Why is the ceasefire agreement happening now?

The timing of the ceasefire is the results of a convergence of interests between the Israeli government, Hezbollah itself, and its most important sponsor, Iran – but all for different reasons.

For the Israeli government, domestic issues are at stake. First, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are exhausted after greater than a 12 months of war. This is especially true for Israeli reservistsan increasing variety of whom don’t report for duty. Israeli public opinion can be bored with ia conflicts most favor a ceasefire with Hezbollah.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also has to take care of internal problems in his government. He is face the pressure from ultra-Orthodox partners of the ruling coalition to develop laws exempting ultra-Orthodox Jews from military conscription.

Reducing the necessity for lively personnel by calming down the front with Lebanon will help. The secular and national-religious segments of society who actually serve within the IDF and who’re concerned about the potential for introducing a formal law exempting ultra-Orthodox men from military conscription could also be more willing to swallow this pill if the war with Hezbollah ends.

From the Israeli military’s perspective, the war in Lebanon is approaching the purpose of diminishing returns. It has managed to weaken Hezbollah’s military position but he was unable to completely destroy this group of militants.

This also influences Hezbollah’s pondering. The group was severely weakened in Lebanon; the war weakened its military potential. In contrast to his previous position – repeated again and again over the past 12 months by the late leader Hassan Nasrallah – that a ceasefire can be possible if an agreement is reached between Hamas and Israel in Gaza first, Hezbollah and, by extension, Iran, are now willing to separate the 2 fronts. This puts Hamas in a much weaker position, as it is currently without the support of Iran’s most important proxy group – the “axis of resistance”. Drawing Hezbollah and other allied groups within the region into direct confrontation with Israel was Hamas’ hope when it launched its attack on Israel on October 7, 2023.

Hezbollah and other political factions in Lebanon also face intense domestic pressure. Lebanon has over a million refugees as a results of the conflict – the overwhelming majority are Shiites, the branch of Islam from which Hezbollah comes. The conditions in Lebanon have increased the chance sectarian fights between Shiites and other factions within the country. The time could appear right for Hezbollah’s leaders to chop their losses and prepare to regroup as a political and military body.

Iran can be attempting to rehabilitate Hezbollah’s position in Lebanon as quickly as possible. The deal comes as Tehran is preparing for the American administration it could take a more hawkish stance toward Iran and its proxies within the region, of which Hezbollah is a very powerful. With a latest Iranian president and a latest U.S. administration, a ceasefire between Iran’s chief proxy and Israel might be step one toward Tehran constructing a constructive dialogue with the Trump White House.

What is the US role within the ceasefire?

What’s interesting to me is that despite the very clear position of the US regarding favoring Israel over the past 12 months conflict, continues to operate as an efficient mediator. It was because of the USA that a ceasefire was achieved – despite the indisputable fact that Washington is much from neutral on this conflict, being Israel’s most important ally and its most important supplier of weapons.

But the Lebanese government and Hezbollah also see a role for the United States. And this shouldn’t be latest. United States was a mediator within the landmark 2022 agreement which marked the maritime boundaries between Israel and Lebanon for the primary time.

The ceasefire agreement advantages each the outgoing and incoming U.S. administrations. For President Joe Biden, it would mean a diplomatic success after a 12 months during which the US didn’t mediate any breakthrough actions within the conflict in Gaza, and for Biden it is a likelihood to finish his presidency on a positive note in foreign policy. From Trump’s perspective, a ceasefire in Lebanon will likely be one less problem for him.

What might be the results for Lebanon and Israel?

Lebanon has essentially the most at stake on this ceasefire. The the country was already in a dangerous economic situation before the war, and months of fighting only worsened the country’s structural, economic and political crisis. This is as scary as it gets.

Moreover, the war has reignited sectarian tensions in Lebanon – discuss returning to the civil war within the country shouldn’t be far-fetched.

However, it is uncertain how the ceasefire will affect the varied rival factions in Lebanese society. Hezbollah has been weakened and may now look for a method to strengthen its power in Lebanese politics. The most important query is how other factions and parties will react to this.

With Hezbollah weak, other factions may challenge the militant organization in ways they have not before. Before the decimation by Israel, there have been no rival groups that would challenge Hezbollah in Lebanon. But all that has modified: Hezbollah’s military power has degraded and Nasrallah, the group’s leader, was killed. And Nasrallah was not only the face and brains of Hezbollah, he was also the group’s most significant link with Iran.

Some experts in Lebanon express fears that the gap left by a weakened Hezbollah could mean a power struggle and further conflicts within the country. And I imagine that we must always have no illusions that Hezbollah will attempt to strengthen its position as a national power.

The matter is complicated by the indisputable fact that any change within the balance of political forces in Lebanon takes place in an environment of political vacuum. There has been an interim government for two years – without a president because Hezbollah made this nomination conditional a latest president, whose candidate will likely be an ally of the group. Now Lebanese politicians would have to agree on a latest president, who would in turn appoint a latest prime minister and a latest government. Time will tell how this may develop within the case of a weakened Hezbollah.

For Israel, the ceasefire will likely be a chance to rebuild parts of the country’s north were destroyed by Hezbollah rockets and possible return 60,000 Israelis fled northern areas near the border with Lebanon. It can even enable the Israel Defense Forces to regroup, refresh and concentrate resources in Gaza quite than fighting on two fronts.

Can a ceasefire result in a lasting peace agreement?

I don’t see any lasting peace agreement on the horizon, on condition that the basic political goals of Israel, Hezbollah and Iran have not modified and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to escalate.

However, I hope that the ceasefire will result in peace and stability between Israel and Lebanon for the foreseeable future. The details of the ceasefire agreement will not be much different from UN Resolution 1701 that ended the last major war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006. That agreement brought relative peace to the region for 18 years, whilst Hezbollah, backed by Iran, used those years to accumulate its military capabilities and prepare for a potential ground invasion of northern Israel .

In my opinion, there’s the potential for greater stability this time, on condition that the ceasefire agreement also states that if and when it becomes everlasting, it will function basis for negotiations regarding the demarcation of the Israel-Lebanon territorial border. This wouldn’t be a simple task, especially in the world of ​​Shebaa Farms and Ghajar Village. However, with good will and good intentions, even difficult border disputes might be resolved.

Advertisement A ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hezbollah this is excellent news for a region torn apart by over a yr of war. Once implemented, the ceasefire will hopefully provide some respite for each Lebanese and Israeli civilians.

Agreement got here into force on Wednesday at 4:00 a.m. local time. However, the previous 24-48 hours had been dramatic increase in violence on either side. This is a part of a long-established pattern of warfare by which the intensity of fighting increases just before a ceasefire comes into force.

My tests showed that while a ceasefire may be the least worst option we are able to pursue to reduce violence in war, it is actually not a panacea.

In particular, I examine the timing and dynamics of ceasefires to higher understand a few of their less obvious consequences. Here are 4 questions and concerns I actually have about the current ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah.

1. What will occur after 60 days?

The ceasefire agreement reportedly does 13 points whose aim is to stop hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah for 60 days.

This would theoretically allow over a million people displaced from southern Lebanon and over 60,000 people displaced from northern Israel to return to their homes.

The return of Israelis to their homes in the north is considered one of the goals of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu clear war purposes. Thousands of northern Israelis have been housed in hotels across the country for over a yr at great cost to the government, so there is also a large economic incentive to enter into this deal.

However, given the relatively short time-frame and the fragile nature of the ceasefire, it stays to be seen whether civilians on either side will take the opportunity to return home.

In addition, there is destruction in southern Lebanon extensivemaking it difficult for people to return inside the relatively short duration of the truce.

Although US President Joe Biden and his French counterpart Emmanuel Macron have said a ceasefire would ensure base for “lasting peace,” the terms of the ceasefire provide no details on what is going to occur after the 60-day period.

2. The conflict may spread to Syria

Many of the terms refer to limiting Hezbollah’s ability to rearm during the ceasefire. This includes dismantling all illegal infrastructure and weapons production facilities in southern Lebanon.

Hezbollah’s principal patron, Iran, supplies weapons to Hezbollah through Syria. The terms of the ceasefire raise the possibility that Israel will conduct more airstrikes in Syria to ensure weapons from Iran do not reach Hezbollah.

While not expressly permitted under the ceasefire or international law, the agreement provides Israel with some justification for taking such motion. It may argue that it is enforcing the terms of the ceasefire by stopping Hezbollah from rearming with arms supplies from Iran.

After Israel announced the ceasefire targeted for the first time, places on Lebanon’s northern border with Syria, probably to limit Iran’s influence.

3. No details regarding troop withdrawal

In many respects, the ceasefire is based on UN Security Council Resolution 1701that ended the war between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006.

It is ironic that the terms of the ceasefire recognize the importance of this resolution when Israel largely did not ignored several other UN resolutions calling for a ceasefire in Gaza.

And probably Resolution 1701 was never complete implemented by Israel or Hezbollah.

Another condition of the agreement is that Israel will progressively withdraw its troops from southern Lebanon over 60 days.

At that point, the Lebanese army and state security forces will turn out to be “the only entities authorized to bear arms or deploy troops” in the area south of the Litani River. Al Jazeera has reported that Israel insists that Hezbollah disband and leave southern Lebanon before any Israeli soldiers withdraw.

Given that the ceasefire does not include any details regarding logistics, it stays to be seen whether and the way the IDF will withdraw its troops. In addition, it is generally the Lebanese army and security forces seen as vastly underfunded and unable and/or unwilling to challenge Hezbollah’s primacy in Lebanon.

Next, one other one deadline The ceasefire agreement states that the United States will support indirect negotiations between Israel and Lebanon to achieve an internationally recognized delimitation of their border.

The explicit mention of negotiations at the border suggests that it might change as a results of the ceasefire. This may mean that, as a result, Israel will try to retain and maintain the latest territory.

4. What about Gaza?

Netanyahu does he said the ceasefire will enable Israel to focus its efforts on Hamas fighters in Gaza and its principal security threat, Iran.

Other officials called the ceasefire a “gamechanger” that might show Hamas that the conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon have been resolved.

Hezbollah has had this before he insisted did not agree to a ceasefire until the war in Gaza ended. The latest agreement assumes that this condition has been dropped.

Some people do suggested a ceasefire with Hezbollah could put additional pressure on Hamas to agree to an agreement with Israel to release the remaining Israeli hostages it holds.

However, this ignores the undeniable fact that Hamas was like this willing to reach a ceasefire agreement in the past, while the Israeli government did so difficult negotiations by adding latest terms at the last minute.

Moreover, Qatar has turn out to be so frustrated by the “reluctance to engage” and “lack of good faith” on either side that it recently he withdrew as a mediator between the parties.

The ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah should not distract attention from the fighting in Gaza or the horrific and tragic humanitarian situation there.

Time will tell how the war in Gaza will unfold. Will Israel undertake a more formal occupation of parts of the enclave, as some have suggested? Or will a ceasefire with Hezbollah serve to isolate Hamas to the point where it feels it has even less to lose than it – and the Palestinians – have already got?

Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025, combined with the presence of the Republican-led US Senate, was was widely feared amongst international allies and shall be cheered by some of America’s enemies. While the former placed on a brave face, the latter can barely hide their joy.

ON war in UkraineTrump will likely attempt to force Kiev and Moscow to at the least conform to a ceasefire on their current front lines. This could possibly include a everlasting agreement recognizing Russia’s territorial gains, including the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and occupied territories since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

It can also be likely that Trump will accept Russian President Vladimir Putin’s demands stopping Ukraine’s future membership in NATO. Given Trump’s well-known distaste for NATO, it might also put significant pressure on Kiev’s European allies. Trump could once more threaten to desert the alliance to influence Europeans to sign an agreement with Putin on Ukraine.

When it involves Middle EastTrump has been a staunch supporter of Israel and Saudi Arabia in the past. He will likely double down on this, including taking an excellent tougher stance on Iran. This is in step with the current priorities of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Netanyahu appears determined to destroy Iran’s proxies, Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen and seriously degrade Iran’s capabilities. By rejection his Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, by criticizing his conduct of the offensive in Gaza, Netanyahu laid the foundations for the continuation of the conflict in that country.

It can also be preparing for an expanded offensive in Lebanon and a potentially devastating attack on Iran in response to further actions Iranian attack on Israel.

Trump’s election will embolden Netanyahu to act. And this, in turn, would also strengthen Trump’s position towards Putin, who relies on Iran’s support in his war in Ukraine. Trump could offer to limit Netanyahu in the future as a bargaining chip against Putin in his game to secure an agreement on Ukraine.

Move to China

Although Ukraine and the Middle East are two areas where changes are looming, relations with China will almost certainly be characterised by continuity relatively than change. With relations with China perhaps the key strategic challenge in U.S. foreign policy, the Biden administration has continued many of the policies adopted by Trump during his first term, and Trump will likely double down on them in his second term.

The Trump White House is more likely to raise import tariffs, and it has done so he talked loads about using them to attack China. But Trump is equally more likely to be open to pragmatic transaction deals with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

As in relations with European allies in NATO, a serious query mark hangs over Trump’s involvement in the so-called defense of Taiwan and other treaty allies in Asia, including the Philippines, South Korea and potentially Japan. Trump is at best indifferent to American security guarantees.

But as his on-and-off relationship with North Korea during his first term showed, Trump is typically willing to accomplish that push the envelope dangerously near war. This happened in 2017 in response to North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missile test.

The unpredictability of the Pyongyang regime makes one other such close encounter just as likely as Trump’s unpredictability makes it conceivable that he would accept a nuclear-armed North Korea as part of a broader agreement with Russia, which has forged increasingly closer relations with Kim Jong-un’s regime.

This would give Trump additional influence over China, which was the case anxious on account of growing relations between Russia and North Korea.

Preparations for the Trump White House

Friends and foes alike plan to make use of the remaining months before Trump returns to the White House to try to enhance their standing and tackle issues that will be harder once he takes office.

Anticipating Trump’s push to finish wars in Ukraine and the Middle East will likely result in intensified fighting there to create a establishment that various sides say shall be more acceptable to them. This doesn’t bode well for the humanitarian crises which are already mounting in each regions.

An increase in tension on and around the Korean Peninsula cannot even be ruled out. Pyongyang will likely want this increase its credibility with much more missile – and potentially nuclear – tests.

Intensifying fighting in Europe and the Middle East and tensions in Asia are also more likely to strain relations between the United States and its allies in all three regions. There is fear in Europe that Trump may strike deals with Russia over the heads of its EU and NATO allies and threaten to desert them.

This would undermine the durability of any Ukrainian (or, more broadly, European) agreement with Moscow. Relative dismal condition European defense capabilities and the declining credibility of the US nuclear umbrella wouldn’t only help encourage Putin to further his imperial ambitions after securing an agreement with Trump.

In the Middle East, Netanyahu can be completely unrestrained. And yet, while some Arab regimes may cheer on Israel striking Iran and Iranian proxies, they’ll accomplish that worry about the response on the difficult situation of the Palestinians. Without solving this age-old problem, stability in the region, let alone peace, shall be almost unimaginable.

In Asia, the challenges are different. In this case, the problem is less about US withdrawal and more about unpredictable and potentially unmanageable escalation. Under Trump’s rule, it’s rather more likely that the US and China will find it difficult to flee the so-called Thucydides trap – the inevitability of war between a dominant but declining power and its emerging rival.

This raises the query of whether U.S. alliances in the region are secure in the long run, or whether some of its partners, reminiscent of Indonesia and India, will consider realigning with China.

All of this means, at best, more uncertainty and instability – not only after Trump’s inauguration, but additionally in the months leading as much as that date.

At worst, this may prove to be the undoing of Trump’s self-proclaimed infallibility. But before he and his team realized that geopolitics was more complicated than real estate, they might have began the same chaos they accused Biden and Harris of.