why these visions gave option to a more rigid place, warming nationalism at the tip of World War II.

The book returns to a similar chapter within the creation of anti -colonism and the tip of the British Empire within the Middle East and South Asia. And explains the conditions during which these daring and optimistic visions have collapsed – releasing the stream of violence, which we’ve got not yet lost, almost 80 years later.