What the fall of Assad says about Putin’s ambitions regarding the status of the great power of Russia

The rapid collapse of the Assad regime in Syria caused shock waves in the Middle East. The removal of the dictator, whose family ruled the country with an iron fist for over half a century, caused potentially a seismic shift of the balance of power in the region.

But there are also essential repercussions outside Syria and its neighborhood – with Russia one of the most important powers.

In 2015, the Assad regime was on the brink of fall. This He was saved through Russian intervention – with the support of Iran and Hezbollah. Fired in the context of The growing threat from the Islamic State Russia enabled the Assad regime to pus the other rebel forces.

Over the following years, Assad allowed Assad to consolidate control over the capital, other key cities, especially the coastal region, by which Russia had two military bases.

The future of these bases is now uncertain. The Russian Navy base in Tartus-which dates back to the Soviet times-also the air base in Khmeimi, founded southeast of Latakia in 2015, were essential benefits of Russia to display military force in the Mediterranean Sea and strengthen the Kremlin’s claim to the Russian status of great power .

Considering the importance of bases for Russia and significant investments revamped the years in supporting the regime, the fall of Assad It reflects badly About Russia’s ability to make sure a reputable influence on the global scene.

Even if Russia someway manages to barter a contract with recent rulers of Syria about the future of its military bases, the undeniable fact that Moscow was unable to save lots of a vital ally, resembling Assad, reveals critical weaknesses in Russia’s ability to act, not only saying , like great power.

There are clear intelligence failures that omitted or incorrectly interpreted the accumulation of anti-asssad forces by runny nose and silent support of Turkey. These failures were then compounded by the reduced Russian military assets in Syria and the inability to strengthen them in a short while. This is clearly as a consequence of the ongoing Russia war against Ukraine.

The impoverishment of the military abilities of two other allies in the region – Iran and Hezbollah – moreover intensified the difficulties for Assad and exacerbated the effect of excessive pulling of Russia. This also raises the query of whether Russia strategically evaluated the situation and underestimated its sensitivity in Syria.

But much more so, he emphasizes Russia’s own dependence on allies, who simply don’t agree with Moscow’s demands – as Assad did when he provided Russia with its military bases – but who actively support the great power, which has no means to acknowledge them Status – like Iran and Hezbollah did it in 2015.

Where are China?

China is missing on this equation. While Beijing on the Assad side after the start of the civil war in Syria, the support was mainly rhetorical. This was mainly stopping the intervention supported by the western part of the one in Libya, which led to the fall of Gaddafi and since then immersed the country in chaos.

Loud Assad visit to China in September 2023 Partnership strategic agreement. This appeared to signal the next step towards the rehabilitation of the Syrian regime, at the least in the eyes of Beijing. But when Push got here to a pushing and Assad’s rule was under a serious threat, China did nothing to save lots of him.

This raises a vital query About the Chinese judgment of the Syrian regime i The evolving crisis. But here can be a wider point on the Russian ambition of great power.

Despite the whole conversation about the unlimited partnership between Moscow and Beijing, China eventually did nothing to save lots of Russia from the embarrassing defeat in Syria. Where Russia needed a military presence to strengthen its claims to the status of great power, Chinese interests in the Middle East are First of all, about economic possibilities and perceived threat Islamic fundamentalist terrorism.

This clearly limited Beijing’s appetite to get more involved, let alone save Assad.

Putin has decreased

Russia’s position in the Middle East is now at risk. Moscow lost a key ally at Assad. Other foremost allies, Iran and Hezbollah are significantly weakened. Israel and Türkiye, with which the Kremlin has not had easy relations in the previous few years, have been strengthened.

This exposes the Holowness of Russian claims for great power status. It will probably reduce the Russian prestige and the position it has in the eyes of other partners – regardless of whether or not they are China or North Korea, members of BRICS, or countries on the global south, which Russia recently tried to get.

The consequences of this for Ukraine-probably the foremost source of excessive stretching of Russia-will probably be ambivalent. On the one hand, the ease with which Assad has been covered shows that Russia isn’t invincible and that its support for brutal dictatorships has limits. On the other hand, there ought to be no waiting for anything but doubles in Ukraine.

Putin needs success that restores his national and international trust – and quickly. After all, Donald Trump doesn’t like losers.