The long-awaited independent inquiry into Australia’s response to Covid-19 has been published Todaycontaining lessons on how the nation can higher prepare for future pandemics.
The 868-page report presents nine guiding recommendations and 26 actions, including 19 to be implemented over the next 12-18 months. They form the basis for future pandemic preparedness.
The investigation found that Australia, initially strong in national solidarity, took swift motion to shut its national borders. This bought crucial time, but Australia was ill-prepared for a crisis on the scale of the Covid-19 pandemic.
Australia’s response lacked strong central coordination and leadership. Communication about public health advice to the most vulnerable groups was often contradictory or inappropriate. Public trust has been further eroded by a lack of transparency in decision-making, equivalent to disease modeling, that has underpinned vital public health responses.
IN viewfinderan investigation found that a full-fledged Australian Center for Disease Control (CDC) could have made a huge difference. In response, the federal government committed today 251 million Australian dollars to determine such a center in Canberra.
What did the investigation reveal?
1. Early rapid response and consensus helped keep us secure. As an inland country, Australia was in a position to close its borders in preparation for the eventual, inevitable spread of SARS CoV-2 throughout its population. However, she was not prepared for pandemic-related quarantines.
2. Initially, communication was clear and consistent. It didn’t take long. Massive uncertainty, rapidly changing circumstances, differing expert opinions and the politicization of responses have challenged communication strategies. Communication with different ethnic groups and vulnerable population groups was often suboptimal. Going forward, misinformation and misinformation must be addressed through improved health literacy and proactive communication.
3. We lacked health care infrastructure that would not address emergency loads, as the investigation found, although health care employees “came together” in a remarkable way. Aged care homes were particularly vulnerable and had poor infection control practices. More broadly, there have been supply chain issues and insufficient supplies of essential infection prevention and control equipment, equivalent to masks and gloves. Australia was unable to provide them and was left at the mercy of overseas suppliers.
4. Analysis of the virus’s genetic material and extensive testing have been crucial to tracking the evolution and spread of the virus. Pathogen genomics for instance in New South Wales and Victoria, enabled accurate tracking virus variants and native transmission. However, data sharing between jurisdictions was poor and there was limited national coordination to optimize data interpretation and response.
5. There was a lack of transparent, evidence-based decision-making. The disease models on which key decisions were based were opaque and never subject to scrutiny or peer review.
6. Vulnerable groups in society, including children, have suffered disproportionately. School closures because of Covid-19 have been particularly damaging as they’ve disproportionately impacted learning, socializing and development affected children from lower socio-economic classes. Strict social isolation also increases the risk of domestic violence, in addition to anxiety and other mental health effects. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people were at greater risk because of inequalities in service delivery and social determinants of health.
7. Research is vital and must be scalable quickly. Good surveillance systems for emerging infectious diseases and future pandemic threats must be put in place. Patient samples must be stored in order that we are able to quickly investigate disease mechanisms and develop obligatory diagnostic tests. The inquiry recognized that Australia must develop its own vaccines, and access to mRNA technology was identified as a very important health security measure given the challenges in accessing vaccines.
8. Global solidarity and cooperation create a safer word for all.
Clear inequalities in access to Covid vaccines, opened major fault lines in diplomacy and proceed to complicate the development of a global pandemic treaty.
9. Emerging diseases that give attention to a single health must be considered a ‘persistent threat’. In our modern, interconnected world with high concentrations of human and animal populations coupled with stressed ecosystems, recent diseases with pandemic potential will proceed to emerge at an unprecedented rate. This requires overall focus.
How could the CDC make a difference?
One of the key findings of the inquiry is that the lack of strong, independent and central coordination hampered our response to the pandemic.
The most important shortcoming limiting the ability to focus on the response was the inadequate flow of data between jurisdictions. This is needed to grasp:
- transmission dynamics
- defenselessness in individuals with severe illness
- circulating virus variants.
The investigation also highlighted the need to research data in near real time.
Good, data-driven and transparent, evidence-based policy. This is a key area for the future Australian CDC to handle. The CDC will function as a “data hub” and Canberra will offer an excellent location to support a multi-jurisdictional “hub and spoke” model.
The recent Australian CDC is expected to be launched approx January 2026pending approval of regulations. The ongoing challenge might be to make sure optimal long-term health advantages for all Australians.