For a long time, Iran and Israel have been involved in “shadow war”
This conflict, not equal to direct military confrontation, was characterised by a war waged by other means – through proxies, computer attacks, economic sanctions and fiery rhetoric.
However, the events of recent weeks within the Middle East have modified the character of this conflict. First, Israel is widely believed to have broken diplomatic norms by bombing the Iranian mission in Syria. An operation through which 12 people died, including: seven officials from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force – raised the stakes.
She also crossed a brand new threshold. Never before have so many Quds Force or other Iranian military officials been killed in a single attack by Iran’s adversaries. Almost immediately rhetoric of leaders in Tehran indicated that Iran would respond quickly and radically.
Then on April 13, 2024, Iran responded by crossing the border has not been exceeded to date: launch a a direct attack on Israeli soil.
Iran’s attack on Israel was also qualitatively and quantitatively different than anything Tehran had directly attempted before. Israel Defense Forces spokesman Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari said they consisted of at the very least 170 drones, 30 cruise missiles and 120 surface-to-surface missiles. The attack began from positions in Iran, Iraq, Syria and Yemen.
Physically, the dam caused little damage. Hagari said it 99% of the missiles sent by Iran were intercepted by air and missile defenses and that just one person was injured. For now, Tehran appears to be satisfied with its own response; Iranian mission to the UN posted a message on social media after the attack, which meant the tip of the operation.
But as national security and Middle East expertI consider that the Iranian attack was not intended to cause physical harm to Israel. Rather, it was about Iran attempting to restore deterrence against Israel after the Damascus incident and show its strength to a domestic audience. By doing so, Tehran’s leaders are also sending a signal that if Israel takes more aggressive motion against Iran’s interests, it would be willing to escalate.
Friends, then long-time enemies
Iran and Israel have been adversaries virtually because the Iranian Revolution in 1979, when the Shah of Iran fled the country to get replaced by a theocracy. New leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini severed the previous regime’s ties with Israel and quickly adopted a strident anti-Israel agenda, each in words and policy.
Over the a long time, Israel and Iran have harmed one another’s interests in each the physical and virtual worlds. This includes major terrorist attacks against which Iran is supported Israel’s interests in Argentina in 1992 and 1994, Tehran’s support Massive Hezbollah rebellion against Israel in southern Lebanon and important operational support provided to Hamas which partially enabled the attacks of October 7, 2023.
Meanwhile, Iranian officials blame Israel for killing a senior citizen military officials and scientists related to Iran’s nuclear program in Iran or anywhere else within the region.
Israel’s failure to openly acknowledge the killings was intended to create illusion of plausible deniability and sow doubt about who was actually responsible.
In recent years, Iran has relied heavily on itsaxis of resistance” – militant groups in Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria and Gaza that share a few of Tehran’s goals, especially in opposing Israel and undermining U.S. influence within the region. In the month-long conflict sparked by the October 7 attack Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen AND Islamic Resistance network in Iraq they have repeatedly attacked the interests of Israel and the US.
“Clear message”
So what’s next? Much will rely upon the response of Israel and the US.
Officially, US President Joe Biden he stated that by keeping off Iranian missiles and drones, Israel sent “a clear signal to its enemies that they cannot effectively threaten (its) security.”
But there are reports that Biden warned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu Israel should have “won” and couldn’t count on US support in any offensive operations against Iran.
Adam Schultz/White House via AP
Numerous aspects will determine whether Iran and Israel proceed to launch more overt attacks against one another within the open, or return to a shadow war.
These include how both sides reads internal moods. Netanyahu is is already battling pressure based on his approach to the Gaza war and previous domestic concerns regarding, amongst other things, attempts to influence the Israeli Supreme Court.
Similarly in Iran, United Nations reports that two years after major social protests within the country based on socio-economic conditions, the regime in Iran continues to ruthlessly suppress dissent.
In addition to domestic considerations, each Iran and Israel may also consider the risks of a more open confrontation relative to their current operational capabilities. In this case, it seems clear that neither Iran nor Israel can decisively win a protracted military campaign against one another.
Israel’s powerful military is definitely able to conducting air and missile attacks against Iranian interests within the region, as they have already shown in Syria and Lebanon for a few years. And probably Israel he could do the identical for a short while on to Iran.
However, Israel would face significant challenges in sustaining a protracted-term combined arms campaign in Iran, including the relatively small size of the Israel Defense Forces in comparison with the Iranian army and the physical distance between the 2 countries. Israel openly conducted military exercises for years which appear to focus more on simulating air strikes and perhaps special operations raids against fewer targets in Iran, reminiscent of nuclear facilities.
Moreover, launching a brand new front by attacking Iran directly risks diverting Israeli resources from more immediate threats in Gaza, the West Bank and its northern border with Lebanon.
Of course, Israel has fought and won wars against its regional adversaries previously.
But the conflicts through which Israel fought against its Arab neighbors 1967 AND 1973 took place in a unique military era and before the event of drone warfare, cyber operations, and support for Iran-backed proxies and partners in Israel’s immediate neighborhood.
Be careful against further escalation
An identical form of campaign against Iran could be unlike anything Israel has faced. Israel would undoubtedly have difficulty achieving its goals without high support from the United States and possibly Arab countries reminiscent of Jordan and Egypt. And there is no indication that such support will probably be available.
Iran may also be wary of further escalation. Tehran demonstrated on April 13 that it did has a big – and perhaps growing – range ballistic missiles, drones and cruise missiles.
However, the accuracy and effectiveness of lots of these platforms remain questionable – as evidenced by the apparent ease with which most were shot down. Israelis and the USA air and anti-missile defense networks within the region continues to prove reliable on this respect.
Given the realities and risks, I consider it seems more likely that Iran will try and return to its unconventional war strategy of supporting its proxy axis of resistance. Overt attacks just like the one carried out on April 13 could also be reserved for signaling resolve and showing strength to domestic audiences.
The danger is that the war has moved out of the shadows and could also be difficult to get back there.