An Israeli attack on Rafah could make victory over Hamas more elusive

The prospect of a ceasefire agreement by Hamas taken over proposed earlier this month, was a source of optimism for Gazans in search of respite from the war. This sense of joy was short-lived. According to mediators in Qatar, the talks were successful lost steam.

And with Israel continuing its recent military offensive within the southern border city of Rafah and in parts of northern Gaza where Hamas has regrouped, there is no such thing as a indication that this conflict has an end date.

The Israeli offensive in Rafah, where over one million displaced Palestinians are in search of refuge, is becoming increasingly intense. Israeli tanks have this advanced further towards the eastern a part of the town, reaching some residential areas. An estimated 500,000 civilians have now fled the fighting area and the death toll in Palestine has reached an all-time high 35,000 – based on Gaza health authorities, this number includes each civilians and fighters.

On May 14, as Israel celebrated its independence day, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed the country and said: warned that the war won’t end “until the Hamas monsters are eradicated.” His comments are met with frustration by even Israel’s staunchest allies. The US warned, for instance, that a brand new offensive could bring them down suspend the transfer weapons parts to Israel.

Increased diplomatic pressure, mounting military losses and the persistent Israeli hostage problem in Gaza won’t be enough to stop Netanyahu from ordering a brand new offensive. However, there’s so much to lose by continuing this strategy.

This not only risks perpetuating the conflict, but may make an Israeli victory over Hamas more elusive. External pressure from the US and EU will proceed and will limit the extent to which Israel can pursue its military objectives.

This leads us to query the psychological conditions governing Netanyahu’s war policy. We argue that Israel is stuck in a “dilemma of loss.” This concept describes a process by which actions taken to beat state anxiety by avoiding one form of loss (military failure to eradicate Hamas) create a brand new fear of suffering of one other type (lack of domestic political position).

The effect of this likely influenced Netanyahu’s war cabinet to proceed its current policy and maybe explains the disregard for civilian casualties and Israel’s declining repute internationally.

Internal pressures

The trauma of the potential lack of Israelis still held captive by Hamas is a reason to make a decision on a ceasefire, especially because the Israeli public puts pressure on Netanyahu to bring them home. Israel says 128 hostages haven’t been present in Gaza, at the very least 34 of whom are presumed dead. However, the inner politics of the Israeli war coalition made this not possible.

Netanyahu positioned himself as a frontrunner who would “give Israel security and revenge.” His grand claim of military victory in Gaza puts his political position at immediate risk of being weakened. Any sense of diversion from his commitment to securing Israel’s borders will make it difficult for him to stay in power.

This dilemma is further deepened by the pressure exerted on him by the ultranationalist contingent of his political coalition, on which he currently bases his political power. During the war, the tough stance of National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir gained support from a few of the appropriate wing of Netanyahu’s Likud party.

At a recent Ben-Gvir rally he argued that Israel must “encourage Gazans to leave voluntarily” in order that Israelis can settle on the “holy land” in Gaza.

One of the fundamental dynamics at work on this case is the query of who can feel at home within the “homeland”. Gazans, staying at home within the Gaza Strip, are perceived by Israel as posing a significant security threat. This logic suggests that Palestinians living in Gaza will all the time produce Hamas fighters and subsequently every Gazan poses a possible threat to Israel’s very existence.

It is obvious that that is about losses, especially historical ones loss Israeli settlements in Gaza in 2005. However, as tensions proceed to rise in Israel over its conduct of the war, it becomes increasingly difficult for Israel to take care of a unified image of who can feel at home there. As plurality becomes politically poisonous, more primitive identities grow to be the premise of who can legally call Israel and the land it occupies home.

This dilemma of loss, which underscores the present internal dynamics of Israeli politics, influenced Netanyahu to commit his army not only to rid Gaza of Hamas militants but additionally to pursue a policy of expanding Israel’s borders.

Time will tell whether Netanyahu will ultimately comply with such calls from ultranationalist members of his coalition. But one thing is for certain: the present strategy won’t lead to an entire Israeli victory and can as a substitute be sure that the conflict will proceed for a few years.

The Palestinians will strongly support maintaining control over the Gaza Strip and can need to avoid a takeover of their homeland by Israeli settlers.