What will we know in regards to the latest strike?
We know that it was the so-called The Israeli drone that killed al-Tawil. Hezbollah has since published a photograph of him with Hassan Nasrallah, the group’s secretary general, and Qassem Soleiman, the previous head of the Quds Force – one in every of Iran’s primary military branches – who was assassinated by the United States in 2020. This suggests that al-Tawil was a chief goal for Israel because he clearly had connections with leading figures in Lebanon and Iran.
The proven fact that it was a drone attack can also be essential. This suggests that the operation was based on good Israeli intelligence about al-Tawil’s whereabouts. It wasn’t a probability meeting. It was clearly a calculated and precise attack.
After the operation, Israel stated that al-Tawil was answerable for the recent operation rocket attack on the Israeli intelligence base of Mount Meron in northern Israel. This attack was in response to the sooner assassination of a Hamas leader in Beirut.
So we see a tit-for-tat pattern.
So this does not imply escalation?
I don’t see al-Tawil’s killing as an escalation per se. Rather, it’s Israel’s targeted retaliation for Hezbollah’s earlier attack on one in every of its facilities.
There are a couple of essential things to note on this regard. It was positioned just 10 kilometers north of the Israeli-Lebanese border. This continues to be in a geographic area where both sides have exchanged fire since Hamas attacked Israel on October 7. So, for my part, this still falls inside the realm of border skirmishes and doesn’t constitute a full-blown war.
Is the escalation of the conflict in Israel’s interests?
I do not think either side is desirous about a full-blown war for quite a lot of reasons.
In Israel’s case, the pressure comes from outside the country. There is big international pressure on Israel not to launch a full-scale war against Hezbollah. Indeed, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken is currently within the region, visiting Israel with the next message: Don’t start a war with Hezbollah.
I believe the international community realizes that a full-scale war between Hezbollah and Israel will decimate Lebanon and also cause serious destruction in Israel.
What in regards to the pressure in Israel?
There is definitely a robust lobby in Israel for war against Hezbollah. There is a belief amongst Israeli military hawks that a large military strike against Hezbollah would enable people living in Israel’s north to return to houses they evacuated when it seemed that war was on the cards.
Indeed, the Israeli Ministry of Defense wanted a pre-emptive war with Hezbollah after the October 7 Hamas attack. But US President Joe Biden prevented this from happening for a similar reason that Blinken is currently trying to dissuade Israel from further escalating the conflict.
What about Hezbollah? How might he react?
Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, is between a rock and a tough place. Most Lebanese clearly don’t want war. However, any attack that kills senior Hezbollah figures can be met with internal demands for motion.
But there’s a tipping point for Hezbollah, as there’s for the Israelis – and that’s the reason this tit-for-tat scheme is such a dangerous affair.
On the Lebanese side, if Israel strikes Hezbollah’s strategic assets deep inside Lebanon – that’s, beyond the border areas – or carries out an attack that leads to mass civilian deaths, it could lead on to a full-blown conflict. But thus far that hasn’t happened. Israel’s attacks were surgical and precise. In the case of the Hamas leader killed in Beirut, it was only Palestinians.
Anwar Amro/AFP via Getty Images
It was definitely a humiliation for Hezbollah – it took place in a Hezbollah stronghold in southern Beirut. But it wasn’t about Hezbollah’s assets, similar to personnel, strategic sites or command centers. Israel limited its attacks mainly to the border area.
Public sentiment continues to be very much against the war in Lebanon. There is definitely strong sympathy for Gazans. However, the prevailing belief in Lebanon is that support cannot come on the expense of the lives of the Lebanese people.
And this corresponds to the present hierarchy of Hezbollah. They know that the specter of war is their most vital card. Once played, they’ll now not use it.
Is there a diplomatic solution?
Both sides are diplomacy. This was said by Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant his country’s preferred path is an “agreed diplomatic agreement.” Meanwhile, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that the goal is the return of Israeli residents to their homes within the north can be, if possible, “diplomatically”. But he added: “If not, we will work in a different way.”
Similarly, in Lebanon there’s talk of a diplomatic solution – especially through law enforcement United Nations Resolution 1701which calls on Hezbollah to withdraw north of the Litani River and for Israel to withdraw towards the international border.
So it just isn’t that there isn’t any credible diplomatic path. And the proven fact that both sides are using the language of diplomacy suggests there isn’t any appetite for full-scale war.
Indeed, the United States has long tried to get Israel and Lebanon to resolve their differences over their shared borders.
Both sides signed A US-brokered maritime agreement in 2022and attempts were made to reach an identical agreement on the land border. There was disagreement in 13 places along the border. However, since October 7, the United States has been trying to use the prospect of a negotiated land solution based on UN Resolution 1701 to defuse tensions between Israel and Lebanon.
The Lebanese government said it welcomed U.S. efforts to resolve the disputes. The Israeli side also agrees with US attempts to maintain UN Resolution 1701 – mainly, I consider, to keep America on side.
Does Iran play any role in influencing Hezbollah’s response?
Iran has enormous influence over Hezbollah – it pays for military operations and equipment.
But Hezbollah just isn’t just an Iranian proxy; he has internal considerations, and his interests lie on the side of the Lebanese political scene. For this reason, Hezbollah is sensitive to public pressure in Lebanon against the war.
I also don’t think Iran wants the conflict to escalate. Like Hezbollah, Iranian leaders know that the specter of war – through their proxies within the region – is their most useful asset. And I do not think Iran is prepared to benefit from it.
Iran might also fear that if fighting escalates, it is going to be drawn into war. Since the October 7 attacks, Iran has thus far played smart by staying out of the battlefield, supporting sporadic attacks on Israel by Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen, and pro-Iran militias in Iraq and Syria.
However, a full-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah could draw Iran into direct confrontation with Israel and the US. And the leaders in Tehran will almost certainly not want this, especially after the terrorist attack in Iran on January 3, which revealed how defenseless Iran is internally.