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China’s balance regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine has been clarified

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What is behind China’s position on Russia and the war in Ukraine?

The President of China, Xi Jinping, he said on March 8 that he “felt pain”.” to see how “the flames of war were rekindled in Europe.” However, China is reserved in criticizing Russia.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 28, 2022 described China as one of Russia’s key remaining friendsand Moscow will hope that Beijing will proceed to supply rhetorical and substantive assistance.

Beijing shall be sensitive to Western attempts increase tension in the relationshipand Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently described associations with Moscow as “rock solid”. He added that China and Russia “will always maintain strategic focus and steadily advance our comprehensive strategic coordination partnership for a new era.”

China has fastidiously ensured that its own media stays pro-Russian and even reposted fake ones Russian state media reports.

However, the invasion of Ukraine is problematic for Beijing. It is unclear what economic aid China might provide to Russia. And the Chinese government is not going to put the country’s own financial interests in danger threatened in any significant solution to help Russia avoid sanctions.

Meanwhile, China can also be in search of to take care of its popularity as a responsible stakeholder and protect its economic, trade and political ties with Europe. Xi is at the heart of this met along with his German and French counterparts on March 8, 2022 to debate a diplomatic solution to the war in Ukraine.

Beijing’s balancing act – visible in its decision to abstain from voting from the UN Security Council’s vote condemning the invasion – will change into increasingly difficult as the fighting drags on, especially as the Russian army resorts to much more brutal methods and the Russian economy continues to deteriorate.

What was Beijing’s response to the sanctions imposed on Russia?

Beijing has was critical of Western sanctions against Russia, and definitely doesn’t want an entire collapse of the Russian economy. Such an consequence could contribute to instability in a neighboring country that Beijing considers a vital strategic partner.

However, to this point China has been in no hurry to supply economic support to the Russian Federation. China may be very at risk of secondary sanctions – penalties imposed on institutions linked to the country as part of primary sanctions – and it’s price noting that some Chinese financial institutions have begun they distance themselves from the Russian economy.

Meanwhile, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a development bank established by China and through which it holds 27% of the votes, stopped operations in Belarus and Russia in protest against the invasion of Ukraine.

Time will tell whether China will use creative, less visible methods to assist the Russian economy in a way that will not expose its larger institutions to the risk of being accused of violating sanctions.

Beijing can also be more likely to draw conclusions about its potential vulnerability to sanctions should China, like Russia, ever provoke large-scale economic penalties from the West.

What role does anti-Western sentiment play in China-Russia relations?

Russia and China survived a long time of rivalry and hostility throughout much of the Cold War. But rapprochement, which has been a long time in the making, has gained momentum in recent times, partly based on opposition to the West.

The governments of each countries have similarly negative views about America’s role in Europe and Asia. They also share A aversion to Western democracy and the desire to influence global public opinion more favorable towards autocracy.

But Washington just isn’t the only factor that unites them. In the first decade of the twenty first century, Russia and China finally completely resolved the long-standing territorial dispute over their common border. Both countries are also trading partners: Russia sells weapons, gas and oil to China, and China supplies investment and consumer goods.

Close ties have been reflected at the highest level, with Putin and Xi developing a private relationship that they’re desperate to showcase to the world. In July 2021, Wang, Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, described the relations between Moscow and Beijing like every part except alliance, but in addition higher than alliance. And then, in February, Xi and Putin signed a joint declaration presenting common positions on a number of issues.

How significant was this statement, made just before the invasion?

The moment of the joint declaration fell on the eve of the Beijing Olympics, and Putin’s presence at the event contrasted sharply with the absence of Western leaders, many of whom announced a diplomatic boycott.

The document was signed at the height of pre-war tensions around Ukraine and contained statements criticizing the American system of alliances each in Europe and Asia. This specially outlined the two countries’ shared opposition to any “further expansion of NATO”.

There was also some suggestion in Western media that the Chinese were warned against getting into a pact on a Russian invasion of Ukraine. Details of Putin and Xi’s conversation about Ukraine in Beijing usually are not fully known, but the joint statement actually gave Western observers reason to consider that China’s behavior could have helped enable Russian aggression.

Can China play a task in ending the war?

China got here up with an idea play some mediating role, but what exactly this might mean stays unclear. Beijing is widely perceived in the West as too pro-Russian and has no experience in playing such a task in Europe.

There is actually hope that China will put pressure on Russia to finish the conflict. This was announced in March by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Dmytro Kuleba received assurances that “China is interested in stopping this war,” adding: “Chinese diplomacy has enough tools to make a difference and we count on it already being involved.”

Western policymakers have signaled to China that Beijing will bear costs whether it is seen as an enabler of Russia’s continued aggression. And Putin could also be sensitive to any change in Xi’s position. However, China lacks the will and talent to force Russia to back down completely. Both sides have reason to attempt to resolve any tensions that will currently exist.

(Subscribe to The Conversation’s politics newsletter.)

 

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International

Grattan on Friday: Oil prices could be where Middle East crisis collides with Australia’s cost of living crisis

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Angry, accusatory exchanges over the war within the Middle East have dominated federal politics this week. But for many abnormal voters the difficulty stays “out there.”

Leaving aside the minorities directly affected – Jews frightened by anti-Semitism, the Muslim community, those with families in Lebanon and elsewhere – it’s a tragedy with no tangible connection to their each day lives.

But on Thursday, Treasurer Jim Chalmers warned that the foreign crisis could directly translate right into a domestic cost of living crisis through the worth of oil.

At midweek, the worth of oil was 11% lower than a 12 months ago but 7% higher than per week and a half ago, Chalmers said at a news conference.

The Treasury estimates that if prices were 10% higher for the entire 12 months, it would cut back Australia’s GDP by 0.1% and increase the Consumer Price Index by 0.4 percentage points.

Nothing is for certain in the approaching months, however the potential implications are clear. Consumers would feel the results of higher oil prices at gas stations.

ACCC chair Gina Cass-Gottlieb and treasurer Jim Chalmers at a press conference on Thursday.
Mick Tsikas/AAP

The Reserve Bank will even watch the possible trajectory of oil prices along with all other indicators relevant to its rate of interest decisions. This comes against the backdrop of the federal government being desperate for an rate of interest cut (or two) before the elections.

While the rise in fuel prices (hitting businesses and families) wouldn’t be the federal government’s fault, it could be blamed.

According to the Labor Party, there may be currently a disconnect between, on the one hand, the partisan political heat generated by the war within the Middle East and, on the opposite hand, the shortage of public engagement on the difficulty.

Voters aren’t focused on the Middle East

Labor sources say focus groups conducted this week with swing voters showed that the majority people aren’t closely following events within the Middle East.

In addition, they’re generally satisfied with the federal government’s position and don’t feel that the crisis is distracting them from the cost of living (which is separate from how they think the federal government is dealing with the cost of living).

This is consistent with this week’s results Necessary surveywherein 56% said they were satisfied with the federal government’s response to the war between Israel and Gaza. Another 30% thought the federal government was too supportive of Israel; 14% thought he was too harsh towards Israel.

With the exception of some directly invested people, the Middle East crisis is unlikely to vary votes.

In the interior political struggle, Dutton tries to use the conflict to portray the Albanians as weak. This is a giant nod to the difficulty itself, although the prime minister and his government are generally seen as having lost their way.

While Dutton tries to define Albanian negatively, Albanese tries to make Dutton an even bigger goal.

NBN sale is a distraction

And so on Wednesday, the Prime Minister, shortly before hopping on a plane to attend the ASEAN-Australia summit in Laos, spoke personally in regards to the regulations put in place to make sure the NBN stays in public hands.

If the Coalition fails to vote for the bill, it means it is going to sell the NBN, Labor has argued. It was a crude attempt at intimidation that was easy to identify. The Coalition is just not suggesting it might sell the NBN, and if it did, would most individuals care? Either way, Labor originally planned to denationalise the NBN. Dutton ridiculed this tactic.

Looking ahead to the election 12 months, the 2025 parliamentary calendar was released this week. It has a two-week meeting in February and pencils within the March 25 budget, which might trigger a May poll. This, of course, doesn’t rule out earlier (March) elections, although Albanese has often said that he’s planning a pre-election budget.

Either way, we’re already in the center of an election campaign. In Tuesday’s club, Albanese spoke for the second time recently in regards to the agenda for the second term.

Announcements like confetti

Announcements fall like confetti, especially those regarding the cost of living. Supermarkets are under intense attack. Introducing his merger reform laws on Thursday, Chalmers said any supermarket merger would be scrutinized, regardless of whether it fell under the brand new arrangements.

Current polls show that the more than likely election result for embittered voters will be a hung parliament with a minority Labor government.

Albanese told the club he was focused on winning a majority government. Dutton knows that if the Coalition cannot win, the more crossbenchers it could actually force Labor to rely on, the more unstable a second-term Labor government will be.

Both sides have so much to do before the actual campaign.

Key points of the Labor Party’s legislative program weren’t only not introduced, but went unnoticed – for instance, regarding gambling promoting, restrictions on young people on social media and election financing.

The most significant bills are stuck in parliament – especially on housing, where the Greens may eventually reach an agreement, but are prolonging all difficulties.

On the opposite hand, the Coalition adopted a minimal policy. He provided minimal details in his controversial nuclear energy plan, notably refusing to stipulate costs. You cannot keep the whole lot until the last minute.

Will the campaign even matter?

When the formal campaign comes, what difference will it make?

There is an old saying: “You can’t fatten a pig on market day.” In other words, the election result may be decided long before the actual campaign.

What do the last three elections (2016, 2019, 2022) tell us in regards to the importance of a proper campaign? In each case the result was small and limited to a number of seats.

In 2022, there was probably nothing Morrison could have done in recent weeks to save lots of the day – to make use of one other farm metaphor, his goose was cooked. Either way, he ran a nasty campaign.

In 2016, Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull had just returned home; Turnbull’s flawed campaign maximized the number of seats lost.

In 2019, when Bill Shorten seemed almost certain to steer Labor to victory, its defeat could have been sealed within the campaign itself, although the heavy political burden was at all times going to place Labor in a precarious position.

In 2022, Albanese was deemed a poor campaigner. Aware of this, Labor strategists will do the whole lot they will to ensure that he’s fully prepared for “I have no idea” questions (to which he hesitated last time) and other threats which will spontaneously arise.

Dutton’s area of expertise is negativity, his natural style is attack. But more will be needed in these final weeks.

One of the challenges of delaying the publication of policies is that loopholes can slip through the cracks, making mistakes more likely.

Dutton remains to be a great distance from establishing himself as a flexible alternative prime minister. Indeed, his current approach to the Middle East, completely lacking in nuance, raises questions on how he would deal with the complexities of foreign policy overall. This didn’t make me optimistic.

This article was originally published on : theconversation.com
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What does Israel and its neighbors want now that total war is approaching in the Middle East – podcast

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The Middle East is dangerously near total war. In the yr since Hamas’ October 7 attacks on Israel, thousands and thousands of individuals have been displaced from their homes in Gaza, Israel, the West Bank and now Lebanon, and tens of 1000’s have died.

After Israel killed Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of the Iran-backed Hezbollah militia, Iran fired a barrage of ballistic missiles against Israel on October 1. As the world waits to see Israel retaliate, the Israeli army continues to attack Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and Beirut.

In this episode Weekly Conversations podcast, we check with two Middle East experts, Mireille Rebeiz and Amnon Aran, to find out about the strategic calculations each Israel and its neighbors are making at this terrifying moment for the region.

Mireille Rebeiz is director of Middle Eastern studies at Dickinson College in Pennsylvania, USA, and an authority on Hezbollah. He says that since announcing its manifesto in 1985, Hezbollah has at all times positioned itself “in opposition to the existence of the state of Israel.”

She reaffirmed her commitment to the Palestinian cause. She reaffirmed her commitment to the Iranian revolution and Shiite ideology.

Rebeiz claims that Iran’s military goals are entirely consistent with those of Hezbollah and traces them to the United States’ destabilization of Iraq.

When Iraq descended into full chaos and war (it), he allowed Iran to interfere with Iraq and gave a giant voice to the conservative Shia voices.

This was followed by the 2011 Syrian Civil War, during which Hezbollah stepped in to defend Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

This is a domino effect – expansion from Iran, through Iraq, through Syria, to Lebanon. And this is clearly visible in Iran’s military goals, that are ultimately the expansion of Iranian ideology in the region. Honestly, I’d say that at this point there is an try to hide behind the Palestinian cause to realize this goal.

Israel elections

Amnon Aran is Professor of International Relations at City St George’s, University of London, UK, and an authority on Israeli foreign policy. For Israel, Aran says, the last 12 months have been described as an “existential moment” that determined the war in Gaza and now Lebanon.

When the query arose of easy methods to reply to this existential threat, it was largely based on what I actually have called elsewhere a type of entrenchment, which effectively means that Israel makes peace only in exchange for peace. Any diplomatic settlement should be depending on and subject to a good military balance of power vis-à-vis Israel and the fact that Palestinians in the West Bank, and now the Gaza Strip, will remain under Israeli occupation for the foreseeable future.

Aran says there is fierce debate in Israel about what to do now. One side follows the considering of former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, who reached X in early October say that: “Israel now has its best chance in 50 years to change the face of the Middle East.” This camp argues that given the weakening of Hezbollah, this is the moment to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities.

On the other hand, Aran says, in the military community they oppose attacking Israeli nuclear facilities and as an alternative give attention to weakening Hezbollah as much as possible. The reasoning of this camp is as follows:

After a yr of an extended and very difficult conflict, the next query is: you might be actually entering a war, probably on 5 – 6 fronts, including a really large country of 90 million people, Iran, with a really wealthy history, and you might be actually entering a very recent a phase that can be quite prolonged.

To hear the full interviews with Mireille Rebeiz and Amnon Aran, take heed to The Conversation Weekly podcast.


This article was originally published on : theconversation.com
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The long-awaited war in the Middle East has arrived. In this way, Israel can now respond to Iran

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When Iran fired greater than 180 ballistic missiles at Israel this week in retaliation for the Israeli killings of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders, some were surprised by Tehran’s decisive response.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu immediately announced his country would retaliate brutally at a moment of its selecting. When his security cabinet met for a nightly meeting, he said: “Whoever attacks us, we will attack him.”

The Biden administration stands firm convicted Iran’s aggression and repeated his own commitment to defend Israel. The White House said Iran would face “serious consequences” regardless that President Joe Biden he called for refraining from attacks regarding Iran’s nuclear facilities.

So what might Israeli retaliation appear like, and is a full-scale war between Iran and Israel, or maybe even the United States, likely at this point?

The regional war is already underway

Regional war isn’t any longer inevitable – it has already arrived. The conflict that began in Gaza almost a 12 months ago has spread across the Middle East, with Israel fighting countries and groups removed from its borders. This also has global consequences.

As this week’s Iran strike shows, the conflict has turn out to be a direct confrontation between Israel and its Western allies, on the one hand, and Iran and its proxies, backed by Russia and China, on the other.

Washington played a key role in supply Israel has military aid and diplomatic cover, while Moscow does he promised send fighter jets and air defense technology to Iran. It also buys Iranian weapons for its own war in Ukraine, supplying them to Tehran much needed money.

Moreover, Israel is currently engaged on many fronts.

First, the war continues in Gaza, where over 40,000 Palestinians have died. Hamas has been reduced to a poorly functioning guerrilla organization, but still retains some control over the displaced Palestinian population.

In West BankThe Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducts military operations counteract growth in terrorist attacks, driven by Iranian weapons and funds directed to local fighters.

Meanwhile, Iran’s other proxy groups, Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria, and Houthis rebels in Yemen proceed to launch rocket and drone attacks on Israel. Both Israel and the US have done this he hit back with the Houthis in Yemen.

However, the most significant battle is going down in Lebanon. On October 8, 2023, the day after the Hamas rampage in southern Israel that left 1,200 people dead and over 200 Israelis abducted to Gaza, Hezbollah began firing rockets and other weapons at Israel without provocation, in solidarity with Hamas. This forced greater than 60,000 Israelis near the border to flee their homes.

An Israeli armored vehicle moving near the border with Lebanon.
Atef Safadi/EPA

Two weeks ago, Israel took a decisive step. Netanyahu reportedly ordered the detonation of hundreds of booby traps pagers and walkie-talkies utilized by Hezbollah out of fear that the operation was ongoing risk of exposure.

The IDF then conducted an enormous air campaign geared toward reducing Hezbollah’s estimates arsenal rockets, rockets and drones.

Then the ground one fired invasion to Lebanon, targeting positions fortified by Radwan Hezbollah’s elite forces. The goal is to prevent Hezbollah from invading northern Israel and repeating the October 7 Hamas atrocities there.

Up to 1,000,000 Lebanese were forced to do this they run away from their homes consequently of Israeli actions.

Lebanese people are sleeping on the streets.
Displaced Lebanese sleeping on the streets of Beirut.
Abbas Salman/EPA

Israel’s Counterattack Options

And now Iran has turn out to be directly involved in the fight against its own countries launching ballistic missiles into Israel this week, allegedly targeting military bases. advanced Israeli missile defense systems, assisted by the US, Jordan and other countries, intercepted most of the missiles. Several landed in Israel with shrapnel killing one Palestinian in the West Bank.

It was Iran’s second direct attack on Israel in recent months. First resulted in limited Israel retaliation regarding the Iranian air defense system allegedly protecting the nuclear facility in Isfahan.

The full scope and consequences of Israel’s retaliation this time remain unknown at the time of writing.

One scenario that deeply worries Tehran is that Israel, in concert with the US, could goal its critical infrastructure. This may include communication and transport networks, financial institutions and the oil industry (particularly enterprise facilities). financing mechanism from the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps). This could create chaos in Iran, threatening the survival of the regime.

Although forcing regime change in Tehran could be extremely difficult, Iranian leaders will not be taking any probabilities. Apparently that is what happened willing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to a secure location to prevent any assassination attempts.

Iran’s rapidly expanding nuclear program stays the crown jewel of the Iranian regime, which the United States and its allies say serves as a front for its chasing atomic bombs.

Iranian leaders may now fear that Israel and the United States could seize the opportunity to seriously destroy their nuclear infrastructure, as some have long called for conservative voices in Both countries. But Biden does calling as an alternative for a “proportionate” response.

Destroying Iran’s air defense systems can be considered an option to signal to the regime that it can turn out to be “blindsided” in the event of any future attack on Israel. Other possibilities are also on the table.

Portrait of murdered Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Tehran.
An enormous portrait of murdered Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Tehran.
Vahid Salemi/AP

Narrow window for Israel

In an attempt to ease tensions, Iranian officials rushed decided the desire to end hostilities after a missile attack.

However, the conflict has come full circle. Hamas believed that Israel would fall after the attack on October 7, 2023. However, Israel as an alternative responded with a devastating war in the Gaza Strip, eliminating most of Hamas’ capabilities but additionally causing widespread casualties and destruction.

Similarly, Hezbollah and Iran’s decisions to strike against Israel proved to be grave miscalculations, underestimating Israel’s determination to retaliate with overwhelming consequences.

The ball is now in Israel’s court. While any retaliation must have in mind the incontrovertible fact that the IDF is already stretched across multiple fronts, Iran’s “axis of resistance” has also never seemed more vulnerable.

Israel has a narrow window to deal a serious blow to it – and Netanyahu is unlikely to miss this moment.

This article was originally published on : theconversation.com
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